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PREFACE

Concern about retirement income adequacy has caused policymakers to
search for ways to reduce pension benefit losses of job changers. This book
surveys the pension policy issues relating to job change and analyzes the
potential impact of proposed policy changes. Chapter 3 was co-authored and
chapter 5 was authored by Phyllis Fernandez. Chapters 6 and 11 were written
by Tabitha Doescher. The authors received helpful comments from Alan
Gustman, Edwin Hustead, Joanne Brodsky, and two anonymous reviewers.
Editorial assistance was provided by Elizabeth Sherman and Judith Gentry.
Material presented in this book does not represent the position of the U.S.
Department of Labor or of any other organizations with which the authors are
associated.
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I
Job Mobility
and
Pension Portability
Movement and change enliven American culture. Nowhere is that
more evident than in the labor market. But employers create a conflict
between job mobility and retirement security when they cut future pen
sion benefits for workers who quit a job before reaching retirement
age. Presumably, employers do this to discourage workers from chang
ing jobs.
Neither U.S. workers nor employers commit to a lifetime contract.
After several early-career job changes, however, workers often do stay
permanently with one employer. Once they reach age 40, one of two
male and one of four female workers remain on the same job until
retirement 20 to 25 years later (Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers 1990, p.
34). Jobs with pensions promote even more job stability, especially for
women.
Job change contributes to an efficient labor market, increasing mar
ket flexibility and aiding economic growth and competitiveness. Pen
sions, conversely, bind workers to jobs, and possibly allocate resources
inefficiently. Employers, some argue, should be encouraged to restruc
ture pension plans so that they no longer discourage workers from
changing jobs. Need for such restructuring is heightened by the aging
of the U.S. workforce, since job mobility declines as workers grow
older.
Many employers favor little job change, however, preferring a sta
ble workforce. Longevity is the benefit employers expect in exchange
for their investment in worker skills. Workers do leave jobs, however.
They quit for personal or family reasons, such as the relocation of a
spouse or the need to care for a child or an elderly parent, or they are
laid off frequently for reasons beyond their control.
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HISTORY OF U.S. PENSIONS

A brief history of pension coverage in the United States provides
background for the discussion of pension portability. Private pension
plans began during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 1 By 1930
many large employers, including AT&T, General Electric, and DuPont,
had pension plans. The number of plans stopped growing during the
Depression, but resumed growth in the 1940s. From 1940 to 1972 pen
sion coverage of full-time workers rose from 17 to 52 percent.
Pension coverage grew through 1970 due to union collective bar
gaining in retail, construction, manufacturing, transportation, and min
ing industries. In industries with many small unionized firms,
multiemployer defined benefit plans administered jointly by a union
and an employer-appointed board of trustees are the most common
plan type. Large unionized firms typically have defined benefit plans,
as well.
Since the early 1970s pension coverage has fallen slightly, and basic
coverage has shifted from defined benefit toward defined contribution
plans. Firms also increasingly have provided defined contribution
plans to supplement benefits for workers already covered by a defined
benefit plan.
Defined contribution plans covered one-third of the workers in plans
started before 1975, but they have covered four-fifths of the workers in
plans started after 1975. In 1975,78 percent of the participants in pen
sion plans were in primary defined benefit plans. By 1989 that number
had fallen to 64 percent, and a projection suggests that by 2000 the fig
ure will have fallen to 51 percent (Hay/Huggins 1990a).
Pension coverage changes since the early 1970s have been due
largely to changes in the labor force. Coverage remains high among
large firms and among unionized firms. Such firms are employing a
falling share of the labor force, however, and employment has grown
rapidly in small nonunionized firms in service industries. Pension cov
erage has always been low among workers in these firms.
The fastest growing industries from 1979 to 1988 were services and
specifically finance, insurance, and real estate. Pension coverage rates
also rose most rapidly in those groups: from 30 to 38 percent for ser
vice industry workers, and from 54 to 59 percent for finance, insur-
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ance, and real estate workers. Those industry coverage gains offset
somewhat a drop in workers employed in manufacturing, where cover
age had been high. The large shift in jobs to the service sector, how
ever, with its below-average coverage rate, depressed pension
coverage rates.

PRIVATE PENSIONS AND JOB CHANGE

When private pensions were started in the late 1800s, firms used
them to charitably retire older workers whose productivity was wan
ing. The plans also helped maintain a loyal workforce. Firms fre
quently did not provide pensions to "early leavers" workers leaving
before retirement.
Expectations have changed. Workers now commonly view pensions
as deferred pay that even short-tenure employees have a right to
accrue. These expectations, plus concern about retirement income ade
quacy, make pension benefit loss incurred by job leavers a public pol
icy issue affecting the majority of the workforce. In 1988, 68 percent
of males and 51 percent of females working full time were in a private
pension plan in either their current or a past job. Of all full-time work
ers with over 15 years on their current job, 78 percent had participated
in a pension in a current or past job. Twenty-three percent of full-time
workers age 45 to 54 had been in a pension plan on a prior job (Piacentini 1990b).
Worker myopia when changing jobs may cause low retirement
income. Due to the growth of defined contribution plans, which com
monly allow job leavers to cash out, employers frequently pay prere
tirement lump sums to departing employees. In the late 1980s, 60
percent of vested job leavers received at least partial lump sum cashouts of their pension benefits. Fifty-one percent of vested job leavers
received lump sum benefits for their entire pension (Piacentini 1990b).
Because so many job leavers cash out their pensions, some policymakers argue that federal law on pension policy should lock-in pension
benefits. When workers and employers do not react to this restriction
by reducing the generosity of plans, locking-in pension benefits raises
net savings in pensions. Higher savings via pensions not offset by a fall
in other savings raise gross individual and national savings.
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Because pensions often reward long tenure through various plan
features, and because there is little or no portability, job leavers fre
quently end up with lower benefits than job stayers, even when they do
not cash out their pensions. Consider two workers with equal incomes
through their careers. Worker A spends his/her career with one
employer, while worker B changes employers several times. Worker A
will receive a much larger pension than B, even if B's employers had
pension plans identical to those of A. The benefits differ solely due to
B having changed jobs.

PENSION REFORM FOR A MOBILE LABOR FORCE

Three labor market changes form the background against which
pension reform is considered. First, intermittent workers have diffi
culty accumulating adequate retirement income. With more women
entering the workforce, federal retirement income policy is challenged
by some women's small retirement incomes due to their discontinuous
work histories. Also, workers in some industries have high job turn
over, making it less likely that they will accumulate sufficient pension
benefits to ensure adequate retirement income.
Second, social security expansion has ended, and a slight contrac
tion is predicted. Social security is projected to pay less generous bene
fits relative to earnings during the early part of the twenty-first century
(Doescher and Turner 1988). This places pressure on private pensions
and individual savings to raise retirement income in order to offset the
contraction. Third, jobs have shifted to economic sectors having low
pension coverage rates and relying less on defined benefit plans. These
changes affect the options available to job leavers who are covered by
a pension.
Defined Contribution and Defined Benefit Plans
To understand pension policy, one must understand the basic ways
defined contribution and defined benefit plans differ. Defined contribu
tion plans allocate employer contributions to individual accounts like
savings or mutual funds accounts. Such plans require employers to
contribute a fixed share of pay or allow employers to vary contribu-
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tions (as in a profit-sharing plan). Defined contribution plans may
accept worker contributions, and often require them as a condition for
matching employer contributions. Assets are typically pooled for
investing. Investment gains and losses are allocated pro rata to worker
accounts, and the worker bears the investment risk. In these plans, a
worker's pension benefit at retirement equals the accumulated contri
butions plus investment earnings and losses allocated to the account.
The employer may pay the account balance to the worker as a lump
sum, pay it out over a period of time, or use it to purchase an annuity
paying benefits for a specified period, like 20 years, or for life.
Defined benefit plans promise a retirement benefit figured by a for
mula, which usually includes earnings and tenure. The formula, for
example, might be $20 a month times years of tenure with the
employer, or it might be 1 percent of final salary times tenure. In
defined benefit plans, the employer must make contributions figured
by an actuary under government regulation sufficient to fund the
promised benefits. When investment earnings fall short of promised
benefits, the employer is financially responsible for the shortfall. Pen
sion beneficiaries may share risk, however, by receiving smaller costof-living increases when the firm or the plan does poorly.
Effects of Benefit Loss from Job Change
When job leavers lose pension benefits they also lose tax benefits
afforded by pensions. This raises questions about tax equity. Should
tax benefits reward job tenure? Because long job tenure has been more
common among men than women, does this policy discriminate
against women?
Pension benefit loss deters workers from changing jobs or careers.
The "golden handcuff effect may lower economic efficiency by pre
venting workers from moving to their most productive job situation.
This problem may be critical in declining industries that need to shrink
but have tied workers to jobs by pensions. Similarly, if pensions have
inhibited job change, they have hampered the labor market's ability to
adjust.
Rather than worrying about golden handcuffs, however, some ana
lysts are concerned about short job tenure. They argue that Japanese
lifetime jobs encourage employers and workers to invest in worker
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productivity. Long tenure with an employer may be needed to recoup
the investment from job-specific training. Thus, while both training
and eliminating barriers to worker mobility are critical for fully using
U.S. human resources, the goals conflict.
Pension Portability
Pension portability has been defined as the capacity to carry pension
benefits from one job to the next. It has been closely linked to preserv
ing vested benefits when a worker ends a job before retirement. The
portability concept has recently been expanded to include accrued but
unvested benefits. Of more importance, analysts have recognized that
even when vested, job leavers' benefits erode in value due to inflation,
reducing the real value of vested pension benefits; thus, the portability
concept has expanded to mean preserving the real value of pension
benefits when a worker ends a job before retirement.2 Portability loss
is the shortfall of actual retirement benefits from benefits that would
have been paid had the worker not changed jobs.
Pension portability is achieved in three ways: through portability of
benefits, service, or assets. Benefits are portable when the worker has a
vested right to accrued benefits. With vesting, a worker changes jobs
without losing nominal pension benefits, but the benefits can erode in
real value due to inflation. Service is portable when years of service
under a prior employer's plan count in figuring pension benefits with a
new employer. Service portability is found in multiemployer plans, but
also could be achieved by wage or price indexing the benefits of job
leavers. These options reduce real benefit loss for workers changing
jobs.
Pension assets are portable when the worker receives a cash distri
bution of accrued benefits and rolls it over to an Individual Retirement
Account (IRA) or another employer-provided pension plan. Asset port
ability is commonly available in defined contribution plans, and is
increasingly available in defined benefit plans. Asset portability is
often called "preservation" because the rollover or interplan transfer
preserves preretirement cashouts as retirement savings.
Corresponding to the three avenues to pension portability, there are
three ways a job leaver may lose pension benefits. First, workers lose
benefits by not having worked long enough to vest (deferred vesting).
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Second, workers lose benefits because plans offer lower benefits for
workers who quit before retirement (design aspects of pension plans).
This loss includes those cases where employers base cost-of-living
adjustments on tenure. Third, workers lose benefits by treating the pen
sion plan as severance pay rather than a retirement plan (consuming
benefits before retirement). All three losses may be the result of a vol
untary decision to change jobs or may be due to a layoff.
Legislative changes requiring vesting after five years for most work
ers have reduced portability losses incurred from nonvesting. Approxi
mately one-third of the remaining portability losses are due to other
aspects of plan design, while two-thirds are due to workers cashing out
benefits before they retire. Options for reducing portability losses due
to plan design, on the one hand, and worker behavior, on the other,
would distribute benefit costs differently. Plan design options could be
expected to raise benefits accrued by short-term workers. Worker
behavior options, by contrast, do not affect accrued benefits, but influ
ence what workers do with these benefits.
Other countries have reduced pension portability losses more than
the United States. Such policies include shorter vesting (Canada), a
government or private clearinghouse for job leaver benefits (Nether
lands, Japan), indexed benefits in defined benefit plans for workers
quitting prior to retirement (United Kingdom), and a ban on lump sum
payments to job leavers (Netherlands, Canada).
In 1972, Dan McGill wrote a book analyzing U.S. pension portabil
ity and focusing largely on pension vesting. When McGill wrote, nonvesting caused a major share of portability losses. Since 1972, the U.S.
pension system has changed dramatically. The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) set minimum vesting standards
which have since been tightened; now most workers vest within five
years in a private pension plan.
Pension analysts have increasingly realized that vested workers lose
benefits by changing jobs, however, and that those losses greatly
reduce the benefit protection that vesting was thought to provide.
Though pension portability has been an issue for many years, the
remarkable changes in the U.S. pension system, the changes in the
U.S. labor market, and better understanding of pension economics
have raised the portability issues this book addresses.
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OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

This book analyzes what happens to the pension benefits of workers
who quit or are laid off jobs. Presenting empirical evidence wherever
possible, the book progresses from an overview to an informal analysis
using simple logic and descriptive data, then proceeds to a more formal
analysis using economic theory and econometric studies.
The first six chapters of the book describe why pension benefit
losses are a significant problem and examines the number of workers
affected and the amount of loss they incur. As background on quits and
layoffs, chapter 2 portrays a labor market undergoing changes that
often result in reductions in retirement benefits. Chapter 3 further
describes job change by examining data on individual workers, and the
particular impact of mobility on women's pension benefits. Job mobil
ity often reduces future pension benefits, and chapter 4 investigates the
size of these losses. Chapter 5 examines receipt and subsequent use of
preretirement lump sum distributions, which constitute two-thirds of
portability losses. Chapter 6 discusses issues concerning the pension
benefits of laid-off workers.
Chapters 7 through 12 analyze possible policy responses to the pen
sion benefit loss of job changers. Chapter 7 describes pension plan fea
tures that already reduce portability losses. Chapter 8 debates the pros
and cons of pension portability reform in five areas: equity, tax and
budget policy, regulation, economic effects, and financial responsibil
ity. Chapter 9 describes and evaluates policy options designed to
reduce portability losses. Chapter 10 examines how policies mandating
portability would affect employers and workers. It also surveys studies
relating pensions and job change, because some portability policies
may increase job change. Chapter 11 examines the role of layoffs in
portability losses. Chapter 12 discusses policies towards pension porta
bility in Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
These countries have pension systems similar to that of the United
States, yet each has dealt differently with portability. Chapter 13 con
cludes the book with a selective list of policies that would reduce the
pension benefit losses of job changers.
Several issues related to pension portability have been omitted from
the discussion. The first is greater pension coverage. While it would
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further a goal of portability to raise retirement benefits it is not
itself a portability issue. The second is pension loss when a plan ends.
Like the loss when a worker separates from an employer, some policies
for dealing with those losses such as indexing benefits are the
same. But as with coverage, considering these issues would greatly
expand the book. The third issue is firm-initiated early retirement for
older workers. Though not considered here, many pension issues for
these older workers are the same as those for younger workers facing a
layoff. The fourth omitted issue is pension portability in the public sec
tor. The book deals only with the private sector, although public sector
workers face similar pension issues.
NOTES
1. Much of the discussion of pension coverage is based on Beller and Lawrence (1992).
2. Some analysts define portability more narrowly, distinguishing the ability to transfer benefit
rights between jobs from the preservation of real vested benefit rights with a former employer.

The Changing
U.S. Labor Market
The U.S. labor market changed greatly during the 1980s and early
1990s, causing many workers to switch jobs and affecting the way in
which firms provide pensions. These shifts created the context and
need for pension portability. This chapter describes economic changes
that have caused workers to seek new jobs and explores the magnitude
of that mobility. The chapter provides background information on
changes in employment by industry and changes in unionization fac
tors that affect the need for pension portability. It also discusses
changes in the pension system over the past decade, in particular the
trend towards defined contribution plans and away from defined bene
fit plans.

LABOR MARKET SHIFTS

Shifts in the U.S. economy have affected how workers accumulate
benefits for retirement. One of these changes is the shift toward the ser
vice sector and away from manufacturing. Three-fourths of new jobs in
the 1980s were in services and retail trades. 1 From 1979 to 1988 the
percentage of full-time private-sector wage and salary workers
employed in services rose from 19 to 24 percent. The percentage
employed in finance, insurance, and real estate rose from 7 to 9 per
cent. By contrast, factory jobs in 1988 fell to 1.7 million below the
peak in 1979. From 1972 to 1988 the share of the full-time employed
labor force in manufacturing fell from 34 to 28 percent (Beller and
Lawrence 1992).
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Changes in Employment by Industry
During the 1980s the mining industry suffered an astounding 25 per
cent job loss, while manufacturing suffered a 7 percent loss. In con
trast, government, transportation, and public utilities, the slowestgrowing service sector industries, each grew 11 percent.
Job shifts for narrower industrial classifications were even greater.
Half of mining jobs are in oil and gas extraction, which grew by 50
percent during the decade's first three years as the price of crude petro
leum soared. The number of wells drilled and oil rigs erected, as well
as the price of crude oil all peaked in 1982 and then plummeted to less
then half the peak by 1987. Jobs in oil and gas extraction followed the
same pattern, hitting an all-time high in 1982 and then falling: all jobs
gained earlier in the decade, plus 75,000 more, were lost by 1987. Coal
mining suffered even more than oil and gas during the 1980s, with job
loss reaching 46 percent. Copper and iron mining jobs fell 60 percent
over the decade.
In contrast, construction employment grew during the 1980s. Being
sensitive to business cycles, the industry lost jobs during the two reces
sions early in the decade, but expanded rapidly over the next three
years with the onset of economic recovery and a sharp drop in interest
rates. Growth continued throughout the rest of the decade, with jobs in
the special trades category carpentry, masonry, electrical work, and
roofing growing by 850,000.
The long 1980s expansion triggered growth in other areas. Chang
ing lifestyles, such as women working more outside the home, contrib
uted to retail trade growth. More spending power and less free time
affected services trades, with eating and drinking establishments head
ing the industries adding the most jobs in the 1980s: one of every 10
jobs added over the decade. One of every 20 jobs gained over the
decade was in a grocery store.
Gross Employment Flows
These employment changes, dramatic though they are, understate
total job changes. These shifts in industry employment are net
changes the net workers leaving or entering.2
Since in most industries workers are continuously entering and leav
ing, net employment changes are smaller than gross changes. Within
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industries some firms grow while others decline. Within firms, workers
are fired or quit in some departments while workers are hired in others.
Several studies find large gross employment flows caused by firms
opening, growing, shrinking, and closing (Leonard 1987; Dunne, Rob
erts, and Samuelson 1989).
During the early 1980s, one in eight jobs every year was new, while
one in nine jobs was destroyed. Job creation is defined as the share of
net jobs added at growing firms, while job destruction signifies jobs
lost at shrinking firms (Leonard 1987). In an average quarter during the
early 1980s, 6 percent of manufacturing jobs disappeared and 5 percent
were created (Davis and Haltiwanger 1989).

EMPLOYER-PROVIDED PENSIONS

These labor market changes have affected a number of pension vari
ables: which employers provide pensions; which workers are covered;
and what plans are used. The changes also have affected the amount of
pension benefits lost with job change and the types of policy changes
that would prevent these losses from occurring.
Changes in worker coverage rates by industry from 1972 to 1988
varied by gender, union status, and firm size. Within each industry the
coverage rate for women gained relative to men the coverage rate
among women workers rose from 25 to 35 percent in services, and
from 46 to 60 percent in the finance, insurance, and real estate sector.
For females, who are disproportionately in the service industry and the
finance, insurance, and real estate sector, the coverage rate rise in these
industries contributed to the rise in rate of overall female coverage.
The rise in percentage of males working in low-coverage service
industry jobs resulted in the fall of male coverage rate.
While the pension coverage rate for nonunionized workers rose
from 40 to 44 percent from 1979 to 1988, the rate for full-time workers
in a collective bargaining unit remained at 78 percent. Coverage
among nonunionized workers rose in all major industry divisions
except for transportation, communications, and utilities. This increase,
however, offset the loss of high-coverage union jobs. The percentage
of the labor force that was unionized fell from 27 to 17 percent
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between 1979 and 1988. The decline in union coverage took place in
all major industries, with the greatest drop occurring in services.
Pension plan coverage also closely correlates with firm size. In
1988, coverage rates ranged from 16 percent for workers in firms
employing fewer than 25 workers to 73 percent for firms with 1,000 or
more employees. Workers reporting employment in firms with 1,000 or
more employees fell from 41 to 39 percent of the labor force from
1979 to 1988.
Type of Plan
While the primary pension plan for most workers is a defined bene
fit plan, defined contribution plans are becoming increasingly popular.
In the late 1980s, primary defined benefit plans covered one-third of
workers, while primary defined contribution plans covered one-sixth
(1\irner and Beller 1992); however, 73 percent of primary defined ben
efit plans were offered in combination with secondary defined contri
bution plans by 1984 (Bodie and Papke 1990).
Defined benefit plans, which are found predominantly in union
firms, large firms, and manufacturing firms (Kotlikoff and Smith
1983), have fallen in importance as a source of pension coverage. After
reaching a peak coverage rate of 40 percent of private full-time work
ers in the early 1970s, defined benefit coverage declined to 31 percent
in 1987. Between 1980 and 1989 this coverage dropped from 30.1 mil
lion to 27.2 million workers, and the decline has continued into the
early 1990s.
In contrast, defined contribution plan popularity has risen in recent
years, due in large part to the popularity of 401 (k) plans. In 1975, only
15 percent of full-time workers participated in defined contribution
plans. By 1987, 30 percent were covered by a defined contribution
plan. The Revenue Act of 1978 added Section 401(k) to the IRS Tax
Code, effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1979.
Under a 401(k) plan, workers choose between cash or contributions to
a trust. The latter are made before taxes. Data for 1988 show 12.3 mil
lion workers, or 17 percent of full-time private wage and salary work
ers, were in a 401 (k) plan. The 401 (k) plans covered 18 percent of fulltime male workers and 15 percent of full-time female workers. One
policy concern is that the shift toward defined contribution plans,
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boosted by 401 (k) plans, could lead to lower future pension benefits
because job leavers often cash out those plans.
Several reasons have been advanced for the shift from defined bene
fit to defined contribution coverage, including employment shifts from
industries with large and unionized firms, but also legislation which
imposed costly compliance for defined benefit plans but improved tax
treatment for some defined contribution plans. Firms with a defined
benefit plan have, on average, cut 3 percent of covered workers
between 1975 and 1987. They cut more than 10 percent in mining,
construction, manufacturing, transportation, and wholesale trade. Cov
erage under the defined benefit plans of the big three U.S. automakers
alone fell 22 percent from 1975 to 1987 (a 210,000 worker loss).
Dual Coverage

Many workers are covered both by a defined benefit plan and a sup
plemental defined contribution plan. Supplemental coverage of work
ers by a second plan is highest in industries with a high coverage rate
under primary plans. Manufacturing industry workers have a 65 per
cent coverage rate. Of those covered, 50 percent are also enrolled in a
supplemental plan. Only mining has a high coverage rate (64 percent)
combined with a below average supplemental coverage rate (37 per
cent). Supplemental defined contribution plans enable employers to
offer extra benefits at reduced cost; 56 percent of these plans are
funded to some extent by worker contributions.
Concluding Comments

Major economic changes have significantly affected the way in
which firms provide pensions. This chapter has examined job changes
and the characteristics of employers providing and workers covered by
pensions from an aggregate perspective. The next chapter examines
these issues from the perspective of individual workers, focusing on
the attributes of employees changing jobs. Taken together, these two
chapters describe changes in the U.S. labor market and provide the
background for understanding the pension issues arising from these
changes.
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NOTES
1. This discussion is drawn from Plunkert (1990).
2. Net changes are the difference between total workers entering an industry and total workers
leaving the industry. Gross changes are the total workers entering and leaving

Characteristics of Job Changers
Because portability issues directly concern job changers, it is impor
tant to examine the characteristics of workers who change jobs and to
understand the dynamics of job mobility. Is job change increasing over
time? How does it vary across age groups and by gender?1 If the rate of
job change were to decrease, would we still need to formulate pension
policies to reduce benefit losses incurred by job changers? How do
portability policies affect men and women differently? This overview
discusses these and related questions by looking at job tenure studies,
with particular attention to the impact of portability policies on
women.

JOB TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES

Job change can be studied by examining actual tenure and estimat
ing eventual tenure for jobs in progress. Hall (1982) documented the
prevalence of lengthy completed job tenure for males and concluded
the following:
1. The typical worker holds a job that will last about eight years.
Over one-quarter of all workers are employed in jobs that will continue
20 years or more; 60 percent hold jobs that will last five years or more.
2. The jobs held by middle-aged workers with more than 10 years
of tenure are extremely stable. Over a decade, only 20 to 30 percent of
these workers move.
3. Among workers aged 30 and older, 40 percent are currently
working in jobs at which they will remain for 20 or more years. Threequarters are in jobs at which they will remain for five or more years.
4. The duration of employment among blacks is as long as that
among whites. Even though jobs held by blacks are worse along
almost every other dimension, they are no less stable than those held
by whites.
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5. Women remain on jobs a substantially shorter period of time than
men. Only one-quarter of women over age 30 are employed in jobs
they will occupy for more than 20 years, whereas over one-half of men
over age 30 hold these near-lifetime jobs.
While Hall found that by age 44 workers had held an average of 8.5
jobs, he also found that one-half of those age 40 to 44 who have been
in their current jobs for 5 to 10 years will retain these jobs an additional
10 years. Job changes generally occur in the first few years after
employment begins. Young workers change jobs a great deal until they
find a good career match.
Sehgal (1984) states that employment data from the January 1983
CPS support the contention that mature American workers, on average,
show substantial job stability. The survey asked whether participants
were engaged in the kind of work they had been doing a year earlier,
how long they had done that kind of work, and how long they had been
working continuously for their current employer. Sehgal's principal
findings on tenure are the following:
1. One worker in six has been with his/her employer for at least 15
years.
2. Among workers age 45 and over, nearly one-third have been with
their current employer for 20 years or more.
3. Tenure with one's employer is closely linked to tenure in one's
occupation.
Looking at gender differences in tenure, Sehgal's findings show that
one male worker in five has been with his employer for at least 15
years, while one female worker in 10 has been with her employer for
that period. Among workers age 45 and over, 38 percent of men and 16
percent of women have been with their current employer 20 years or
more.
Mitchell (1986) discusses job attachment among older workers
while focusing on gender differences in job tenure. She also uses data
from the January 1983 Current Population Survey and a methodology
similar to that of Hall (1982). Table 3.1 presents differences in tenure
by sex. It shows the greatest contrast among men and women workers
to be found in the longer-tenure groups. Only 4 percent of working
women have been on their jobs for 20 or more years, compared to 12
percent of men. In addition, 38.8 percent of all males but only 13.3 per-
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cent of all females are likely to complete 20 or more years. This sup
ports Hall's 1978 data, which show these figures as 37.3 percent and
15.1 percent. At the other extreme, the table shows 54 percent of males
and 67 percent of females spending fewer than five years with their
current employers.

Tenure
(years)

Less than 1
1-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20 or more

Table 3.1
Tenure to Date and Eventual Tenure by Sex, 1983
Females
Males
F/M
(percent)
(percent)
Actual Eventual) Actual Eventual Actual Eventual
1.2
17.9
14.2
1.3
24.5
30.3
1.4
1.2
31.7
36.6
22.3
29.9
16.0
1.5
16.6
1.0
16.3
10.6
11.7
8.4
1.6
19.2
0.4
7.5
1.3
7.0
0.6
9.8
4.3
7.6
0.4
13.3
4.2
0.3
11.9
38.8

SOURCE: January 1983 Current Population Survey data as compiled in Mitchell (1986).
NOTE- All figures are adjusted by sex-specific survival rates as in Horvath (1983) The survival
rate is the ratio of Ix values from a standard life table. These values represent the number of per
sons of 100,000 born alive still living at the beginning of the age interval.

Table 3.2 presents eventual tenure of prime age and older workers
and shows clearly that tenure is shorter for women than men across all
age groups. Women aged 40 and over are only half as likely as men to
complete 20 or more years of tenure 23.3 percent versus 56.4 per
cent.
These tables suggest the following conclusions:
1. The majority of jobs last fewer than five years for both sexes; rel
atively short-term employment is not confined to women.
2. The most striking gender differences in actual tenure patterns are
concentrated not in the short-tenure groups, (e.g. fewer than five
years), but rather in the longer-tenure groups. Using eventual tenure
data, sex differences become more pronounced between five and ten
years, and grow larger thereafter. This means that sex differences in
tenure are not primarily due to more "churning" among females start
ing new jobs.

Eventual
years of
tenure
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20 or more

Table 32
Distribution of Eventual Tenure by Sex for Prime Age and Older Workers
Percent age 40-49
Percent age 50-59
Percent age 60+
Male

Female

F/M

15.3
9.3
9.7
10.0
56.4

26.8
16.2
18.9
15.7
23.3

1.8
1.7
1.9
1.6
0.4

Male
14.4
10.6
10.9
8.2
56.5

Female
20.3
18.0
22.3
14.3
26.7

SOURCE: January 1983 Current Population Survey data as compiled in Mitchell (1986).

F/M
1.4
1.7
2.1
1.7
0.5

Male
15.3
16.2
11.1
6.3
51.0

Female
20.6
20.3
17.6
10.2
31.3

F/M
1.3
1.3
1.6
1.6
0.6
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3. Older women are proportionately more likely to have five or
more years of eventual tenure (on their current job) than are their
younger counterparts, while the male ratios remain relatively constant
across age groups. Therefore, the sex differential in medium- and longterm eventual tenure shrinks with age. However, women age 40 and
over are still only half as likely to complete 20 or more years of tenure
as men. If women workers in the 1990s follow the same tenure patterns
as their predecessors, the labor market will experience reduced average
tenure and greater job change in response to the influx of women into
the workforce during the last 20 years.

FREQUENCY OF JOB CHANGE

Studies already discussed have alluded to the increasing number of
women in the labor force and their effect on job change and labor turn
over. To put this in perspective, their share of the total labor force has
increased from 32 percent to 46 percent over the 1955-1990 period
(Economic Report of the President 1992, p. 338).
Table 3.3 indicates that men and women of all age categories have
displayed a relatively constant job tenure during the 26-year period
from 1951 to 1987, even though the common perception is that people
now change jobs more frequently. Women do have lower job tenure
than men, however, and the greater proportion of the labor force that is
female has increased turnover in the labor force.
Korczyk's (1990) analysis of portability issues for women, however,
challenges the standard view of female workers as less attached to the
labor force than men. Her review of the literature on portability dis
cusses a study by Haber, Lamas, and Green (1983), which indicates
that in 1977 the separation rate for women would have been 1.9 per
centage points less than the rate for men if women working full time
had been distributed among wage groups in the same way as men. In
her own analysis, Korczyk finds that women workers display more job
and labor force mobility than men. After controlling for economic and

Table 3.3
Median Years with Current Employer, by Age, Sex, and Race, Selected Years 1951-1987
1983
1981
1978
1973
1968
1966
1951
1963
Years with employer
Worker characteristics
Aged 16 years and over 8
4.0
5.1
4.5
4.6
4.8
5.2
5.7
3.9
Men
2.6
2.5
3.7
2.4
2.8
2.8
2.2
3.0
Women
1.5
1.4
1.9
2.4
1.8
2.4
2.7
1.7
Difference
25-34 years
2.7
2.9
3.8
3.2
2.8
3.2
2.8
3.5
Men
2.0
3.2
1.6
2.2
1.9
1.6
2.0
1.8
Women
1.1
0.9
0.6
1.0
1.2
1.3
1.5
1.0
Difference
35-44 years
7.7
6.9
6.6
6.7
6.9
7.6
7.8
4.5
Men
4.6
3.5
3.6
2.9
3.6
3.6
3.5
3.1
Women
3.1
3.1
3.3
3.1
4.3
4.0
4.0
1.4
Difference
45-54 years
13.2
11.0
11.0
11.5
11.4
11.5
11.3
7.6
Men
6.9
5.9
5.9
5.1
5.9
6.1
5.7
4.0
Women
5.1
5.1
6.3
5.6
6.2
5.8
5.3
3.6
Difference

1987

5.0
3.6
1.4
3.7
3.1
0.6
7.6
4.9
2.7
12.3
7.3
5.0

White, 16 years and over
Men
Women
Difference
Black, 16 years and overa>b
Men
Women
Difference

4.0
2.3
1.7

5.9
3.0
2.9

5.5
2.8
2.7

5.0
2.4
2.6

4.7
2.8
1.9

4.6
2.6
2.0

4.0
2.4
1.6

5.3
3.6
1.7

5.2
3.5
1.7

3.1
1.7
1.4

4.1
2.9
1.2

3.4
2.8
0.6

3.3
2.0
1.3

4.0
3.3
0.7

3.7
3.6
0.1

4.0
3.3
0.7

4.7
4.4
0.3

4.4
4.3
0.1

SOURCE: Compiled by Andrews (1989) from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Labor Force Senes P50, no. 36 (5 December 1951); Special Labor Force Reports, Bureau of Labor Statistics series on job tenure, nos. 36, 77,172, and 235; and Bulletin 2162
as quoted for years 1951-1981 by June O'Neill, Journal of Labor Economics (January 1985); 1983 data from Ellen Sehgal, "Occupational Mobility and
Job Tenure in 1983," Monthly Labor Review (October 1984).
a. Age 14 years and over in 1951,1963, and 1966.
b. Includes other nonwhite races through 1968.
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job characteristics, however, these mobility differences narrow, and
even change direction.

JOB CHANGE, PORTABILITY, AND WOMEN

Women's mobility makes them more vulnerable to portability loss
than men.2 As their participation in the workforce increases, their need
for pension portability grows. The labor force participation rate of
women age 20 and older grew from 34 to 58 percent from 1955-91,
while that for men declined from 88 to 78 percent (Economic Report of
the President 1992, p. 338). These figures show women's labor force
participation rate relative to men's rose from 38 to 74 percent.
As women's labor force participation has risen and they work more
years, their pension coverage rates have also risen. The coverage gap
by gender has closed more rapidly than the earnings gap. From 1972 to
1988, women's pension coverage rate rose from 70 to 88 percent of
men's. For that period, median weekly earnings of full-time women
workers grew from 62 to 72 percent of men's.
Women retiring with pension coverage have lower tenure than men,
thus reducing their pension replacement rates because pensions reward
long tenure. Data for workers retiring in 1977 and 1978 show a median
tenure for female pension beneficiaries of 20 years, compared to 26 for
men. Women had a median replacement rate of 18 percent, compared
to 22 percent for men (McCarthy 1985).3 More recent data on replace
ment rates show that this gap has increased. In 1989, the figures were
17 percent for women and 26 percent for men (Beller and McCarthy
1992).
Women's share of employment differs widely from men's by indus
try (table 3.4). Women represent more than 40 percent of workers in
finance, retail trade, and services, but are represented at a lower rate in
other industries. Two-thirds of working women are employed in
finance, retail trade, and services, while two-thirds of men are
employed in the remaining industries. Because of gender segregation
in the labor force, finance, retail trade, and services are referred to as
female-dominated industries, while the remaining industries in table
3.4 are referred to as male-dominated.
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Table 3.4
Employment and Pension Coverage Rates
by Industry and Gender, 1988
Pension coverage rates
(percent)
Men
Women
Percent male
Industry8
13
15
80
Agriculture
Manufacturing
74
64
68
Durable goods
61
66
50
Nondurable goods
Trade
74
52
38
Wholesale
54
31
28
Retail
Services
43
55
Professional
35
54
19
30
Business and personal
73
65
60
Transportation and public utilities
32
92
25
Construction
59
59
37
Finance, insurance, and real estate
72
62
86
Mining
SOURCE; Korczyk (1992, tables 6.7 and 6 8).
a. Includes self-employed.

The gender mix of an industry's workers dramatically affects pen
sion coverage rates for both sexes. The male pension coverage advan
tage 6 percentage points for all private sector wage and salary
workers narrows to 2 percentage points in male-dominated industries
and disappears in female-dominated industries. For men, working in a
male-dominated industry raises the probability of pension coverage
from 38 to 55 percent, while working in a male-dominated industry
raises the probability for women from 38 to 53 percent.
Vesting and Service Portability
Though women change jobs more frequently than men, vesting rates
among women are close to men's. In 1988, 75 percent of women and

26 Characteristics of Job Changers

80 percent of men in a pension plan had vested benefit rights in their
current plan (table 3.5). For workers with a pension on a prior job, 72
percent of women and 70 percent of men were vested in that pension.
Table 3.5
Pension Coverage and Vesting Among Full-Time
_________Private Sector Workers, by Gender, 1988_________
Women
Men
Number
Number
Employee group8
(millions) Percent (millions) Percent
100
43.5
100
Total
29.0
Pension participants in
14.9
current or prior job
51
29.7
68
43
Current job
12.6
21.9
50
40
9.5
17.4
33
Vested
4.3
15
20
Prior job
8.7
14
3.1
11
6.2
Vested
2.3
Received lump sum
3.3
8
8
4.9
11
Current and prior job
2.0
7
14.1
49
13.8
32
No participants in any job
SOURCE: Korczyk (1992, table 6.1).
a. Includes self-employed workers.

Policymakers seeking to reduce pension losses through portability
of service presume that a worker leaving a pension-covered job goes to
a job with similar coverage. That pattern of job change is less likely to
occur for women. The gender distribution among industries suggests
that options for continuing pension coverage on later jobs favor men.
Women with pensions concentrate in female-dominated industries,
where coverage is less common than in male-dominated industries.
If skills, contacts, and other job-related resources are industry-spe
cific, women with pension coverage who change jobs will be less able
than men to use employer-oriented portability options because they
will be less likely to find another pension-covered job. Portability poli
cies that rely on employers for benefit continuity thus would be less
effective for women than policies operating independently of the new
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employer having a plan such as indexing vested benefits of job leav
ers.
Over 70 percent of male pension participants work in male-domi
nated industries. Nearly 60 percent of female pension participants
work in female-dominated industries. Men working full time in maledominated industries have a coverage rate of 55 percent, versus 38 per
cent for women working full time in female-dominated industries.
Under similar circumstances, therefore, a male pension participant in a
male-dominated industry changing jobs within his industry has a 45
percent greater chance of finding a new job with coverage than a
female participant in a female-dominated industry [45 = (55 percent/38
percent) -1]. Considering all male and female pension-covered work
ers, if (1) they change jobs within their industry, and (2) they have a
chance equal to the coverage rate for their industry and gender of get
ting another pension-covered job, 50 percent of males will find cover
age compared to 44 percent of females. These figures give males a 6
percentage point, or 14 percent, advantage in odds of finding another
job with a pension.
Survey data support the hypothesis that women leaving a pensioncovered job are less likely than men to find another pension-covered
job. The 1988 Current Population Survey data show 47 percent of
female workers with pension coverage on a former job were working
on a pension-covered job as of the survey, versus 55 percent of males.
Thus, the advantage to males of finding a pension-covered job after
leaving one is 17 percent [17 = (55 percent/47 percent) -1], close to the
figure estimated above using coverage rates in different industries.
Men with pension coverage are less mobile among jobs than those
without coverage, but there is evidence that women's quits are unaf
fected by pension coverage. Mitchell (1982), using data from the Qual
ity of Employment Survey collected during the 1970s, found men's
quit rates were reduced by pension coverage, but women's were not.
She conjectures that the women's results may reflect the lower value of
pensions for many covered women who only worked intermittently
and counted more on spouse retirement benefits than on their own. It
could also be explained by women at that time being more likely to
work in small firms. Thus, women's greater mobility makes them more
vulnerable to portability loss than men.
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Preretirement Distributions
Women who have participated in pension plans on prior jobs are far
more likely to have received preretirement lump sum distributions than
men. For women, 53 percent received a lump sum when they left a
pension-covered job, versus 38 percent of men (Korczyk 1992). Thus,
portability policy banning lump sum distributions would affect women
more. Consistent with their lower earnings, women's preretirement
benefit distributions are also much smaller. Although traditionally
small distributions are rolled over less frequently than larger distribu
tions, women invest their smaller lump sums and make more use of
tax-deferred rollovers. Nearly $3 out of every $10 received by women
is rolled over into an IRA or qualified plan, compared to $2 of every
$10 received by men.

JOB TENURE AND PENSIONS

Table 3.6 shows job tenure in the context of pension coverage status.
This table suggests that pensions are used as a personnel tool to keep
workers on the job. The workers covered and participating in a pension
in 1988 averaged 10 years of job tenure, while those without coverage
averaged 5 years.
Piacentini (1990b) also examined job tenure in relation to pension
coverage status. He finds that among full-time private-sector wage
and salary workers, one-fourth of pension participants reported current
job tenure of 15 or more years, while only 7 percent reported similar
tenure when the employer did not sponsor a plan. Twice as many work
ers with at least 15 years of tenure were in defined benefit plans than
defined contribution plans (31 percent versus 16 percent).
In another study, which also examines job tenure as related to pen
sion coverage, Korczyk (1990) found that pension coverage rises sig
nificantly with job tenure (table 3.7). With less than one year on the
job, fewer than one in eight women are covered by a pension plan,
compared to one in six men. In the l-to-4 years category, the coverage
rate rises to just over one in three employees.

Table 3.6
Percentage Distribution of Workers by Tenure at Current Job, 1988
Years of tenure at current job
Worker
characteristics

Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Age
16-20
21-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-59
60-64
65 or over

Total
(OOOs)
72,491

Less
thanl
18

1-4

5-9

34

18

10-14
11

15 or
more
15

Not
reported
4

Mean
tenure8
(years)
7

43,491
29,000

17
19

33
37

17
18

11
10

18
11

4
4

8
6

63,403
7,011
2,078

18
18
18

34
34
39

17
17
19

11
12
10

16
15
8

4
5
6

7
7
5

3,429
7,837
24,476
17,788
11,476
4,040
2,385
1,060

49
33
19
13
9
10
6
8

39
51
43
29
23
18
17
16

2
8
23
20
16
13
17
14

b

b

c

b

10
8
4
3
3
4
3
4

1
2
4
8
12
14
16
16

10
17
13
11
11
14

2
19
36
44
45
44

Table 3.6 (continued)
Percentage Distribution of Workers by Tenure at Current Job, 1988
Years of tenure at current job
Worker
characteristics

1988 earnings
$l-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
Not reported
Union status*
Union
Nonunion
Firm size
Fewer than 10
10-24

Mean
tenure8
(years)

15 or
more

Not
reported

3
4
7
12
14
16
14
17
11

5
6
8
12
17
23
26
29
15

8
7
5
2
3
3
2
2
11

3
4
5
6
8
9
10
11

17
18

17
10

34
12

2
4

12
6

16
15

8
8

10
10

5
4

6
6

Total
(OOOs)

Less
thanl

1-4

5-9

2,168
8,085
13,542
11,388
9,648
6,742
11,369
3,465
6,085

53
32
22
16
13
10
9
7
18

24
41
43
39
33
27
28
25
28

8
10
15
19
20
21
21
20
16

10,283
56,810

8
20

22
37

10,344
6,440

22
20

38
42

10-14

8

25-49
50-99
100-249
250 or more
Not reported
May 1988 pension
status6
Noncovered
Coverage unknown
Covered
Nonparticipant
Participation
unknown
Participant
Defined benefitf
Defined
contribution
Plan type not
reported

5,462
4,342
5,637
34,248
6,019

19
22
19
13
29

41
36
38
30
34

18
17
18
19
13

9
8
9
13
8

10
12
12
21
9

4
3
4
4
7

6
6
6
9
5

26,842
4,575
44,566
4,782

26
74
13

14
1
20
15

7
b
13
5

7
1
20
5

5
20
3

b

41
5
31
75

5
1
9
4

1,802
34,490
20,484

26
6
5

42
27
23

14
23
22

6
16
18

7
25
31

5
2
2

5
10
11

6,756

6

36

25

15

16

1

8

7,250

10

33

22

13

18

4

8

c

SOURCE: Data from ftacentini (1990b).
a Mean tenure calculations exclude workers not reporting tenure. Workers reporting "less than one year" of tenure are arbitranly assumed to have one-half
year of tenure.
b. No observations in category.
c. Less than 0.5 percent.

Table 3.6 (continued)
d. Workers are classified as union if they reported union membership or coverage under a union contract.
e. A worker is considered to be covered if his or her employer sponsors a pension, retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401(k)-type plan for any employ
ees, or if he or she reported a secondary self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh. A worker is considered to be a current pension partici
pant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401(k>type plan at a wage and salary job, or if he or she reported a
secondary self-employed job and contnbution to an IRA or Keogh.
f. A large degree of response error may be present in worker responses on plan type.
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Table 3.7
Job Tenure and Pension Coverage by Gender, 1988
All employees8
(%)
Men
Women
Years with primary employer
17.3
Less than 1
20.4
1-4
34.1
38.7
5-9
18.1
18.5
10-14
11.7
10.6
15-19
7.0
6.1
11.9
20 or more
5.7
All
100.0
100.0
With pension coverage

Less than 1
1-4
5-9
1-14
15-19
20 or more
All

13.4
36.6
62.5
69.9
71.9
75.3
44.6

18.3
38.7
62.4
72.6
77.5
82.2
51.3

SOURCE: Korczyk (1990).
a. Includes self-employed.

MOBILITY AND PENSIONS

A study by Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1990) looks at
the extent to which workers with current pensions are also likely to be
covered on successive jobs. Their findings indicate that one-half to
two-thirds of male job changers age 31 to 50 and initially covered by a
pension, moved to a job that did not provide coverage. This pattern is
found in both the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and in the Sur
vey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
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Finally, the U.S. Department of Labor has derived the following sta
tistics from the Form 5500 for 1987 on the extent to which workers are
protected against pension benefit loss when they change jobs.4
Fourteen percent of covered workers are in multiemployer plans
and thus suffer no pension benefit loss for a job change to another
firm covered by their multiemployer plan.
An additional 29 percent of covered workers have a defined contri
bution plan as their primary plan and thus suffer no pension benefit
loss on that plan when they change jobs and are vested.
An additional 25 percent of covered workers are covered by a sec
ondary defined contribution plan and suffer no pension benefit loss
on that plan when they change jobs.
An additional 4 percent of covered workers are in a defined benefit
plan that provides preservation of benefits when changing to
another employer within a portability network, such as the Bell
Telephone plans.
To summarize these findings, 72 percent of covered workers have
some provision for portability or for preservation of benefits with job
change. Even with this degree of portability and benefit preservation,
an estimated $7 billion in present value of accrued benefits (excluding
lump sum cashouts) was lost due to job changes in 1986.5
NOTES
1. This chapter was written by Phyllis Fernandez and John Turner.
2. This discussion is largely based on Korczyk 1990.
3. This replacement rate is calculated as annual pension benefits divided by the average of the
high consecutive three years of earnings.
4. The Form 5500 series report is filed with the Internal Revenue Service annually by each
pension plan in order to disclose information needed to monitor compliance with Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) standards.
5. Compiled from the Form 5500 for 1987 by Daniel J. Seller of the Office of Research and
Economic Analysis, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.
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Retirement Benefit Loss
\Vhen workers change jobs, they often lose retirement benefits. This
chapter discusses various pension plan features that cause job leavers
to lose pension benefits and the amount of money lost as a result.

MEASURING PORTABILITY LOSS

To clarify alternative measures of portability loss, consider this
example. Assume that a worker is in a defined benefit plan, where ben
efits are based on final pay and years of work. Based on current pay
and years of work to date, the worker has accrued a present value of
pension benefits of $100. Because retirement is 15 years off and the
worker's annual pay increase is about 5 percent, the worker expects
final pay to be twice as high as current pay. Based on expected final
pay and current years of work, he/she has accrued $200.' The $100 is
the amount the employee has accrued to date if he/she leaves today.
The $200 is the amount the employee has accrued to date if he/she
stays until retirement.
Portability loss can be measured three ways: lost net pension
wealth; lost gross pension wealth; and lost retirement benefits. The
value of net pension wealth depends on whether a "free lunch" exists.
The economic argument of no free lunch implies that a worker must
exchange higher wages for pension benefits, a tradeoff known as the
theory of equalizing differentials.
When a job leaver has given up wages equal to a pension's present
value at job change ($100), he/she has no net pension wealth and thus
the portability loss is zero. The worker only loses wealth if he/she has
overpaid in foregone wages for the retained benefit. If he/she has sacri
ficed $200 of wages in expectation of a pension based on pay at retire
ment, the worker suffers a portability loss of $100 by leaving.
The second portability loss metric is lost gross pension wealth in
comparison to no job change. Gross pension wealth based on no job
35
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change is the present value of accrued expected pension benefits based
on expected pay at retirement and current tenure. This measure does
not net out the wages the worker has foregone to earn the pension ben
efit. The loss is measured as lost accrued pension benefits, regardless
of whether the worker had actually expected to receive those benefits
and had paid for them through foregone wages. The worker's gross
pension wealth is $200 based on no job change. However, if the worker
changes jobs, his/her gross pension wealth is $100. Thus, the portabil
ity loss is $100.
A preretirement cashout of benefits is included in net and gross pen
sion wealth because it is a pension payment received by the worker.
The worker receives $100 in the cashout, but this is not considered a
portability loss because it is not a financial loss to the worker. The
receipt of a preretirement cashout thus does not affect portability loss
as calculated by the first two measures.
The third metric is the loss of future retirement benefits. Policymakers use this measure most commonly because it stresses the importance
of retirement income. By this metric, if a worker changes jobs, he/she
loses $100 in future pension benefits a portability loss. If he/she
takes a preretirement cashout and does not reinvest it, he/she suffers a
further portability loss of $100 because future retirement benefits are
reduced. If the worker changes jobs, cashes out a pension, and does not
put the money in another vehicle for retirement savings, he/she has a
portability loss of $200. If, however, the cashout is rolled over for
retirement savings, it is not considered a portability loss.
Under this metric, job leavers with defined benefit plans lose ben
efits by changing jobs even if they do not cash out because such plans
are based, explicitly or implicitly, on final salary and favor long ten
ure.2 Though it may be argued that the short-tenure worker has not yet
accrued the benefits awarded to long-tenure workers (because those
benefits are based on future salary not yet earned), the worker would
have accrued those benefits based on tenure to date had he/she stayed
until retirement: the lost benefits are a clear cost of job change.
Some analysts, accepting the first or second measure, argue that if a
worker chooses to cash out there is no financial loss. Other analysts
argue that a preretirement cash distribution from a pension plan would
not be a portability loss if the worker saved it for retirement. Money
used to pay down the mortgage, they argue, does not constitute a porta-
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bility loss because the worker saves the money, albeit in an illiquid
form, for retirement. For laid-off unemployed workers, using a cashout
to pay the mortgage may be a necessity.
Yet others contend that a worker consuming a cashout could reflect
the fact that a given plan had forced the worker to save too much.
Cashing out allowed the worker to bring his/her retirement savings in
line with expected retirement needs.
A worker losing benefits from one plan may not have reduced his/
her retirement income by moving to another, since the pension from
the succeeding employer may offset the loss. The worker could further
offset a pension loss by raising his/her personal savings, perhaps aided
by higher income from the new job.
Thus, while portability losses are commonly considered as losses in
a worker's retirement income from a pension, they are not necessarily
forfeitures in real wealth because the worker may not yet have paid for
those future benefits through lower wages, or may have taken the bene
fits as a preretirement lump sum payment. Neither is a portability loss
necessarily a loss in total retirement income when a worker offsets the
portability loss through higher pension benefits on a future job.

WHO SUFFERS PORTABILITY LOSSES?

Workers covered by a pension on a prior job often have suffered a
portability loss by changing jobs. Of the full-time 1988 workforce, 18
percent had been covered by a pension on a prior job (table 4.1). Work
ers who are more likely to be covered by a pension on their current
jobs are those who would have been more commonly covered by a
pension on a prior job. A higher percentage of male than female fulltime workers were covered on a prior job (20 versus 15 percent). The
share of workers covered by a pension on a prior job is higher at older
ages and higher incomes: of those age 45 to 54,23 percent were previ
ously covered; of those earning more than $50,000, 33 percent were
previously covered. The odds of having lost benefits due to a job
change also vary by occupation. Twenty-five percent of managers ver
sus 11 percent of service workers were previously covered.
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An indicator of economic loss by workers with pension coverage on
a prior job is their current coverage status. Of all workers reporting a
pension on a prior job, 69 percent reported having a pension on the
current job (table 4.2). The figure is similar for males and females, at
70 and 67 percent. The figure is also similar by age 70 percent for
workers 25 to 34 and for workers 55 to 59. The results differ by earn
ings, however. For those earning $5,00049,999,43 percent with prior
pension coverage were currently covered. The percentage was twice
that, 86 percent, for workers earning more than $50,000. The figures
also vary greatly by industry, 84 percent in manufacturing and 54 per
cent in retail trade. The figures vary greatly by size of current
employer. For workers in firms with 25 or fewer workers, 29 percent
with prior pension coverage were currently covered, versus 89 percent
for workers in firms with 250 or more workers.

TYPES OF PORTABILITY LOSS

Pension benefits are lost due to job change for three reasons: (1)
workers change jobs before vesting; (2) plans provide lower benefits
per year of service for job leavers; or (3) job leavers cash out their pen
sions and spend the money.
Vesting Losses

A worker with a vested pension is guaranteed to receive the nominal
value of those funds at retirement. Thus, when a worker who is fully
vested in pension benefits worth $100 a month quits, he/she will
receive $100 a month at retirement. When the worker is 50 percent
vested, he/she will receive $50 a month. Workers who are not vested
receive nothing.
Before the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), federal law did not set minimum years for vesting. Many
pension plans vested workers' rights to benefits after they had reached
age 45 and had 15 years of service. This meant that a worker with
many years of service could be laid off or change jobs and receive no
pension.
In passing ERISA, Congress wished to ensure that long-service
pension-covered workers would receive their retirement benefits. Prior

Table 4.1
Pension Coverage Rates on Current and Prior Jobs, 1988
Current participants"
Worker
characteristics
Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Earnings
$1-54,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000424,999
$25,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
Not reported

Defined
benefit6
(%)
28

Defined
contribution15
(%)
9

Prior
participants
(%)
18

Current8 and
prior
participants
(%)
10

Current8 or
prior
participants
(%)
56

Workers
(thousands)
72,491

Total
(%)
48

43,491
29,000

50
43

30
25

10
9

20
15

11
7

59
51

63,403
7,011
2,078

48
42
48

29
26
28

10
6
8

19
13
11

10
7
6

57
48
54

2,168
8,085
13,542
11,388
9,648
6,742
11,369
3,465
6,085

7
15
35
49
60
68
74
79
24

5
7
19
27
38
42
47
48
10

1
3
8
11
10
12
13
16
6

12
11
13
17
18
23
25
33
15

1
2
5
9
10
14
17
27
4

18
24
43
57
68
77
81
85
34

Table 4.1 (continued)
Current participants8

Worker
characteristics
Age
16-20
21-24
25-34
35^4
45-54
55-59
60-64
65 or older
Occupation
Professional/
technical
Managers/officials
Sales
Administrative
support
Craftsmen
Operatives
Transportation
equipment operator

Workers
(thousands)

Total
(%)

Defined
benefit6
(%)

Defined
contributionb
(%)

Prior
participants
(%)

Current8 and
prior
participants
(%)

Current" or
prior
participants
(%)

3,429
7,837
24,476
17,788
11,476
4,040
2,385
1,060

12
26
46
56
58
57
55
33

6
14
26
34
37
39
39
18

2
5
11
11
10
7
8
6

2
6
15
24
23
21
27
26

1
2
8
14
13
12
14
7

13
31
54
67
68
67
68
52

9,494
10,285
8,388

60
56
40

34
31
21

13
12
8

24
25
21

15
15
10

69
66
51

11,067
11,061
7,223

51
52
53

31
34
36

11
10
7

17
16
10

9
9
5

60
60
58

3,617

44

27

19

55

Nonfarm laborers
Service workers
Other
Tenure
Less than 1 year
1-4 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15 years or more
Not reported
Union status0
Union
Nonunion
Not reported
Firm size
Fewer than 25
25-99
100-249
250 or more
Not reported

3,332
6,656
1,417

36
22
13

23
11
6

6
4
4

10
11
8

5
4
2

41
29
19

12,853
24,952
12,693
7,840
11,131
3,023

16
38
62
72
78
23

7
19
36
47
56
11

3
10
13
13
10
2

23
21
18
13
9
15

7
11
13
10
7
6

32
48
67
74
80
33

10,283
56,810
5,398

78
44
25

57
25
11

9
10
6

14
19
15

11
10
4

81
53
36

16,784
9,804
5,637
34,248
6,019

16
35
47
68
36

7
17
23
45
18

4
10
12
11
7

15
19
18
19
16

3
8
10
14
7

28
47
56
74
44

SOURCE: May 1988 Current Population Survey; Piacentim (1990b).
a. A worker is considered to be a current pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401 (k>type
plan at a wage and salary job, or reported a secondary self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.
b. A large degree of response error may be present in worker responses on plan type. See discussion of this issue in this paper.
c. Workers are classified as union if they reported union membership or coverage under a union contract.

Worker
characteristics
Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Earnings
$1 -$4,999
$5,00049,999
$10,000-$ 14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000429,999
$30,000449,999
$50,000 or more
Not reported

Table 4.2
Pension Coverage of Workers Covered on a Prior Job
Proportion currently participating8
Proportion
Participant at
currently
Defined
Defined
Plan type not
any prior job
covered1*
Total
benefit'
contribution0
reported
(thousands)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
12,998
69
53
30
12
12
8,706
4,292

70
67

56
47

32
24

13
11

12
12

11,850
915
232

69
71
73

53
51
53

30
29
32

13
8
d

11
14
21

270
887
1,792
1,909
1,773
1,530
2,787
1,150
900

25
43
57
70
71
79
84
86
40

9
16
35
52
55
63
71
81
29

9
6
17
25
33
39
40
48
12

d

d

4
7
13
12
12
16
19
8

5
11
13
10
11
15
14
9

Age
16-20
21-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-59
60-64
65 or older
Industry
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Total
Nondurable
Durable
Trade
Total
Wholesale
Retail
Services
Total
Professional
Business and personal
Transportation

d

81
496
3,766
4,226
2,655
868
632
273

79
49
70
73
68
70
66
47

42
25
51
58
57
54
54
26

37
15
26
32
32
32
39
12

3
15
13
12
7
4
5

5
7
9
13
12
15
12
9

90

38

28

15

8

5

3,550
1,394
2,155

84
79
88

67
60
72

40
37
42

12
9
14

15
13
16

2,383
847
1,536

57
63
54

41
52
34

20
26
17

11
13
10

9
13
7

3,354
2,176
1,178
591

62
68
50
60

44
48
37
50

19
21
16
33

14
15
10
9

11
12
10
8

Table 4.2 (continued)

Worker
characteristics
Communication and
utilities
Construction
Finance, insurance, and
real estate
Mining
Tenure
Less than 1 year
1-4 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15 years or more
Not reported
Union status6
Union
Nonunion
Not reported
Firm size
Fewer than 25

Participant at
any prior job
(thousands)

Proportion
currently
covered1*
(%)

Total
(%)

Proportion currently participating8
Defined
Defined
Plan type not
benefit0
contribution0
reported
(%)
(%)
(%)

418
850

87
48

74
41

58
22

10
11

6
7

1,581
181

79
74

61
60

35
41

12
5

14
14

2,950
5,305
2,274
1,010
994
466

59
66
78
82
82
63

30
50
72
78
78
37

15
24
44
50
53
20

6
14
17
12
12
3

8
12
12
16
12
14

1,446
10,718
833

91
68
40

78
52
29

53
28
12

12
12
9

13
12
9

2,559

29

21

8

8

6

25-99
100-249
250 or more
Not reported

1,868
1,018
6,618
936

55
71
89
64

41
53
70
48

18
24
43
24

13
15
14
11

10
14
14
13

SOURCE: May 1988 Current Population Survey; PiacenUm (1990b).
a. A worker is considered to be a current pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401(k)-type
plan at a wage and salary job, or reported a secondary self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.
b. A worker is considered to be currently covered by a pension if his or her employer sponsored a pension, retirement, profit-shanng, stock, or 401 (k>
type plan for any employees, or if he or she reported a secondary self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.
c. A large degree of response error may be present in worker responses on plan type. See discussion of this issue in this paper.
d. No observations in category.
e. Workers are classified as union if they reported union membership or coverage under a union contract.
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to 1989, ERISA required private pension plans to at least partially vest
after 10 years. 3 Most plans offered 10-year cliff vesting, with zero vest
ing up to 10 years, and then 100 percent vesting after that plateau.
Starting in 1989, ERISA required firms to at least partially vest work
ers after five years in single-employer pension plans, which cover
about 90 percent of participants. Most single-employer defined benefit
plans now offer five-year cliff vesting. Workers with less than five
years of tenure lose all rights to benefits under these plans, and firms
offering cliff vesting can thus avoid paying pension benefits for shortterm workers. By law, worker contributions vest immediately.
Plan Design Losses
Fully vested workers in defined benefit plans still lose retirement
benefits when changing jobs due to the ways employers design pension
benefit formulas.
Defined Benefit Plans
Under defined benefit plans, employers figure benefits using various
earnings and service formulas (table 4.3), and losses vary with each
plan design.
Final-pay benefit formulas are the most common defined benefit
plans. In 1989, 64 percent of enrolled workers in large and mediumsized firms were enrolled in final-pay defined benefit plans.
Between the time a vested worker leaves and the time a plan begins
paying benefits, the fixed nominal benefit declines in real value due to
inflation. Consider a worker earning $25,000 leaving a job at age 45
with 10 years of service. Under a defined benefit plan, his/her vested
benefit might be 1 percent of final salary times the number of years of
service. Thus, the vested annual pension benefit, which a worker could
begin collecting in this plan at age 65, is $2,500 a year (figured as .01 x
$25,000 x 10 years of service).
If the same worker had worked under the plan from age 55 to 65,
rather than from 45 to 55, he/she would receive much higher benefits
for 10 years of work. If the worker's income only kept pace with infla
tion, and if inflation were 4 percent a year, the salary at 65 would be
$55,000. Thus, the annual retirement benefit from the plan would be
$5,500.
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Table 43
Benefit Formulas in Defined Benefit Plans, 1989
(percent of full-time participants)
Professional
and
Technical
Production
All
administrative and clerical and service
Basis of payment8
participants participants participants participants
Total
100
100
100
100
Terminal earnings
formula
64
77
76
51
No alternative
formula
35
45
42
25
Terminal earnings
alternative
10
11
10
9
Career-earnings
alternative
3
4
4
2
Dollar-amount
alternative1*
17
20
14
18
Percent of
contributions
c
c
c
_
alternative
Career-earnings formula
11
15
10
10
No alternative formula
6
7
8
4
Career-earnings
alternative
c
Dollar-amount
alternative15
5
3
5
Dollar-amount formula*5
22
37
11
No alternative formula
19
32
9
Dollar-amount
alternative15
2
Percent of
contributions
alternative
1
Percent of contributions
formula
1
Cash account
2
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1990).
NOTES: Excludes supplemental pension plans. Because of founding, sums of individual items
may not equal totals. Dash indicates no employees in this category.
a. Alternative formulas are generally designed to provide a minimum benefit for employees with
short service or low earnings.
b. Includes formulas based on dollar amounts for each year of service and flat monthly benefit
varying by service.
c. Less than 0.5 percent.

48

Retirement Benefit Loss

This worker has the same real earnings (adjusted for inflation) and
the same tenure. But work between ages 55 and 65 yielded a benefit
worth over twice that earned between ages 35 and 45. The two retire
ment benefits differ because the plan did not index the salary used in
figuring the job leaver's benefit. Inflation between ages 45 and 65 cuts
the real value of the wages used to figure the benefit
The worker also would have earned over twice the benefit per year
for the earlier 10-year period had he/she continued working with the
same employer until age 65. This follows because the benefit earned
during that decade also would have been figured using the $55,000
final earnings. The worker lost 55 percent of pension benefits for work
from age 35 to 45 that he/she would have earned had he/she worked
until retirement.
This illustrates that even moderate inflation, like that experienced
during the early 1990s, causes large portability losses for workers cov
ered by final-pay benefit formulas. Other sources of wage growth
general productivity growth, promotion, and merit pay raises cause
added portability loss. With a 4 percent annual increase due to inflation
and a 1.5 percent annual increase due to productivity growth, the work
er's salary at age 65 is $75,000 In this case, the worker loses 66 percent
of the benefits he/she would have received for the earlier period had
he/she stayed with the employer until retirement.
Benefit losses are even larger than those losses due to wage growth
in plans where the eligibility age for full retirement benefits depends
on minimum service (Gustman and Steinmeier 1989a). These plans
reward continuing employment by lowering or removing the penalty
for early retirement and by crediting extra service and higher salary
when figuring benefits.
Plans based on a career-average benefit formula covered 11 percent
of workers in defined benefit plans in large and medium-sized firms in
1989. Workers in these plans would appear to maintain benefits when
changing jobs because the pension benefit is figured as a share of aver
age (nominal) pay over the worker's career. Such plans count pay
earned each year with the employer; therefore, job change would
appear not to affect the value of benefits accrued to date.
In career-average plans, however, preretirement inflation erodes the
real value of benefits. Erosion occurs equally for those who leave and
those who stay until retirement. While final earnings generally keep
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pace with inflation, earlier earnings, which are fixed in nominal terms,
do not. Inflation lowers the real value of the career-average salary
because nominal earnings are used to compute the career average.
To counteract inflationary loss, most employers periodically update
the career-average earnings base, amending the plan to raise pay bases
in order to counteract the effect of inflation. Typically, employers
adjust the base only for workers they employ as of the adjustment date.
Thus, job leavers in career-average plans suffer portability losses
because they do not benefit from subsequent pay adjustments used for
benefit calculation.
Collectively bargained plans, negotiated between management and
labor, generally figure benefits as a flat sum per year of service. In
1989, 22 percent of workers in defined benefit plans in medium-size
and large firms were covered by flat-dollar benefit formulas.
In a flat-dollar plan, a retiring worker might receive a monthly bene
fit of $18 times years of service. If the worker had worked 30 years
under the pension plan, the monthly benefit would be $540.
It might appear that job leavers do not lose benefits in this type of
plan. The dollars per year of service would be the same for those who
leave and those who stay. But employers typically raise the dollar units
(per year of service) used in calculating benefits each time they renego
tiate the union contract. Job leavers in this type of plan lose benefits
because former workers who have not reached retirement age rarely
share in the dollar unit increases.
In sum, even though some defined benefit pension formulas do not
explicitly adjust for final earnings, most do in practice. This results in
pension benefit losses for job leavers, because they have relatively low
final earnings and lose benefits primarily due to inflation. During infla
tionary periods, creditors lose and debtors gain when assets are fixed in
nominal terms. Job leavers who were enrolled in defined benefit plans
on prior jobs are creditors with assets fixed in nominal terms. They
lose.
Defined Contribution Plans
Under a defined contribution plan, the employer, the worker, or both
contribute. The plan credits contributions and investment earnings to
an employee account where workers' contributions vest immediately.
When an employee has worked long enough for the employer's contri-
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butions to vest, the account balance plus all future earnings provide
retirement income for the worker, even if he/she changes jobs. Most
defined contribution plans treat short- and long-term workers equally;
thus, vested short-term workers do not lose benefits when changing
jobs if they leave the money with the plan. However, job leavers in
some defined contribution plans do lose benefits due to backloading. In
these plans, the employer contributes a higher percentage of pay for
long-service workers.4
Losses Due to Preretirement Distributions

Fully vested job leavers may lose retirement benefits if they receive
a lump sum cash distribution from their pension plan. Employers with
defined benefit plans figure lump sum payments according to actuarial
tables the employer chooses with the plan actuary's advice (within lim
its set by the federal government). Under defined contribution plans,
the distributed lump sum is the amount of money in the worker's retire
ment account.
Employers who cash out terminating workers sidestep administra
tive burdens and are not required to pay the yearly premiums to the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). In 1992 those premi
ums ranged from $19 to $72 per participant in defined benefit plans,
with underfunded plans charged the higher rates by PBGC. Typically,
plans pay lump sum distributions directly to the job leaver, who then
has several options. He/she can (1) spend the money, (2) transfer it to
another tax-qualified pension arrangement such as an IRA, or (3) save
it in a nonretirement account.
If the worker spends the distribution, it provides no retirement bene
fits. If the worker transfers the money to another tax-qualified arrange
ment or saves it in a nonretirement account, he/she can use the sum for
retirement. Saving it in a tax-qualified retirement account yields a
higher return because the worker benefits from tax preferences.
In the three cases, however, the job leaver loses benefits if the distri
bution is from a defined benefit plan, due to the benefit being calcu
lated using termination rather than retirement age wages. Also, when
taking a lump sum cashout, the worker surrenders the survivor protec
tion and ad hoc cost-of-living increases that a defined benefit plan
might have paid.
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 requires plans to figure lump sum dis
tributions for small and medium-sized amounts using the Pension Ben
efit Guaranty Corporation interest rate for calculating deferred
liabilities. Because this rate is less than a market rate, workers will
receive a generous lump sum. This generosity prompts workers to take
lump sum distributions.5 However, for large distributions the firm may
use an interest rate closer to a market rate.
If job leavers take a lump sum distribution and roll over the money
into an IRA, they may lose benefits even from a defined contribution.
First, individuals tend to invest conservatively. Second, employers
sometimes pay plan administrative expenses rather than charging them
against plan assets; the individual bears the expenses of an IRA. Third,
economies of scale make administering an employer plan less costly
than an individual plan. Fourth, employer plans can invest in large
denomination securities with a better rate of return. Individual IRAs
have too few assets to make investing in large denomination securities
feasible.
Workers who are not changing jobs may also incur losses from pre
retirement distributions. A worker may be eligible for a preretirement
hardship withdrawal from a defined contribution plan. The IRS allows
this exception for unreimbursed medical expenses, purchase of a prin
cipal residence, educational expenses, and prevention of eviction/fore
closure. Hardship withdrawals cut future retirement benefits, but are
not a portability loss because the employee has remained with the com
pany.
A worker whose firm or division is sold also may receive a distribu
tion without changing jobs.6 In 1986 the IRS took the "same desk"
position: if an employee leaves work Friday and returns Monday to the
same desk but is working for a different employer, he/she cannot claim
a distribution from the pension plan. In 1990, the IRS changed its
mind.7 Now the employee may take a distribution of benefits in the
same desk scenario if the old employer permits it, unless pension
assets and liabilities transfer to the new employer. The decision enables
employers to control whether they will make preretirement distribu
tions. If the pension assets and liabilities are not transferred to the pur
chaser, preretirement distributions arising from the sale are allowed.
Distributions to affected workers are now allowed for stock sales of
businesses. In a stock sale, the worker's corporate employer stays the
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same, though corporate employer ownership changes. The employ
ment relationship with the employer maintaining the plan is severed if,
among other conditions, the pension plan is maintained by the original
parent but is no longer maintained by the subsidiary in the new owner's
hands.

HOW IMPORTANT ARE PORTABILITY LOSSES?

The size of portability losses has been examined by an actuarial
consulting firm, Hay/Huggins Incorporated (1988), under contract to
the U.S. Department of Labor. To do this, they derived job mobility
patterns from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which includes
extensive pension and job tenure data. Workers with differing lifetime
job mobility patterns were assigned pension coverage based on cover
age data by pension plan type.
The Hay/Huggins study used a simplified model of U.S. career pat
terns and pension plans, including only primary plan coverage. (About
40 percent of pension-covered workers are also covered by a supple
mentary defined contribution plan (Turner and Beller 1992).) Workers
initially enrolled in a pension plan were assumed to have coverage on
all successive jobs. Thus, workers with career gaps in pension cover
age were not considered. The simulation used a five-year cliff-vesting
rule for all plans. (While most single-employer plans use five-year cliff
vesting, multiemployer plans commonly use 10-year cliff vesting.) The
study estimated expected portability losses caused by pension cover
age patterns for representative job histories.
Ignoring preretirement cashouts of pension benefits, pensioners
lose, on average, 15 percent of lifetime benefits they would have
earned if all pension-covered work had fallen under the last pension
plan in which they were enrolled (table 4.4). This figure applies to all
pension-covered workers, including those who do not change jobs. It
considers portability loss due to failure to vest completely and failure
to index deferred vested benefits.
The percentage loss figure is for primary plans only and ignores
social security and secondary private pension plans. As social security
causes no portability loss, including social security benefits reduces the

Retirement Benefit Loss 53

portability loss to 10 percent of retirement benefits. Because secondary
plans are typically portable defined contribution plans, including them
would indicate that the percentage of all retirement benefits workers
lose due to vesting and plan design is smaller. However, because of the
lump sum option for terminating workers in defined contribution plans,
to include supplementary plans probably would raise the portability
loss relative to benefits.
Table 4.4
Loss in Portability Model
Percentage of benefits as
portability loss
Percentage of covered workers
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
1-9
None
Gain
Total
Average loss for all workers
Average loss for workers with a loss

63
13.4
19 4
15.2
46
38.4
2.7
100.0
14.8
23.3

SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
NOTE: The portability loss is the percentage difference between the retirement benefit the
worker would have received if all service had been covered by the retirement plan of the last
employer and the benefit that the worker actually received. A worker who worked from at least
age 30 to age 65 under one pension plan would not have a loss under this definition since the
maximum credited service for the plans in the model was 35 years. A worker who worked for 35
years under one plan and received a vested benefit from a second plan would show a "gain."

Of pension-covered workers, 41 percent suffered no portability loss.
They either stayed with the same employer for 35 or more years and
then retired, or they were covered by primary defined contribution
plans (considered in the study to cause no portability losses). The 59
percent of pension-covered workers who did suffer portability loss, on
average lost 23 percent of retirement income.
While 5 percent of workers losing benefits lost less than 10 percent
of their benefits, 6 percent lost between 40 and 49 percent of their ben
efits. In 1988 dollars, workers losing benefits lost, on average, $5,000
of future annual income per year of retirement.
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Portability losses are higher for pension-covered workers with mul
tiple job changes (table 4.5). Workers with one job change lost 10 per
cent, those with two changes lost 20 percent, and those with three
changes lost, on average, 25 percent of the benefits they would have
received had they stayed with one employer.
Table 4.5
Portability Loss by Number of Jobs
Number of jobs
Percentage loss
1
OO
2
10.0
3
13.9
4
21.3
5
24.4
6
31.1
___________7______________________42.4__________
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).

Losses also vary by plan type (table 4.6). Workers covered by multiemployer and defined contribution plans have little, if any, loss regard
less of how many times they change jobs. They lose benefits in those
plans primarily because they move before vesting. (Job leavers in multiemployer plans were assumed to go to another employer in the same
multiemployer plan.) Workers who were covered by single-employer
defined benefit plans and who changed jobs had losses from 16 to 24
percent, depending on plan type. Those who suffered the highest losses
were enrolled in final-salary plans
Table 4.6
Portability Loss by Type of Plan
Type of plan
Percentage loss
Multiemployer
1.5
Flat-dollar
16.1
Final-pay
Offset
24.6
Step rate
23.8
Career-average
18.1
Defined contribution
1.0
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
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Preretirement Distributions
Evidence suggests that portability losses due to preretirement lump
sum distributions are growing because these distributions are becom
ing more common. Of the 8.5 million civilian workers in May 1988
reporting a lump sum distribution from a prior job's plan, 4.4 million
indicated that they had received a distribution since 1983 (Piacentini
1990b). A total of 1.1 million workers reported having received multi
ple distributions. Between 1983 and 1988, the share of workers who
reported having received a lump sum distribution from a prior job rose
from 6.6 to 7.5 percent. In May 1988,21.6 million nonfarm workers
21 percent reported being eligible for a lump sum distribution from
the primary retirement plan at a current job.
Hay/Huggins estimated that average portability losses of covered
workers would rise from 15 to 39 percent if job leavers cashed out all
vested benefits from primary plans. But they estimated that only 25
percent of primary plans allowed cashouts of $3,500 or more. If work
ers consumed all lump sum distributions available, the average
employee would lose 21 percent, instead of the 15 percent now attrib
uted to inflation and failure to vest. Thus, Hay/Huggins estimated, 25
percent of portability losses are due to workers consuming lump sum
benefits before retirement. The U.S. Department of Labor, by including
supplemental defined contribution plans, estimates that lump sum dis
tributions are, in fact, much larger. The DOL suggests that these distri
butions constitute two-thirds of the portability losses incurred (Ball
1990).
Projecting Portability Loss
In deciding how to cut portability loss, policymakers must consider
the future. If workers are expected to lose little in the future, then the
need for portability diminishes.8 Projecting pension benefit losses is
speculative, but nonetheless may aid policymakers in deciding what
types of portability policies to pursue.
Table 4.7 contains projected portability loss to the year 2000. A
straight line projection of the shift from defined benefit to defined con
tribution plans is used. The 15 percent portability loss in 1987 falls to 9
percent by the year 2000.
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Table 4.7
Projection of Portability Loss to the Year 2000
1987
defined
Year 2000
benefit/
defined benefit/
defined
defined
contribution
contribution
mix
mix
(*)
Primary Benefit
14.7
9.0
Primary + Supplemental*
8.0
Primary + Supplemental* + Social Security
6.1
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
* Assumes 90 percent of employees covered by single employer primary defined benefit plan
have a supplemental defined contribution plan.

Including supplemental defined contribution plans and social secu
rity permits figuring the share of total retirement benefits lost to job
change. The projections indicate that by the year 2000 workers will
lose 6 percent of their total retirement benefits due to job change. This
estimate excludes preretirement lump sum payments, the subject of the
next chapter.
NOTES
1. This calculation is based on the worker's expected salary at retirement. The worker's
expected benefits at normal retirement age, early retirement age, and the age that maximizes the
present value of benefits all may affect his/her expected retirement age.
2. Final salary refers to final average salary, often the average of the workers highest five years
of salary.
3. Years of participation in a pension plan do not necessarily equal years of work for an
employer. However, later in the text, the term "years of work" is used rather than the more techni
cally precise term "years of participation."
4. In the past, a portability loss was suffered in some defined contribution plans due to classyear vesting, which is no longer permitted. With class-year vesting, regardless of the number of
years of service, an employer's contributions for the current year did not vest until a later year.
5. To determine the value of the lump sum payment, an interest rate is used to discount future
benefits.
6. This section draws on matenal presented in Wyatt (1990).
7. In a general counsel memorandum discussed in Chernoff (1990, p. 18).
8. This section is based on "Projection of Total Portability Loss," a report by Hay/Huggins to
the Department of Labor, February 1991.

Preretirement Use
of Retirement Benefits
\Vorkers cashing out their pension plans when they change jobs is the
major cause of lost retirement benefits. The practice has raised concern
that the current generation of workers will have insufficient retirement
income when it retires. This chapter examines who cashes out and how
much they receive.1 Two U.S. Bureau of the Census surveys provide
data on these preretirement lump sum distributions: the May 1983 Cur
rent Population Survey Pension Supplement (CPS PS) and the May
1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement (CPS
EBS). Each of these surveys included questions about receipt and use
of lump sum distributions by civilian workers.
The chapter begins by providing a framework for discussion of pre
retirement lump sum distributions. It is followed by more detailed
examinations of the availability, receipt, and use of the distributions as
reflected in the 1983 and 1988 CPS pension supplements.

BACKGROUND

The growth of defined contribution plans as primary retirement
options and as supplemental plans has increased the availability and
receipt of preretirement lump sum distributions. Unlike defined benefit
plans, defined contribution plans typically pay lump sum distributions
at retirement or preretirement job separation. The trend toward defined
contribution plans coincides with enactment of the Employee Retire
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which provides a conve
nient reference point. Total active participants in defined contribution
plans increased from 9.8 million in 1975, before ERISA fully took
effect, to 27.5 million in 1987 a 281 percent increase. Active partici
pants in defined benefit plans increased only 6 percent over the same
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period, gaining 1.5 million for a total of 28.0 million participants in
1987.
ERISA permits defined benefit plans to cash out job leavers with
small accrued benefits, set at a maximum of $3,500, without requiring
consent of the participants. Laws regulating pensions enacted since
ERISA continue to permit lump sum distributions, at the same time
discouraging workers from consuming cashouts by imposing excise
taxes or other economic disincentives.
With the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, Congress mandated sev
eral changes to encourage workers to save distributions for retirement.
It imposed a 10 percent excise tax on all preretirement distributions
from qualified retirement plans, including Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs). This tax does not apply to distributions rolled over to
another qualified plan, to an IRA, or to distributions of employee con
tributions.
In another move inducing workers not to cash out, Congress, in the
TRA, repealed 10-year forward averaging and substituted one-time 5year tax averaging for a lump sum distribution after the individual has
reached age 59 1/2. The TRA also phased out, over six years, the longterm capital gains tax treatment of lump sum distributions. In 1992
Congress imposed a 20 percent withholding on lump sum distributions
that were not rolled over.

LUMP SUM DISTRIBUTIONS

Availability
Data show substantial availability of lump sum distributions before
retirement, with the greater proportion available from defined contribu
tion plans. Using May 1988 data, Piacentini (1990b) finds that onefifth of full-time private sector wage and salary workers reported cur
rent eligibility to receive a preretirement lump sum distribution from
their primary retirement plan.
Recipients in 1983
In 1983, 6.6 million currently employed workers reported receiving
a lump sum from a prior employer's pension or capital accumulation
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plan at some time. This means that three out of every five workers who
had changed jobs and were vested in the prior employer's plan took a
lump sum distribution upon job change (Atkins 1986).
Definite patterns emerge in analysis of the 6.6 million recipients
(table 5.1). One-half of the men and three-quarters of the women who
were vested in a previous plan took a lump sum upon job change.
Among age groups, younger workers had the highest percentages of
lump sum receipt, with workers between ages 25 and 34 showing the
highest rate (76 percent). Workers in the ascending age groups that fol
low show a pattern of decreasing lump sum receipt through the 65 and
over age group, which had only a 21 percent rate of receipt.
Receipt by income level shows consistency in the four middle
ranges covering between $5,000 and $30,000. These four categories
show rates of lump sum receipt ranging from 62 to 64 percent. Workers
earning less than $5,000 had the highest rates of lump sum receipt (71
percent), and those earning $50,000 or more had the lowest (46 per
cent).
Regarding the amount of the distribution, although a greater per
centage of women than men took a lump sum upon job change, they
also more commonly received smaller amounts than men. Eighty-four
percent of workers received a lump sum of less than $5,000, and only 8
percent of women received $5,000 or more versus 20 percent of men
(table 5.2). While these amounts appear small, it should be remem
bered that they would be considerably larger if left in the plan until
retirement. At 3 percent real interest, a lump sum distribution of $5,000
taken at age 30 would grow to $14,300 in real dollars at age 65. Among
other characteristics, age and income had the greatest association with
lump sum distribution amounts. Older workers and high-income indi
viduals received the largest amounts.
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Table 5.1
Percentage of Workers with a Pension from a Previous Job Receiving
a Lump Sum by Characteristic of Worker, 1983
Total
Received lump sum
Worker
(thousands)
<*)
characteristics
Sex
Male
Female
Age
Under 25
25-34
35^4
45-54
55-64
65 or over
Income
Missing
$0 or negative
$l-$4,999
$5,000-59,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
Total
SOURCE: Data from Atkins (1986).

50.9
76.7

7,033
3,902

51.2
75.5
68.9
54.8
41.5
20.9

319
2,867
3,091
2,285
1,781
590

57.5
44.1
71.3
63.9
610
63.2
61.7
52.4
45.6
60.1

489
139
753
1,338
1,882
1,704
2,356
1,594
676
10,935
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Table 5.2
Amount of Lump Sum Received by Characteristic of Worker, 1983
Received
Received
$5,000 and
less than
Don't
Worker
over
$5,000
know
Total
characteristics
(%)
(*)
(%) (thousands)
Sex
Male
Female
Age
Under 25
25-34
35^14
45-54
55-64
65 or over
Income
Missing
$0 or negative
$l-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
Total

78.3
91.1

19.9
8.2

1.8
0.7

3,580
2,993

99.5
91.9
83.7
78.9
71.2
67.6

0.5
7.0
15.6
18.9
26.4
32.4

0.0
1.1
0.7
2.2
2.4
0.0

163
2,164
2,130
1,253
739
123

84.7
57.8
91.1
91.7
89.1
85.4
84.7
73.5
62.2
84.3

12.0
37.5
6.7
7.3
10.4
14.3
13.4
24.8
37.4
14.5

3.3
4.7
2.2
1.0
0.5
0.3
1.9
1.6
0.4
1.3

282
61
537
855
1,147
1,076
1,453
835
308
6,574

SOURCE: Data from Atkins (1986).
NOTE: Numbers may not add to 100 due to founding.

Uses in 1983

Analysis of the 1983 CPS pension data shows that the uses of prere
tirement lump sums are strongly associated with the dollar amount.
Only 26 percent of those receiving distributions of less than $5,000
saved some of the money (table 5.3). This percentage more than dou
bles for the $5,000 to $9,999 distribution range (58 percent), rises to 79
percent in the $10,000 to $19,000 range, and peaks at 87 percent in the
$20,000 and over range. The greatest number of recipients, 84 percent,
received less than $5,000, and 77 percent of these spent some or all of
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the sum. The $5,000 to $9,999 category had the next highest number of
recipients, 9 percent, and 52 percent of these spent some or all of the
sum.
Defining retirement savings to include only rollover of the lump
sum into another tax-qualified retirement vehicle, an IRA, or a taxdeferred annuity, only recipients of large lump sums who were either
older or college educated had high rates of retirement savings (Atkins
1986). Andrews (1985) calculated that 4.4 percent of recipients save
for retirement in this way (table 5.3).
Recipients in 1988
The May 1988 CPS pension supplement showed that there were 20
million civilian workers age 16 and over who reported participating in
a private pension or retirement plan at a prior job (Piacentini 1990b).
The workers reporting a lump sum distribution from a prior employer's
plan increased to 8.5 million in 1988 from the 6.6 million in 1983
when there were 16.9 million workers reporting coverage by a pension
in a previous job. This increase in number of recipients is an increase
in the percentage of employees participating in a prior employer's plan
who reported receiving a lump sum (39 and 43 percent). The average
amount of the sum in real terms did not change substantially over time.
Distributions received after 1984 in constant 1988 dollars averaged
$8,300, versus $7,700 for 1975-79, and $6,600 for 1960-69.
In 1988, 60 percent of lump sums were received before age 35, and
85 percent were received before age 45, perhaps because most job
changes occur at younger ages (table 5.4). This pattern resembles that
shown in 1983 data. The change in preretirement lump sum distribu
tion between 1983 and 1988 when examined by characteristics of
recipients is no more than 5 percent in almost every category under
gender, age, and income. The 1983 and 1988 sets of lump sum recipi
ents closely resemble each other when distribution is compared
according to the characteristics of the workers (table 5.5).
Although small lump sums are a relatively low percentage of the
total dollar amount of distributions, they represent most of the distribu
tions. Of the total amount distributed in preretirement lump sum distri
butions, 8 percent are in amounts of less than $2,500 and 17 percent
are distributed in amounts of less than $5,000 (table 5.4). At the same
time, one-half of lump sum recipients receive payments of less than

c
c
c

45.9
42.6
c
c
c

12.5
29.9
51.9
c
c

9.3
14.0
76.6
4.8
3.1
68.7
40.9

c
c

c

c

c
c

c

c

10.1
16.8
71.4
4.8
3.2
63.4

c

c

c

c

100.0
87.3

100.0
78.9

100.0
26.2
2.4

100.0
32.0
4.4

100.0
57.6

$20,000
and over
154
2.3

SOURCE: Andrews (1985, p. 163).
a. Recipients by lump sum amount are less than total recipients and percentages are less than 100 percent because of the omission of "don't know" and
"no response" to value of distnbution.
b. Percentages may add to more than 100 percent because recipients may have used lump sum distnbution in more than one way.
c. Number of workers too small for rates to be calculated reliably.

Percentage all usesb
Total saving
Retirement program
Insurance annuity
Housing purchase
Other investment
Total consumption
Car purchase
Vacation
Other use

Table 53
Use of Preretirement Lump Sum Distributions by Purpose and Amount, 1983
Less than
$10,000-$19,999
$5,000-$9,999
$5,000
Total
219
583
5,534
6,594
Total recipients8 (thousands)
3.3
8.9
84.2
100.0
Percentage distribution8
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$2,500. Those receiving less than $5,000 are 70 percent of total recipi
ents. Thus, allowing workers to cash out amounts of $5,000 or less
would not affect 70 percent of workers receiving distributions, but
would preserve most of the pension money taken in lump sum distribu
tions until retirement.
Uses in 1988

The increase in the rollover of distributions into tax-qualified vehi
cles is one of the chief findings from the 1988 data. The 4.4 percent of
recipients reported to have used some of the distribution for a retire
ment program or tax deferred annuity in 1983 under the narrowest def
inition of savings (Andrews 1985) increased to 13 percent in 1988.
The May 1983 and May 1988 CPS benefit supplements cannot be
compared exactly on lump sum use because the two sets of recipients
were asked different questions. The high number of recipients—63
percent—indicating the "other" uses category in 1983 prompted a
change in the 1988 questionnaire in order to target these uses in more
detail. The effort successfully reduced the other uses choice to 27 per
cent in 1988. The following lists compare the two sets of options con
cerning use of any part of the recipient's distribution.
1983

• Invested in a retirement program
• Invested in an insurance annuity
• Invested in other financial
instruments

• Bought a house
• Bought a car
• Went on vacation

• Other uses

1988

• Invested in an IRA
• Invested in an insurance annuity or
other retirement program
• Invested in other financial
instruments
• Put into a savings account
• Started or purchased a business
• Bought a house or paid a mortgage
• Bought a car
• Paid off loans or other debts
• Paid educational expenses for self or
others
• Paid expenses during a period of
unemployment
• Other uses

Table 5.4
Distribution of Amount of Lump Sum (LS) Payments, 1983
Aggregate amount8
Recipients
Percentage
Percentage
of total0
(billions)b
oftotalc
(thousands)1*
Worker characteristics
100
100
$8,478
$48.1

Total
Amount of most recent LS
$l-$499
$500-$999
$l,000-$2,499
$2,500-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,OOQ-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
Year in which most recent LS was
received
1985-1988a
1980-1984
1975-1979
1970-1974

Average amount
per recipient*1
$6,800

1,042
955
1,627
1,220
1,114
449
211
335
160

15
13
23
17
16
6
3
5
2

0.3
0.7
2.7
4.4
7.9
5.4
3.6
9.7
13.5

1
1
6
9
16
11
7
20
28

300
700
1,200
3,600
7,100
12,000
16,900
29,100
67,200

3,391
2,403
1,191
579

41
29
14
7

19.7
13.8
7.5
3.4

41
29
16
7

6,500
6,600
7,700
7,200

Table 5.4 (continued)
Distribution of Amount of Lump Sum (LS) Payments, 1983
Recipients
Aggregate amount8
Percentage
Percentage
Worker characteristics
(thousands)
oftotalc
(billions)b
of total0
1960-1969
558
7
2.7
6
Before 1960
156
2
0.5
1

Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Age of recipient in May 1988
16-24
25-34
35^4
45-54
55-59
60 or over

Average amount
per recipient
6,600
5,400

4,597
3,881

54
46

32.9
15.2

68
31

8,600
4,600

7,941
426
110

94
5
1

46.5
1.1
0.4

97
2
1

6,900
3,600
4,000

161
2,348
3,149
1,666
545
608

2
28
37
20
6
7

0.1
6.0
14.7
12.2
7.7
7.4

0
12
31
25
16
15

800
2,900
5,500
9,200
18,900
15,600

Age of recipient when most recent LS
was received
16-24
25-34
35^14
45-54
55-59
60 or over
1988 earnings of recipient
$l-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more

1,225
3,755
2,042
850
214
171

15
45
25
10
3
2

2.3
13.3
15.2
10.1
4.7
2.0

5
28
32
21
10
4

2,100
4,100
8,500
14,500
26,800
15,400

345
616
954
1,113
1,045
818
1,761
561

5
9
13
15
14
11
24
8

3.0
1.8
3.0
4.7
4.6
4.6
8.8
4.9

8
5
8
13
13
13
25
14

10,500
3,300
3,600
5,100
5,000
6,400
6,200
10,300

Table 5.4 (continued)
SOURCE: Piacentini (199%).
NOTES: Tabulations by the Employee Benefit Research Institute of the May 1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement,
a. Aggregate and average amounts may be understated. While 8.5 million workers are estimated to have received LSs as of May 1988, data on the amount
of the most recent LS received are available for just 7.1 million of these individuals. Therefore, the aggregate amount of most recent LSs received
excludes the LSs received by the remaining 1.4 million workers, leading to an understatement of aggregate amounts received. However, if no systematic
relationship exists between the amount of LS received and whether or not the amount is reported, distributions and averages will not be affected. (With
out evidence of the nature of such a relationship, the effect on estimated averages is ambiguous.) In addition, in the May 1988 CPS EBS public use data
base, all LSs reported to be greater than $99,999 in nominal dollars have been topcoded at $99,999. An estimated 36,800 workers had received LSs equal
to or in excess of this amount as of May 1988. Therefore, both aggregate and average amounts may be understated to the degree that the amounts
received by these workers actually exceeded this amount.
b. Individual items may not add to total because some respondents did not report some characteristics of recipients or lump sum distributions,
c. Bases of percentages exclude respondents for whom recipient and lump sum distribution characteristics were not reported,
d. Rounded to nearest $100.
e. Because the survey was conducted in May 1988, includes only LSs received in the first four or five months of 1988.
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Table 5.5
Distribution of Lump Sum Recipients by Demographic Characteristics
of Recipients, 1983 and 1988
1983
1988
%
Change
Worker characteristics
%

Sex
Male
Female
Age
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over
Income
$l-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,OOO-$19,999
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more

55
46

54
46

-1
0

3
33
32
19
13

2
28
37
20
13

-1
-5
5
1
0

8
13
17
16
22
13
5

5
9
13
15
25
24
8

-3
-4
-4
-1
3
11
3

SOURCE; Atkins (1986); Piacenum (1990b).
NOTE: Individual items may not add to total due to founding. Bases of percentages exclude
respondents for whom recipient and lump sum characteristics were not reported.

Table 5.6
Distribution of Preretirement Lump Sum (LS) Recipients by Amount of Lump Sum Received,
by Selected Economic and Demographic Characteristics, 1988
Amount of most recent LS distribution (constant 1988 dollars)
Total
$5,000$1,000$20,000
$10,000Not
receiving LS
or more
$19,999
$9,999
$4,999
$14999
distributions reported
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(thousands)8
Worker characteristics
13
6
8
24
34
8,478
6
Total

Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Age in May 1988
16-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over

4,597
3,881

16
16

19
29

33
34

14
13

9
6

9

7,941
426
110

16
13
9

23
25
42

34
33
32

14
9
1

8
5
10

6
15
6

2,509
2,042
850
385

10
18
20
23

41
15
13
6

38
29
28
23

6
16
18
13

4
12
8
13

2
9
13
23

3

Age when most recent LS was
received
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over
Year in which most recent LS
was received
1988C
1987
1986
1980-1984
1975-1979
1970-1974
Before 1970
1988 earnings
$149,999
$10,000-$ 14,999
$15,000419,999
$20,000424,999
$25,000429,999

b

1,225
3,775
2,042
850
385

18
20
18
20
23

38
24
15
13
6

37
34
29
28
23

6
12
16
18
13

7
12
8
13

1
2
9
13
23

451
1,220
920
2,403
1,191
579
624

10
10
10
14
18
19
28

28
33
30
24
20
17
8

41
31
29
35
38
38
35

7
11
14
13
13
14
16

8
9
9
9
4
5
9

6
6
8
6
6
7
4

1,577
954
1,113
1,045
818

48
14
16
13
12

17
33
29
28
20

19
35
34
32
42

11
11
11
15
11

2
4
7
10
11

3
3
3
2
4

Worker characteristics
30,000-549,999
$50,000 or more
Not reported
May 1988 pension statusd
Nonparticipant
Participant
Defined benefit*
Defined contribution*
Not reported

Table 5.6 (continued)
Amount of most recent LS (constant 1988 dollars)
$1,000$5,000- $10,000- $20,000
Not
Total
$19,999 or more
$9,999
$4,999
receiving LS reported $l-$999
(%)
(*)
(%)
(thousands)"
5
14
7
34
20
20
1,761
13
11
12
13
35
15
561
13
9
17
13
28
19
1,265

2,672
4,500
2,370
1,022
1,108

16
16
18
11
19

24
23
22
28
20

33
34
34
39
31

14
13
14
11
11

8
8
8
5
10

5
6
4
6
10

SOURCE: Piacentim (1990b).
NOTE: Tabulations by the Employee Benefit Research Institute of the May 1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement.
a. Individual items may not add to total because some respondents did not report some information.
b. Less than 0.5 percent.
c. Because the survey was conducted in May 1988, includes only LSDs received m the first four to five months of 1988.
d. A worker is considered to be a pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit shanng, stock, or 401(k>tvpe plan at a
wage and salary job, or reported a self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.
e. A large degree of response error may be present in worker responses on plan type.
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Recipient choices for lump sum distributions in 1988 can be divided
among savings and consumption categories. Of the 13 percent of recip
ients who reported rolling at least part of a distribution into tax-quali
fied savings, 11 percent invested in IRAs and 2 percent invested in a
deferred annuity or other retirement plan (table 5.7). When the broad
est definition of savings is used, including all financial savings, buying
a house, paying a mortgage, and paying loans or debts, 65 percent of
recipients reported some savings. Forty percent of recipients reported
consuming part of a distribution. They defined that consumption as car
purchase, education expense, unemployment expenses, and "other"
uses.
The 1983 data show that young recipients more commonly consume
some of their distribution, and the 1988 data indicate this also. Half of
those age 16 to 24 reported some consumption, while 4 percent
reported some tax-qualified savings (table 5.7). Consumption drops to
39 percent in the next two age categories (25-34 years and 35-44 years)
and to 29 percent in the age 55 and over category. Figures for tax-qual
ified savings show the opposite pattern, rising steadily over the age cat
egories to 36 percent in the age 55 and over category.
There is a marked increase in use of tax-qualified financial savings
over the years in which the most recent lump sums were received.
Almost 25 percent of recipients reporting a lump sum in 1988 used
some for tax-qualified savings and 74 percent reported using some por
tion for savings as broadly defined (table 5.7). This compares to 15 and
66 percent in 1980-84 and 2 and 61 percent in 1970-74.
Use of tax-qualified savings drops from 13 to 11 percent when use
of the total lump sum distribution rather than a part is examined, and
under this condition the broadest definition of savings drops from 65 to
59 percent (table 5.8). Thirty-four percent of recipients report consum
ing the entire lump sum distribution. These 34 percent represent only
21 percent of total distributions (table 5.9). The much smaller group
who reported using only tax qualified vehicles for lump sums, 11 per
cent, account for 22 percent of the total amount of the money distrib
uted in lump sums.
The determinants of using a preretirement lump sum for savings in
1988 differ from those found in 1983 data. Andrews (1990b) used 1988
data to determine that when retirement savings are narrowly defined as
savings placed in an IRA, a deferred annuity, or in another retirement

Table 5.7
Proportion of Lump Sum (LS) Recipients Reporting Various Uses for Any
of Their Most Recent Lump Sum Distribution, 1988

Worker characteristics
Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Amount of most recent LS
$l-$499
$5004999
$1, 00042,499
$2,500-$4,999
$5,00049,999
$10,000419,999
$20,000 or more

Proportion of recipients using any of their LS
Insurance
annuity or Tax-qualified
retirement
financial
Financial
savings0 Savings'1 Consumption*
plan
savings6
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
2
13
65
40
35

Received LS
from prior job
(thousands)8
8,478

IRA
(%)
11

4,597
3,881

12
10

3
2

15
11

36
34

67
62

38
41

7,941
426
110

11
6
17

2
f
f

14
6
17

36
24
26

65
59
76

40
42
24

1,042
955
1,627
1,220
1,114
660
495

3
6
8
16
17
23
22

g

3
6
8
17
21
28
29

21
31
28
38
44
54
57

50
62
62
68
74
80
81

50
40
43
37
33
33
30

1
1
1
4
5
10

Age when most recent LS
was received
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over
Year in which most recent LS
was received
1988h
1987
1986
1985
1980-1984
1975-1979
1970-1974
Before 1970
1988 earnings
$l-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-524,999
$25,000429,999

1,225
3,755
2,042
850
385

3
9
13
22
31

1
2
2
5
7

4
10
15
26
36

24
32
38
50
61

51
67
66
70
75

50
39
39
35
29

451
1,220
920
800
2,403
1,191
579
694

18
18
15
15
13
6
1
r

5
3
3
2
3
1
1
1

23
20
18
17
15
7
2
1

46
46
39
45
36
22
25
24

74
72
70
72
66
57
61
47

31
37
38
30
38
46
40
55

961
954
1,113
1,045
818

6
6
11
11
10

1
2
1
1
2

7
8
12
12
11

32
24
31
35
35

63
56
68
62
66

45
46
37
44
39

Table 5.7 (continued)

Worker characteristics
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
May 1988 pension status1
Nonparticipants
Participants

Received LS
from prior job
(thousands)8
1,761
561
3,977
4,500

IRA
(%)
14
20
10
12

Proportion of recipients using any of their LS
Insurance
annuity or Tax-qualified
retirement
financial
Financial
plan
savings1"
savings' Savings'1 Consumption*
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
3
16
38
63
40
6
25
55
78
30
2
3

12
15

34
36

65
65

40
39

SOURCE: Data from ftacentini (1990b).
NOTE: Tabulations by the Employee Benefit Research Institute of the May 1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement.
a. Individual items may not add to total because some respondents did not report some information.
b. Includes IRAs, insurance annuities, and other retirement programs.
c. Includes tax qualified savings savings accounts, and other financial instruments.
d. Includes all financial savings, purchase of a house, payment of a mortgage, and payment of loans or debts.
e. Includes purchase of a car, education expenses, expenses incurred during a period of unemployment, and other uses.
f. No observations in category.
g. Less than 0.5 percent.
h. Because the survey was conducted in May 1988, includes only LSs received in the first four to five months of 1988.
i. A worker is considered to be a pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit shanng, stock or 401(k>type plan at a
wage and salary job, or reported a self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.

Table 5.8
Proportion of Lump Sum Recipients Reporting Various Uses for All
of Their Most Recent Lump Sum Distribution by Demographic Characteristics, 1988

Worker characteristics
Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Amount of most recent LS
$14499
$5004999
$1,00042,499
$2,500-$4,999
$5,00049,999
$10,000419,999
$20,000 or more

Proportion of recipients using all of their lump sum distribution8
Mixed
consumption
Financial
Tax-qualified
Received LS
and savings
Consumption'
Savings'
from prior job financial savings0 savings'1
(%)
(%)
(%)
(thousands)6
(%)
(%)
5
34
59
30
11
8,478
4,597
3,881

12
10

30
30

61
57

32
36

6
5

7,941
426
110

11
4
9

31
21
24

59
52
76

34
36
24

5
7
g

1,042
955
1,627
1,220
1,114
660
495

3
6
7
14
18
23
22

21
28
24
33
36
42
44

50
59
56
62
67
67
70

49
37
38
31
25
20
19

1
3
5
5
7
13
12

Table 5.8 (continued)
Proportion of Lump Sum Recipients Reporting Various Uses for All
of Their Most Recent Lump Sum Distribution by Demographic Characteristics, 1988

Worker characteristics
Age when most recent LS
was received
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over
Year in which most recent LS
was received
1988"
1987
1986
1985
1980-1984
1975-1979
1970-1974
Before 1970

Proportion of recipients using all of their lump sum distribution8
Mixed
consumption
Tax-qualified
Financial
Received LS
savings'1
and savings
Consumptionr
Savings'
from prior job financial savings'
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(thousands)1*
(%)

1,225
3,755
2,042
850
385

4
9
13
20
28

23
28
30
41
53

49
61
60
62
70

47
33
33
27
23

2
6
6
8
6

451
1,220
920
800
2,403
1,191
579
694

21
16
15
15
13
5
1
1

43
39
32
39
30
19
21
21

69
61
61
69
60
53
59
44

26
27
30
27
33
42
38
52

5
11
9
3
5
4
2
3

1988 earnings
$1 -$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000429,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
May 1988 pension status1
Nonparticipants
Participants

961
954
1,113
1,045
818
1,761
561

6
5
11
10
9
14
22

28
19
26
31
30
34
45

54
52
62
56
60
59
69

36
42
32
38
34
36
21

9
4
5
6
5
4
9

3,978
4,500

10
12

28
32

58
60

51
27

6
5

SOURCE: Data from Piacentim (1990b).
NOTE: Tabulations by the Employee Benefit Research Institute of the May 1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement.
a. For purposes of determining exclusive uses of LSs, "don't know" and missing responses were taken as "no" responses. For example, a worker whose
only "yes" response was to the IRA option was classified here as using his or her entire LS for "tax-qualified savings" even if the worker's response to one
or more nontax-qualified options was "don't know" or missing. Some workers did not respond "yes" to any of these options; therefore, mutually exclusive
horizontal percentages may add to less than 100 percent.
b. Individual items may not add to total because some respondents did not report some characteristics.
c. Includes IRAs, insurance annuities, and other retirement programs.
d.Includes tax-qualified savings, savings accounts, and other financial instruments.
e. Includes all financial savings, purchase of a house, payment of a mortgage, and payment of loans or debts.
f. Includes purchase of a car, education expenses, expenses incurred during a period of unemployment, and other uses.
g. Less than 0.5 percent.
h. Because the survey was conducted in May 1988, includes only LSs received in the first four to five months of 1988.
i. A worker is considered to be a pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401(k)-type plan at a
wage and salary job, or reported a self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.

Table 5.9
Proportion of Aggregate Amount of Lump Sum (LS) Distributions Used Entirely for Selected Purposes, 1988

Worker characteristic1*
Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Amount of most recent LS
$l-$499
$500-5999
$1,00042,499
$2,500-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$19,999
$20,000 or more
Not reported

Proportion of aggregate LS amounts reportedly used entirely for:8
Mixed
Financial
Received LS
Tax-qualified
consumption
from prior job financial savings'1
savings'
Savings'
Consumption8
and savings
(billions)6
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
48.1
44
21
70
22
9
32.9
15.1

19
29

44
46

71
68

19
26

11
6

46.5
1.1
0.4

22
4
34

45
18
57

70
49
69

21
31
30

9
15

0.3
0.7
2.7
4.4
7.9
8.9
23.2
12.7

3
7
7
15
17
25
26
24

19
28
23
34
35
43
53
49

48
57
57
63
68
68
75
76

50
39
38
31
24
19
16
16

b

1

3
5
5
8
13
9
7

Age when most recent LS was received
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over
Year in which most recent LS
was received
1988'
1987
1986
1985
1980-1984
1975-1979
1970-1974
Before 1970
1988 earnings
$1-59,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000-$29,999
$30,000-549,999
$50,000 or more

2.3
13.3
15.2
10.1
6.8

6
13
20
25
41

17
28
41
55
75

38
65
67
78
82

57
26
24
7
14

3
9
9
15
3

2.5
6.3
5.8
5.1
13.8
7.5
3.4
3.2

36
23
26
14
23
26
14

59
49
36
61
45
39
47
14

71
65
58
78
74
75
78
44

26
18
23
15
18
21
17
49

3
16
19
7
8
4
5
5

4.8
3.0
4.7
4.6
4.6
8.8
4.9

25
10
24
21
11
27
21

58
25
41
34
28
54
42

74
56
77
63
56
72
65

17
32
18
28
33
22
13

9
11
5
9
11
5
21

Table 5.9 (continued)
Proportion of Aggregate Amount of Lump Sum (LS) Distributions Used Entirely for Selected Purposes, 1988

Worker characteristic1*
May 1988 pension status1
Nonparticipants
Participants

Proportion of aggregate LS amounts reportedly used entirely for:8
Mixed
consumption
Financial
Tax-qualified
Received LS
and savings
Consumption8
Savings'
from prior job financial savings'1 savings'
(%)
(%)
(%)
(billions)'
(%)
(%)
21.5
26.6

21
22

41
47

70
69

20
22

9
9

SOURCE: Data from Piacenuni (1990b).
NOTE: Tabulations by the Employee Benefit Research Institute of the May 1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement.
a. Aggregate amounts are understated by an unknown amount. While 8.5 million workers are estimated to have received LSs as of May 1988, data on the
amount of the most recent LS received are available for just 7.1 million of these individuals; therefore, the aggregate amount of most recent LSs received
excludes the LSs received by the remaining 1.4 million workers. In addition, in the May 1988 CPS EBS public use database, all LSs reported to be
greater than $99,999 in nominal dollars have been topcoded at $99,999. An estimated 36,800 workers had received LSs equal to or in excess of this
amount as of May 1988; therefore, aggregate amounts are understated to the degree that the amounts received by these workers actually exceeded this
amount.
b. For purposes of determining exclusive uses of LSs, "don't know" and missing responses were taken as "no" responses. For example, a worker whose
only "yes" response was to the IRA option was classified here as using his or her enure LS for "tax-qualified savings" even if the worker's response to
one or more nontax-qualified options was "don't know" or missing. Some workers did not respond "yes" to any of these options; therefore, mutually
exclusive horizontal percentages may add to less than 100 percent.
c. Individual items may not add to total because some respondents did not report some characteristics.
d. Includes IRAs, insurance annuities, and other retirement programs.
e. Includes tax-qualified savings, savings accounts, and other financial instruments.
f.Includes all financial savings, purchase of a house, payment of a mortgage, and payment of loans or debts.
g.Includes purchase of a car, education expenses, expenses incurred during a penod of unemployment, and other uses.
h. Less than 0.5 percent
i. Because the survey was conducted in May 1988, includes only LSs received in the first four to five months of 1988.
j. A worker is considered to be a pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401 (k>type plan at a
wage and salary job, or reported a self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.

Table 5.10
Use of Lump Sum Distributions Before and After Major IRA Legislation, 1960-1988
Number rolling entire Percentage rolling Estimated 90 percent
confidence interval8
entire distribution
distribution
Recipients
Year received
(weighted estimates)
7.02
20.81
93,758
450,590
1988"
3.88
16.32
199,021
1,219,609
1987
4.30
14.80
136,160
919,929
1986
4.60
14.74
117,964
800,486
1985
5.96
14.66
69,612
474,866
1984
5.56
12.79
62,152
485,851
1983
5.57
13.06
64,465
493,629
1982
5.15
10.68
51,774
484,848
1981
5.72
12.91
59,826
463,352
1980
2.36
5.21
62,069
1,191,413
1975-1979
1.42
0.88
5,077
579,015
1970-1974
1.75
1.28
7,149
558,033
1960-1969
1.92
0.37
507
135,805
Before 1960
6.51
6.23
11,588
185,928
Don't know
0.00
0.00
0
34,275
Missing
1.25
11.10
941,122
8,477,629
Total

Year received

Recipients

Groupings and differences
Tax reform
1,670,199
1987-1988
3,174,761
1982-1986
Difference
IRA deduction expansion and IRA marketing
3,174,761
1982-1986
1,191,413
1975-1979
Difference
ERIS A and inception of IRAs
1,191,413
1975-1979
1,272,853
Before 1975
Difference

Table 5.10 (continued)
Number rolling entire Percentage rolling
entire distribution
distribution
(weighted estimates)

Estimated 90 percent
confidence interval0

292,779
450,353

17.53
14.19
3.34

3.41
2.27
4.10

450,353
62,069

14.19
5.21
8.98

2.27
2.36
3.28

62,069
12,733

5.21
1.00
4.21

2.36
1.02
2.58

SOURCE: Unpublished Employee Benefit Research Institute tabulations prepared by Joseph S. Piacentini for the U.S. Department of Labor,
a. Based on formula provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census as part of CPS documentation,
b. Part-year data—survey conducted in May 1988.
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Table 5.11
Calculation of Estimated Value of Preretirement Lump Sum
Distributions Not Placed in Retirement Savings, 1990
(Dollars in millions)_________________

Pension payments administrative data, 1987

Trusteed defined benefit payments paid to participants
(Form 5500)
Insurance payments (not including individual policies)
Total pension payments

$44,935
$16,390
$61,325

Pension payments survey data, 1987

December 1989 Current Population Survey
Retirees (private and self-empoyed)
Spouses of retirees (private estimate)
Total pension payments
Ratio of administrative to survey data (estimate of undercount)

$36,386
$5,724
$42,110
1.456

Preretirement distributions survey data, 1987

December 1989 Current Population Survey
Workers age 40-54—private sector
Nonworkers age 40-54—private sector
All individuals age 40-54
May 1988 Current Population Survey
Workers under age 40—private sector
All preretirement distributions

$2,823
$ 127
$2,950
$ 1,854
$4,805

Preretirement distributions, 1987

Adjusted for undercount

$6,998

Preretirement distributions, 1990

Rough adjustment to 1988 CPI
Rough adjustment to 1989 DC assets

$7,638
$8,393

Distributions not rolled over, 1990

Based on CPI adjustment
Based on DC asset adjustment

$5,958
$6,547

SOURCE: Fu Associates, Lump-Sum Distributions- A Comparison ofAdministrative and Survey
Dote. Arlington, VA: 1990.
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program, workers most likely to have invested lump sum distributions
in this way were older, were more recent recipients of a distribution,
were owners of an IRA in 1988, received dividends in 1988, and were
homeowners. The 1983 data found relatively high rates of savings for
retirement, using a similarly narrow definition, only among those who
received large lump sums and were either older or were college edu
cated (Atkins 1986).
Analysis of 1988 data found that recipients increasingly used taxqualified savings vehicles. Those who contributed to a current IRA
more commonly used a lump sum for retirement savings than for cur
rent spending. Since 1975, the use of IRAs as a repository for distribu
tions has steadily increased. Table 5.10 shows the use of rollovers to
IRAs by lump sum recipients pre- and post-major legislation. Follow
ing the imposition in 1987 of a 10 percent excise tax on lump sum dis
tributions that were not rolled over into another tax-qualified
retirement vehicle, the percentage of recipients making rollovers
increased, but the increase was not sufficiently large to be statistically
significant. Based on patterns in prior years, plans paid an estimated
$6.0 to $6.5 billion in 1990 preretirement distributions that job leavers
did not put into IRAs, annuities, or employer plans (Table 5.11).

CONCLUSIONS

Preretirement lump sum distributions became increasingly available
during the decade of the 1980s and the number of pension plan partici
pants who exercised the option to receive a lump sum at job change is
substantial, particularly among younger workers.
A large share of those who took a lump sum distribution did not roll
it over into a tax-qualified vehicle or other retirement plan. However,
the percentage of recipients using some part of a preretirement lump
sum distribution for tax-qualified savings increased during the 1980s.
NOTE
1. This chapter was written by Phyllis Fernandez.

Pensions and Layoffs
Quits are the focal point for most studies investigating the effects of
job change on pension benefit losses and the opposing effects of pen
sion benefit losses on job change. 1 Quits and layoffs are behaviorally
distinct, and portability policies designed to address quit-related issues
may fail to address important issues related to layoffs. Moreover,
unless layoffs are explicitly considered, portability policies could have
an undesirable impact on workers who lose their jobs or on firms who
must lay off workers to remain economically viable. This chapter pro
vides information on the magnitude of layoffs in the U.S. economy and
discusses the relative importance of quits versus layoffs. It also exam
ines possible effects of layoffs on portability losses.
LAYOFFS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY

Employers may find it necessary to dismiss their employees, either
because of poor economic conditions or because of poor performance
by the employee or the company. These dismissals can be temporary or
permanent. In a temporary layoff, a worker may be off the job for
weeks or months, but is eventually reemployed by the company that
initiated the layoff. A worker who is permanently laid off must either
find a new job or drop out of the labor force. Because temporary lay
offs are not relevant to pension portability issues, this chapter is con
cerned with permanent layoffs only.
Permanent layoffs sometimes result from deficient demand for the
company's product.2 Deficient demand can arise for two reasons. First,
it can result from structural changes in the economy, brought about by
competition from imports or loss of international competitiveness by
U.S. firms, automation and other types of technological change, chang
ing consumption patterns, or loss of regional competitiveness. Defi
cient demand can also occur as part of the business cycle.3 Both
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structural and cyclical layoffs and layoffs associated with a company's
poor performance manifest themselves through plant closings, plant
relocations, shift or position phaseouts, or closure of the entire busi
ness. Layoffs resulting from poor performance by the worker show up
as individual dismissals.
Before the mid-1980s, information on the number of permanent lay
offs was sketchy, and estimates ranged widely. However, in January
1984, the Bureau of Labor Statistics added a special supplement on
displaced workers to the Current Population Survey. This supplement,
which is referred to as the first Displaced Worker Survey (DWS), and
two additional supplements added in January 1986 and January 1988
are the primary sources for most of the information on the extent of
permanent layoffs in the U.S. economy.4
As shown in table 6.1, estimates from the first Displaced Worker
Survey indicate that 13.9 million workers 20 years of age and older
lost their jobs between January 1979 and January 1984 because of
plant closings, employers going out of business, or layoffs from which
they had not been recalled (Flaim and Sehgal 1985). Eliminating the
2.4 million workers who lost their jobs for seasonal reasons, or for
other reasons that could not be classified, leaves an estimated 11.5 mil
lion workers who were permanently laid off during this period. 5 The
second survey, which examined layoffs between January 1981 and Jan
uary 1986, estimates slightly fewer layoffs—approximately 10.8 mil
lion over the five-year period (Horvath 1987). This represents
approximately 2.2 million workers per year, as opposed to 2.3 million
for the 1979-84 period.
The number of layoffs varies over the business cycle, with more lay
offs occurring during economic downturns and fewer layoffs occurring
during upswings. Because the periods covered by both the first and
second surveys included severe recessions, layoff estimates of 2.2 and
2.3 million workers per year are probably at the high end of the range
when averaging over a business cycle. The third Displaced Worker
Survey was conducted during an economic upswing; it examined lay
offs between January 1983 and January 1988. Unfortunately, the infor
mation published from this survey does not include an estimate of the
total number of permanent layoffs; instead, it presents information on
the number of permanent layoffs among workers with three or more
years of tenure. By comparing this information with similar informa-
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tion from the first two surveys, it is estimated that during this period
2.0 million workers per year were permanently laid off.6 Combining
this estimate with the estimates from the two previous surveys suggests
that during the decade of the 1980s an average of 2.0 to 2.3 million
workers were permanently laid off from their jobs each year.
Table 6.1
Layoff Statistics, 1979-1988
(in millions of workers)
First
Second
DWS
DWS
Number of workers losing jobs
13.9
NA
Number of workers permanently
laid off
11.5
10.8
-with 1 or more years of tenure
7.1
6.8
-with 2 or more years of tenure
6.9
NA
-with 3 or more years of tenure
5.1
5.1
-with 5 or more years of tenure
3.2
NA

Third
DWS
NA
NA
NA
NA
4.6
NA

SOURCES. Flaim and Sehgal (1985), U.S. Department of Labor (1985); Horvath (1987); Herz
(1990).
NOTE: The first Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) covers the penod between January 1979 and
January 1984; the second DWS covers January 1981 through January 1986; and the third DWS
covers January 1983 through January 1988.

In general, there are more quits than layoffs in U.S. labor markets.7
However, the quit rate, like the layoff rate, varies over the business
cycle—except that quits are higher when the economy is booming and
lower when the economy is in recession. As a result, there may be
some years when layoffs exceed quits. Data from the Employment and
Training Report of the President (1982, table C-13) show that although
the (temporary and permanent) layoff rate was considerably higher
than the quit rate throughout the first half of the 1960s, this was the
case in only three years (1975, 1980, and 1981) between 1965 and
1981.
The situation appears to be similar for pension plan participants; in
general, for these workers the number of quits exceeds the number of
layoffs. Using panel data for males age 31-50 from the 1983-86 Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the 1984-87 Panel Study of Income
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Dynamics (PSID), Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) show that 60 per
cent of the males who had a pension on their initial job and who
changed jobs reported that they changed jobs voluntarily. The statistics
are similar to the rates for job changers who did not have a pension.
According to the SCF, 59 percent of the job change by those without a
pension on their initial job were voluntary; in the PSID, the figure was
64 percent.8

LAYOFFS AND LOSS OF PENSION BENEFITS

As is the case with quits, layoffs can result in pension benefit losses.
This section first attempts to identify the number of workers who are at
risk of pension benefit loss. This is followed by a discussion of the
types of benefit losses that may be incurred by workers who are laid
off.
Pension Coverage of Laid-off Workers

Evidence on the number, or percentage, of laid-off workers who are
covered by a pension is sketchy. Unfortunately, none of the three Dis
placed Worker Surveys includes any questions about pensions, so they
cannot be used to determine pension coverage among laid-off workers.
Instead it is necessary to turn to other sources.
These sources suggest that a smaller portion of laid-off workers are
covered by pension plans than is the case for workers as a whole.9
Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) present descriptive statistics indicat
ing that 40.7 percent of the involuntary movers in their sample from
the 1984-87 PSID were covered by a pension on their lost job, whereas
60.6 percent of their entire sample was covered. Calculations based on
descriptive statistics from the Survey of Income and Program Partici
pation (SIPP) and the SCF make a similar point (Gustman and Stein
meier 1990, tables 1, Al, and A4). In the SIPP, 39.6 percent of the
involuntary movers had a pension in their initial job, while this figure
was 63.7 percent for the sample as a whole. The SCF figures were 63.6
percent and 74.8 percent. 10 All three samples consisted of males who
were 31-50 years old at the beginning of the sample period.
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In an earlier study using the National Longitudinal Survey of
Mature Men, Fames and King (1977, p. 83) found that about half of
their sample of displaced workers were covered by pensions, versus
three-quarters of nondisplaced workers. They examined male wage
and salary workers over age 45 who had been with their employer for
over five years and who were permanently separated from the
employer between 1966 and 1971.
It is tempting to conclude from this evidence that between 40 and 60
percent of the 2.0 to 2.3 million workers who were permanently laid
off each year during the 1980s were covered by a pension. However,
because the samples cover males only, this is not correct. Females have
a lower probability of being laid off than their male counterparts, and
this results in an overrepresentation of males among displaced work
ers. 11 Despite this problem, the information can be used, along with
other data, to arrive at a rough estimate.
Estimates of the number of displaced workers (from the Displaced
Worker Survey) include both male and female full-time and part-time
workers. According to data from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
pension supplement, the pension coverage rate for full-time and parttime workers was 42 to 43 percent during the 1980s (Beller and
Lawrence 1992). 12 Assuming that the ratio between the percentage of
laid-off workers covered by a pension and the percentage of all work
ers covered by a pension is roughly the same in the CPS data as it is in
Gustman and Steinmeier's PSID data, and assuming that the distribu
tion of full-time versus part-time workers in the CPS supplement on
displaced workers is the same as it is in the CPS pension supplement, it
is estimated that during the 1980s slightly less than 30 percent of the
2.0 to 2.3 million laid-off workers were covered by a pension. This
implies that between one-half and two-thirds of a million workers lose
all or some of their pension benefits each year due to layoffs.13
Pension Losses Associated with Vesting Requirements

Laid-off workers who are unvested lose their rights to future retire
ment benefits. Although estimates of the number of unvested laid-off
workers are not available, some information can be gleaned from the
tenure statistics for displaced workers. Current regulations require
vesting after five years for most workers. 14 According to the first Dis-
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placed Worker Survey, approximately 28 percent of the 11.5 million
workers who were permanently laid off between January 1979 and
January 1984 had five or more years of tenure (table 6.1). 15 This sug
gests that about 70 percent of the 550,000 to 600,000 pension-covered
workers who lose their jobs each year also lose their pensions because
they have not vested.
This estimate is certainly too high. For pension participants as a
whole, only 23 percent of all private-sector full-time pension plan par
ticipants are not vested (Piacentini 1990b). 16 Because displaced work
ers generally have less tenure than the population as a whole (Blau and
Kahn 1981; Madden 1988), it is reasonable that a larger percentage of
displaced workers will not be vested. However, a 50 percent differen
tial is not realistic.
Part of the differential can be attributed to the fact that the data from
the Displaced Worker Survey are not strictly comparable to those for
all pension participants. In particular, the DWS statistics include parttime workers, which inflates the estimate of the percentage of workers
who are not vested. Another part of the differential is due to the fact
that a small number of pension plans offer full and immediate vesting,
so that at least some of the displaced workers with fewer than five
years of tenure will be vested. A third factor in the differential is that
the pension participant statistics are for workers with partial as well as
full vesting, whereas the Displaced Worker Survey tenure statistics are
proxies for the full vesting standards. Finally, the major part of the dif
ferential is probably due to tenure statistics being a poor proxy for
vesting statistics.
The data for pension participants suggest that this is the case. Based
on these data, 54 percent of all private-sector full-time workers have
fewer than five years of tenure (Piacentini 1990b, table 1). However,
data from the same source indicate that only 23 percent of all privatesector full-time pension plan participants are not vested. The most
likely explanation for this discrepancy is that workers who participate
in pension plans tend to have more years on the job than workers who
do not participate. If this is true for displaced workers—and there is no
reason to suggest it is not—then considerably less than 70 percent of
the 550,000 to 600,000 pension-covered workers who lose their job
each year are unvested.
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Pension Losses Associated with Back load ing
As is the case for workers who quit, a laid-off worker who is fully
vested in a defined benefit plan will suffer a pension benefit loss even if
he/she is able to immediately find a new job offering the same compen
sation package as the old job. This is because in a defined benefit plan
benefits are frequently tied to wages near retirement. A worker who is
laid off before retirement will receive benefits based on his/her wage
before the layoff. Because these benefits are generally not adjusted to
take into account inflation occurring between the layoff and the time at
which the employee would have been eligible to retire, the worker will
suffer a benefit loss.
Displaced workers who are covered by defined contribution plans
will generally not incur losses due to backloading. Thus whether this
type of benefit loss is an important policy issue for displaced workers
depends in part on how many of these workers are covered by defined
benefit plans. In the workplace as a whole, about 68 percent of all
workers in pension plans participate in a defined benefit plan (Beller
and Lawrence 1992, p. 6). However, this percentage may not be as
high for displaced workers. Dorsey (1987) finds a positive relationship
between permanent layoffs and the primary pension plan being a
defined contribution plan. Using industry layoff rates, he finds that a
one standard deviation increase in the permanent layoff rate (.20 per
100 workers) raises the likelihood of defined contribution coverage by
about 2 percent. When the probability of permanent layoffs is high,
companies may tend to offer defined contribution plans rather than
defined benefit plans. This could occur, for example, if the company
recognizes that it is susceptible to intense foreign or domestic competi
tion, automation, or changing consumption patterns. In this way,
employees will not suffer a loss from backloading if they are laid off. 17
Pension Losses Associated with Lump Sum Distributions
A third major source of pension portability loss stems from prere
tirement lump sum distributions. It is likely that the percentage of laidoff workers who receive lump sum distributions is higher than for the
workforce as a whole. Although laid-off workers frequently receive
unemployment insurance, severance benefits, trade adjustment assis
tance, and so forth, some may need additional money to carry them
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through a lengthy period of unemployment. For this reason, a higher
percentage of laid-off workers may elect to receive a lump sum distri
bution and use all or part of it for current consumption.
A low percentage of workers receiving lump sum distributions use
them for expenses incurred during unemployment (Piacentini 1990b).
Only 11 percent of lump-sum recipients use any of their distribution
for nondiscretionary consumption (educational expenses and expenses
incurred during a period of unemployment), and only 8 percent use all
of the distribution for this purpose.18 However, even though a small
percentage of lump-sum recipients use their distribution to carry them
through a period of unemployment, the distribution could be quite
important for that minority.

CONCLUSIONS

At least half a million pension-covered workers are laid off each
year. While some of them suffer large pension losses, as well as a loss
in earnings, two factors mitigate the loss for many workers. First,
workers who are laid off tend to have relatively short job tenure. Sec
ond, workers who are laid off are more likely to have a primary defined
contribution plan than are other pension covered workers.
NOTES
1. This chapter was written by Tabitha Doescher.
2. Some permanent layoffs manifest themselves as opportunistic behavior on the part of the
firm. For example, a firm may promise pensions to some of its workers and then lay off some
workers so that it does not have to meet its pension obligations. The firm could be engaging m
deceptive behavior (which would be illegal) or it could be responding to unexpected changes in
its situation (e.g., changes brought about by deficient demand).
3. Many of the layoffs associated with a cyclical downswing will be temporary rather than
permanent. However, some cyclical layoffs become permanent layoffs. This would be the case for
example, when a cyclical decline lasts for several years.
4. All respondents to the January 1984, 1986, and 1988 CPS were asked if they or a member
of their household age 20 or older had lost or left a job in the previous five years because of a
plant closing, an employer going out of business, a layoff from which the individual was not
recalled, or other similar reasons. An affirmative response led to additional questions about the
reason for the job loss, the nature of the lost job (e.g., when it was lost, years of tenure, and earn
ings), and the individual's unemployment and reemployment experience. The three data bases
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compiled from these Displaced Worker Surveys thus contain a wealth of information about lay
offs during the 1980s.
5. This estimate does not (in concept) include workers who were discharged for cause. As a
result, data from the DWS slightly underestimate the number of permanent layoffs. Using a small
sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of mature men, Parnes and King (1977) found that
7.1 percent of the layoffs which occurred between 1966 and 1971 were discharges. The underesti
mate from the DWS is probably not that large since some discharged workers may rationalize that
they were laid off because of slack work rather than fired for cause and may therefore be included
in the survey. Another possible source of underestimation is the recall bias which may occur when
an individual is asked to recall a past event Some respondents apparently forget layoffs that
occurred several years ago.
6. This estimate was obtained by (1) using both the first and second DWS to calculate the
number of displaced workers with three or more years of tenure as a percentage of the number of
workers who were permanently laid off (regardless of tenure), (2) taking the average of this per
centage across both surveys and applying it to the number of displaced workers from the third
DWS with three or more years of tenure to estimate total permanent layoffs over the five years
covered by the third survey, and (3) dividing the estimate of total permanent layoffs by five to
obtain an estimate of average annual layoffs. Data from the third DWS are from Herz (1990).
7. The distinction between quits and layoffs can be fuzzy Some workers may quit their jobs in
anticipation of being laid off or fired, while others may be laid off or fired immediately before the
time they would have quit on their own.
8. Gustman and Stemmeier also examine panel data for males age 31 - 50 from the 1984-87
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and these data tell a different story. First, in
the SIPP data the number of quits is less than the number of layoffs among pension plan partici
pants: only 43 percent of the SIPP job changers changed jobs voluntarily. Second, the SIPP data
suggest that the incidence of involuntary turnover is considerably higher for job changers with
pensions than for those without pensions: approximately 59 percent of the SIPP job changers who
were without a pension on their initial job changed jobs voluntarily. In all likelihood, the reason
for the discrepancy between the SIPP statistics and the SCF and PSID statistics rests with prob
lems classifying job changes as quits or layoffs. In the SIPP data, of a total of 107 job changes,
only 37 could be classified as either voluntary or involuntary. For this reason, the SCF and PSID
data are probably more reliable for analyzing voluntary and involuntary turnover among job
changers than the SIPP data.
9. One explanation for this is that jobs with a high probability of layoffs are less likely to offer
pensions. Another possibility is that workers who are laid off have different characteristics than
workers in general, and these characteristics are associated with low pension coverage. The evi
dence on this second possibility is unclear. For example, a disproportionate number of laid-off
workers are from the manufacturing industry, which typically has a high rate of pension coverage.
Estimates from the DWS suggest that about 40 to 50 percent of displaced workers were in jobs in
manufacturing (Flaim and Sehgal 1985; Horvath 1987; Herz 1990). In addition, a disproportion
ate number of laid-off workers are male (about 64 percent in each of the three DWS), and males
tend to have higher pension coverage rates. On the other hand, there is some speculation that
small companies tend to have higher plant closing rates than large companies (Howland and
Peterson 1988, p. 49); however, the pension coverage rate is lower at small firms than at large
firms (Even and Macpherson 1990).
10. The reason for the difference in magnitude between the SCF statistics and the PSID and
SIPP statistics is not clear, but may have something to do with small sample sizes and problems
with the data (discussed in Gustman and Steinmeier 1990a and 1990b).
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11. Both Blau and Kahn (1981) and Maxwell and D'Amico (1986) find that women have a
lower probability of being laid off. Each of the Displaced Worker Surveys shows that approxi
mately two out of three displaced workers were men (Flaim and Sehgal 198S; Horvath 1987; Herz
1990).
12. Covered workers includes those who have met a plan's eligibility requirements and are
participating in the plan. It does not include workers who are employed with firms sponsoring a
plan but who are not enrolled because they (a) do not meet age and/or service requirements, (b)
are in an employee group excluded from the plan, or (c) chose not to participate.
13. This number should be used with caution. The estimate is based on the assumptions men
tioned in the text, and it is not known whether these assumptions are valid. In addition, the reader
should keep in mind that layoffs vary over the business cycle.
14. More specifically, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 sets out the following minimum vesting
requirements: for plans with cliff vesting, it requires 100 percent vesting after five years (ten years
for multiemployer plans); for plans with graduated vesting, it requires 100 percent vesting after
seven years (20 percent after three years and 20 percent additional in each of the next four years).
See Graham (1988) for a more complete discussion.
15. For these workers, the minimum vesting requirements were those specified by ERISA:
100 percent vesting after 10 years for plans with cliff vesting; 100 percent vesting after IS years
for plans with graduated vesting; the "rule of 45" for plans with alternative graded vesting; and a
provision that each class must vest after five years for plans with class-year vesting. Since the pur
pose of this section is to get a ballpark estimate of the number of laid-off workers who might be
expected to lose their pension rights under current regulations (rather than to estimate what actu
ally happened to these particular workers), the current standard of five years of tenure is used.
16. Using the employee benefits supplement of the May 1988 CPS, Piacentim (1990b, Table
3) reports that 37 percent of all private-sector full-time workers are at least partially vested on
their current job. Since 48 percent of all private-sector full-time workers are currently participat
ing in a pension plan (Piacentim 1990b, Table 1), this suggests that 77 percent of all private-sector
full-time pension plan participants are vested. This implies that 23 percent are not vested.
17. Dorsey suggests an alternate explanation. He views the rate of permanent layoff as a proxy
for firm-financed specific training, with a high layoff rate indicating a low level of specific train
ing. Companies in which workers have low levels of specific training have less incentive to
attempt to tie workers to the firm and thus exhibit a higher incidence of defined contribution plans.
18. Note that these statistics will vary over the business cycle.

Pension Portability
in the United States
The U.S. pension system provides workers some portability through
vesting, multiemployer plans, reciprocity, and portability networks.
Although some portability arrangements currently benefit few work
ers, they are a logical starting point for discussing portability policy
because they demonstrate options that could be extended to more
workers.

PORTABILITY OF BENEFITS

An unvested job leaver loses all rights to a pension. 1 Prior to the pas
sage of ERISA in 1974, some plans required workers to stay until
retirement to vest. Dan McGill (1972) wrote, "The most sensitive (pen
sion) issue of the moment is whether a pension plan should be required
by law to provide for vesting prior to retirement" (p. 322, italics from
the original). For full-time workers in 1972, only 53 percent of men
and 39 percent of women covered by a private pension plan who had
worked 20 to 24 years for one employer were vested (table 7.1).
Many plans before ERISA required a sum of age and service for
vesting, 40 being the norm (McGill 1972, p. 11). A break in service
before vesting canceled all accumulated benefit credits, and they were
usually not restored if the worker returned to the firm. Some plans
made former employees forfeit benefits if they worked for a competi
tor. Discouraging employees from working for competitors helped pre
serve the firm's trade secrets and protected it from competing against
workers it had trained. Some firms also denied benefits to any
employee guilty of misconduct. This action punished workers and
secured restitution.
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Table 7.1
Vesting Status of Private Pension-Covered Workers, 1972
Length of
employment
(in years)
Total8
Less than 5
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25 or more
Total8
Less than 5
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25 or more
Total8
Less than 5
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25 or more

Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Percentage distribution by vested status
No
Don't
response
know
Not vested
Vested
Total
1
15
51
32
1
20
60
20
1
16
59
25
1
15
49
36
41
47
1
11
b
12
38
50
3
10
37
51
Men
1
15
50
34
1
19
59
21
1
16
58
25
48
1
14
36
1
10
39
49
b
36
11
53
2
37
52
9
Women
1
18
55
26
22
61
16
1
1
15
60
24
b
15
50
34
c
47
14
39
46
2
13
39
6
14
32
47

SOURCES: Bureau of the Census; Kolodrubetz and Landay (1973).
a. Vested status totals include workers not responding to length of employment on current job,

not shown separately.
b. Less than 0.5 percent.
c. Not calculated where base is less than 200,000.
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The passage of ERISA improved worker status by offering benefit
protection through vesting requirements. Once vested, an employee
cannot become divested. Plans may use any vesting method with a
waiting period not exceeding ERISA standards. Two common methods
are cliff vesting and graded vesting.
Under cliff vesting, in which a worker jumps from zero to full vest
ing after working a specified period of time, ERISA initially required
workers to fully vest within 10 years. Large defined benefit plans typi
cally used this schedule. In a nationally representative survey taken
prior to enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,90 percent of plans
using cliff vesting had a 10-year waiting period (U.S. General
Accounting Office 1990).
Under graded vesting, in which the percentage of vested benefits
periodically rises until the worker is fully vested, ERISA's standard
(initially) required that, at a minimum, a worker be partially vested
after five years, and his/her vesting rights rise a fixed percentage yearly
until reaching full vesting after 15 years. Small defined contribution
plans used this schedule.
Disability, death, or early retirement benefits generally do not vest if
they are more generous than the actuarial equivalent to normal retire
ment benefits. To receive these benefits, the employee must be working
for the employer when the contingency occurs.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 shortened vesting for single-employer
pension plans. It cut the maximum years a worker must wait for full
vesting from 10 to 5 for cliff vesting. For graded vesting, it cut the 5to-15-year period to 3 to 7 years, with 20 percent vesting after 3 years.
The Tax Reform Act lowered the minimum age for vesting credit from
22 to 18 years old.
Multiemployer plans, to which several employers contribute under
collective bargaining agreements, satisfy the Tax Reform Act's require
ments if participants fully vest after 10 years. Participants in these
plans earn credit for service with any employer funding the plan. Mul
tiemployer lobbyists argue that longer vesting schedules are appropri
ate for their plans because participants still earn service towards
vesting after switching jobs. As a result, job leavers vest in situations
where vesting would not occur in a single-employer plan.
The U.S. General Accounting Office (1990) studied the accelerated
vesting required by the Tax Reform Act. Under the old rules, many
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participants in cliff plans did not work long enough to become vested,
but would be fully vested under the new rules. The GAO figured that 9
of 10 plans of large employers had to cut the years required for vesting
to comply with the Tax Reform Act. By contrast, half the plans of
small employers had to change vesting rules. The Employee Benefit
Research Institute estimated the added cost of five-year cliff vesting at
2 to 7 percent of private pension plan contributions to the system as a
whole (Employee Benefit Research Institute 1986a).
ERISA demands more stringent vesting standards in some cases.
Accrued benefits deriving from the worker's contributions must vest
immediately. Worker contributions and salary reduction contributions
to a qualified cash or deferred arrangement—a 401(k) plan—as well as
the investment earnings from those contributions, also must be fully
vested and nonforfeitable at all times. Similarly, contributions to a
Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) must vest immediately. SEPs
were authorized through the Revenue Act of 1978 to enable smaller
employers to start pensions without the complexity and administrative
expense of a traditional pension plan.
Faster vesting standards, set by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi
bility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), are also required for "top- heavy" plans.
A top-heavy plan, by definition, provides most of the benefits to key
workers, including the company's owners, officers, and highly com
pensated workers. One of two vesting standards must be met. The first
requires the worker to fully vest after three years. The second standard
is six-year graded vesting, in which the worker must be at least 20 per
cent vested after two years, with this percentage rising over four more
years, until 100 percent vesting is reached after six years.
Congress enacted TEFRA legislation to ensure that plans of smaller
employers provided broadly based coverage for all workers, not just
for those with an ownership or management position. In 1987, 57 per
cent of defined benefit plans were top-heavy. However, 84 percent of
top-heavy plans had less than 10 participants (Turner and Beller 1992).

PORTABILITY OF SERVICE

Portability of service is the transfer of service credit between plans
of different employers when a worker changes jobs. It is predomi-
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nantly an issue for defined benefit plans. It is usually not an issue for
defined contribution plans because employer contributions are based
only on current salary, with service not affecting the amount the
employer or employee contributes to the plan. In some defined contri
bution plans, however, the employer contributes a larger share of sal
ary for workers with long tenure.
Multiemployer Plans

Multiemployer pension plans, which are predominantly defined
benefit plans, provide portability of service. They are collectively bar
gained plans covering workers in an industry or craft within a fixed
geographic area. They enable workers to change jobs without losing
service credit when they resume work with another employer in the
plan.
Multiemployer plans typically develop in industries with certain
features. First, the industry has many small firms within a single geo
graphic labor market. Second, the industry has high turnover of firms.
Third, the industry has high worker turnover. Fourth, the industry is
skilled-labor-intensive. Multiemployer plans are common in construc
tion, trucking, the merchant marine and coal mining. Of the 3,066 multiemployer plans in 1988, 35 percent were defined contribution plans
(Turner and Beller 1992, p. 590).
The decline in unionism has reduced the importance of multiemployer plans. The share of private pension participants in multiemployer plans fell from 19.8 to 14.8 percent from 1975 to 1988 (1\irner
and Beller 1992, p. 592).
Reciprocity

Service-credit transfer arrangements among plans are known as rec
iprocity agreements. Under these contracts, several plans, usually multiemployer plans covering members of local unions with the same
international union, agree to give pension credit for service under any
of the plans. With reciprocity, "two, or more, financially independent
pension plans will each recognize employee service credited in the
other participating plan, or plans, for the purposes of (1) establishing
an employee's eligibility to accrue benefit credits, (2) determining an
employee's entitlement to receive benefits from a plan, and/or (3)
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determining the benefits payable to an employee" (McDonald 1975).
Reciprocity may be between plans of unrelated employers, related
employers, or the same employer.
Reciprocity agreements are common among multiemployer plans.
In multiemployer arrangements, the plan rather than a particular
employer ultimately pays the benefits. Between 45 and 50 percent of
multiemployer plans have reciprocity with another plan (Meier and
Bassett 1981). These agreements are concentrated in motor transporta
tion, clothing, construction, and water transportation industries.
Reciprocity is uncommon among single-employer plans. The only
study on portability and reciprocity agreements among singleemployer plans, using 1975 data, found that only 8 percent of singleemployer plans had reciprocity with unrelated employers (Grubbs
1981). Reciprocity agreements are more common among very large
plans. For plans with 1,000 or more participants, 20 percent of defined
benefit plans and 19 percent of defined contribution plans had reciproc
ity agreements.
The prevalence of reciprocity arrangements varies greatly by indus
try and union status. For plans overall, 8 percent of both collectively
bargained and noncollectively bargained plans had reciprocal arrange
ments. In the finance, insurance, and real estate industry sector, 54 per
cent of collectively bargained plans and 4 percent of noncollectively
bargained plans had portability or reciprocity arrangements with plans
of other employers. In manufacturing, however, the figures dropped to
7 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
Reciprocity agreements take two forms.2 Under the "money follows
the worker" approach, a pension member working temporarily in
another jurisdiction has the pension contribution that jurisdiction
requires sent to his/her "home" plan. The employee receives pension
credits for the contributions according to the rules of the home plan.
The second form of reciprocity agreement is the "pro rata" approach,
where a pension participant accruing credits under several plans will
receive a pension benefit from each. The sum due from each is figured
as though combined service applied to that plan, and it is then prorated
according to service in that plan. Under this approach money is not
transferred between plans. Reciprocity preserves benefits by broaden
ing the definition of continuing service. It is thus similar to break-in-
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service rules, allowing workers to return to an employer and count ser
vice before and after the break.
Portability Networks

A portability network, or clearinghouse, holds pension funds and
combined benefits from various plans. There are 11 centrally adminis
tered networks or clearinghouses of unrelated employers, all but two of
which have been operating since 1963.
Each of these networks covers a single industry's workers and per
mits service portability for workers transferring between employers in
the network. The largest network is the Teachers Insurance and Annu
ity Association and the related College Retirement Equities Fund
(TIAA-CREF). Some others are the National Automobile Dealers
Association, the National Health and Welfare Mutual Life Insurance
Association, the National Education Association, and the Savings
Banks Retirement System.
The networks have various arrangements to transfer vested credits
between employers. AT&T provides a good example. The divestiture
of AT&T on January 1, 1984, prompted the formation of a new porta
bility network, resulting in the division of two pension plans—cover
ing one million workers—into eight plans (Schmitt 1988). The new
plans for each regional holding company accepted the service credits
for reassigned workers or those who otherwise moved between or
among AT&T and the divested companies and former Bell System
workers who returned to work with AT&T. Service credit for figuring
benefit eligibility and amounts is recognized as if there were a single
company.
Grubbs (1981) studied 25 portability networks, including networks
among related employers. The networks were classified into two
groups. The first consisted of the 10 centrally administered portability
clearinghouses existing at the time covering employers not under com
mon control. The second, comprised of other portability networks and
plans with portability aspects, consisted of pension plans of a single
employer or an employer group under common control, and some
plans offering portability to any other pension plan.
Grubbs obtained data on nine of the ten centrally administered net
works, the oldest of which began in 1918. Some networks, such as the
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National Automobile Dealers Association, were started by employer
associations formed for other purposes. Others, like TIAA-CREF,
formed to meet retirement needs of employers and workers in an
industry, but are not affiliated with an employer association having
other functions. Some networks have only a single plan or a single plan
type; others sponsor various plans. Individual employers choose to par
ticipate in one or more types. Together, the nine networks covered 2
percent of active U.S. pension participants.
Because each network is limited to a single industry, workers often
move among participating employers. If a social worker employed by
one employer in the National Health and Welfare network ends
employment, his/her next employer in all probability will be a partici
pating employer in that network.
The nine networks are nonprofit, but with differing forms of organi
zation. The TIAA-CREF and National Health and Welfare plans are
organized as life insurance companies. Others are organized as trusts,
with management by the trust or a related company. The portability
they provide varies. Service with any participating employer is often
treated as service with the current employer in figuring worker eligibil
ity to participate in, vest in, or receive benefits from the plan. If a
worker is entitled to benefits based on employment with several
employers, most networks combine the benefits into a single check.
The clearinghouses allocate benefit liabilities differently. For
defined contribution plans, each employer's cost for benefits is the sum
of the contributions allocated to its workers. For defined benefit plans,
actuaries figure costs for each employer as though a separate plan were
maintained for that firm. Or, they figure costs for the network, or some
segment of it, and an allocation is made to individual employers, per
haps as an equal share of pay for all employers with the same benefit
formula. Even if the network calculates costs separately for each
employer, the service of all retired workers is usually combined. This
is done by purchasing annuities at retirement or by using a similar
uninsured approach.
All nine networks handle most of the administrative work for the
plans, thus minimizing the administrative work for individual employ
ers. The networks often maintain direct communication with individual
participants. Four networks provided data showing that from 2 to 15
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percent of retiring participants receive benefits from employment with
multiple employers.
Case Studies of Portability Networks

The National Automobile Dealers and Associates Retirement Trust
(NADART) serves retail automobile dealerships belonging to the
National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA). If a worker trans
fers between employers with NADART money purchase or profit shar
ing plans and the new employer agrees, the worker's vested account
balance is transferred to the new employer's plan. If a worker transfers
between defined benefit plans, service in one plan counts towards vest
ing in the other.
The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA) incorpo
rated as a legal reserve life insurance company in 1918. The College
Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), founded in 1952, is a companion
organization. CREF provides variable annuities with values depending
on the common stocks in which the premiums are invested. All partici
pating employers are nonprofit colleges, universities, independent
schools, and related nonprofit research and educational institutions. In
1981, 80 percent of four-year colleges and universities provided
TIAA-CREF coverage. Of the 3,200 participating institutions, 450
were publicly supported colleges and universities. The TIAA-CREF
system uses fully portable individual annuity contracts. These con
tracts are vested in and owned by individual workers from the date
they are issued.
The Savings Banks Retirement System provides benefits for
employees of mutual savings banks. This system consists of 120
employers in seven states. Portability differs among the employers. In
most plans, the service earned by a worker under a prior plan in the
system counts towards eligibility for early retirement, disability retire
ment, and preretirement spouse's benefits. Nineteen plans recognize
prior service with a former system employer for figuring benefits. The
benefit based on total service is offset by any benefit available from the
prior plan. In effect, this results in the current employer raising the
benefit accrued with prior employers.
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Controlled Groups
Portability is also available within a controlled group, which is
defined as a group of firms with 80 percent or more common owner
ship.3 While pension law does not require service portability among
unrelated employers, it does require some service portability among
related employers, which includes firms under common control, trades
or businesses (whether or not incorporated) under common control,
and some affiliated service groups.
ERISA requires that work for all employers in a controlled group be
counted as work for a single employer in calculating a worker's eligi
bility to participate and, later, to vest in a plan. Thus, the service of a
worker transferring to a related employer must be used in figuring
whether the worker is vested under the new employer's plan, but it
need not be used in calculating a worker's benefit. As a business prac
tice, some employers count all service with controlled group members
when determining benefit levels.
If a firm is sold to a new owner, federal law also requires an
employer maintaining a plan of a predecessor employer to treat service
for the predecessor as service for the current employer.
Large Firms
The extent of portability can be measured by the relationship
between the plans having such arrangements. The most extensive situ
ation is portability applying to unrelated employers. Less extensive is
portability applying to plans of related (controlled group) employers.
Least extensive is portability applying only to the same employer's
plans. If a job change within a large firm requires the worker to change
pension plans, the plans generally are set up so that the worker loses no
future pension benefits.

PORTABILITY OF ASSETS

Preretirement Distributions
Portability of assets is the transfer of a worker's pension assets from
one plan to another when he/she changes jobs. Defined contribution
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plans often give the worker a lump sum of money when he/she leaves
the firm. The cashout is the worker's account value.
Present law allows portability of assets by permitting them to be
rolled over, or transferred, from one tax-favored retirement arrange
ment to another. It also induces workers to save money received from
pension plans for retirement. Vested workers enrolled in defined contri
bution plans do not lose benefits unless they opt to receive a lump sum.
If they leave their money in the plan, the account accumulates invest
ment earnings as if the workers had not changed jobs.
Transfers from Plans
Funds generally cannot be distributed to a worker from a pension
plan before the end of employment, but contributions to profit-sharing
and stock bonus plans are distributable within two years of the contri
bution, even if the job has not ended. Some employers prefer not to
offer lump sum distributions from defined benefit plans because doing
so reduces the plan's funding ratio for underfunded plans.
Many plans cash out benefits of under $3,500 because the employer
wants to avoid the administrative burden of managing small accounts
for former employees. If the worker's present value of benefits exceeds
$3,500, the benefit cannot be distributed before the earliest of normal
retirement age or 62, unless the worker consents to the distribution.
Workers with benefits with present values of more than $3,500 may opt
to leave the benefits in the plan until retirement age, thus preserving
the benefits until retirement.
Tax Treatment of Preretirement Distributions
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 encourages workers to save preretire
ment lump sum distributions. It imposes a 10 percent tax if lump sum
distributions are not rolled over into an IRA or an employer-sponsored
plan within 60 days of receipt. Because the tax is an income tax, it
applies to the part of a lump sum ineluctable in income. In 1992 the fur
ther requirement of 20 percent withholding was added on distributions
not rolled over within 60 days.
The tax does not apply to the following distributions: (1) those
received after age 59 1/2; (2) those received due to the individual's
death; (3) those received due to the individual's disability; (4) those
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used to pay medical expenses that would be deductible if the individual
itemized deductions (not applicable to IRAs);4 (5) those paid as equal
periodic payments over the life expectancy of the individual (or the
joint life expectancies of the individual and spouse); (6) those made for
a worker separating from service after age 55 (not applicable to IRAs);
(7) those received from an employee stock ownership plan; or (8) those
made under a qualified domestic relations order in a divorce settlement
(not applicable to IRAs).
The Tax Reform Act further induces workers not to take preretire
ment distributions. Under prior law, an individual receiving a lump
sum distribution could apply 10-year income averaging to the distribu
tion. The Act phased out 10-year forward averaging, allowing workers
instead a one-time five-year forward average for a lump sum distribu
tion after the worker reaches age 59-1/2. Also, under prior law, that
portion of a distribution attributable to contributions before January 1,
1974, could qualify as a long-term capital gain. The Act phased out the
use of long- term capital gains treatment over six years.
The Tax Reform Act also changed rules on the treatment of tax basis
when an individual receives a distribution from a tax-favored retire
ment arrangement to which he/she and the employer have contributed.
If the worker received a sum before the date the plan began paying the
worker an annuity, prior law treated the worker as first receiving nontaxable income and then receiving taxable income. The Act modified
the basis recovery rules for pre-annuity starting date distributions to
provide for the pro-rata recovery of basis. Thus, a worker is entitled to
exclude from taxation a portion of the payment figured by multiplying
the payment by the ratio of his/her basis to the accrued benefit under
the plan. In making this change, Congress decided the prior rule per
mitted the accelerated tax-free recovery of worker contributions and
thus encouraged the nonretirement use of tax-favored retirement
arrangements.
Rollovers

A rollover is a tax-free transfer of pension assets from one plan to
another. A worker receiving a lump sum distribution from an
employer-sponsored retirement plan may transfer it, less any after-tax
employee contributions, to an IRA where it can still receive tax-
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deferred investment income.9 The tax code also permits the funds to be
transferred into another employer's plan, but few plans accept such
rollovers. Partial rollovers of lump sum distributions into an IRA are
permitted if at least half the worker's account balance is rolled over.
A rollover into an IRA is a substitute strategy for making a portabil
ity transfer to another employer's plan. A distribution rolled over into
an IRA is excluded from income and is not subject to the 10 percent
excise tax on early distributions. When such sums are later distributed
from the IRA, they are includable in income. A total distribution may
be rolled over to an IRA if made due to the individual's death; after the
individual has reached age 59 1/2; due to ending employment (other
than for a self-employed person); or for self-employed persons only, if
the person becomes permanently disabled. Only employer contribu
tions (and income on employer or worker contributions) may be rolled
over into an IRA. Distributions of worker contributions cannot be
rolled over.5
Distributions from qualified retirement plans are rolled over into
another qualified plan on the same basis that distributions are rolled
over into an IRA. Law does not require plans to permit transfers or
rollovers from another qualified plan. Plans permitting such transac
tions are most common among related employers or with a merger or
acquisition.
Grubbs (1981) surveyed plans to investigate the acceptance of roll
overs by pension plans. He found that 93 percent of plans did not
accept rollovers. Of the plans accepting rollovers, 96 percent placed
the rollovers in individual accounts and 4 percent did not specify how
the rollover would be treated. Two percent of defined benefit plans
with fewer than 100 participants and 1 percent of plans with 100 or
more participants accepted rollovers. Nine percent of defined contribu
tion plans with fewer than 100 participants and 5 percent with 100 or
more participants accepted rollovers.

SOCIAL SECURITY

Social security provides the majority of retirement income for most
workers. In 1988 only 2 percent of elderly households received at least
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50 percent of income from private pensions, while 55 percent received
at least 50 percent from social security (1\irner and Beller 1992). Most
workers are now covered by social security, and benefit accruals are
portable among all employers included in the system. Social security
portability is possible because plan design, funding, and administration
are done centrally, by Congress and the Social Security Administra
tion. Social security benefits are based on lifetime earnings, so a
worker changing jobs loses no benefits under this plan. Expanding
social security would solve portability problems. Projections show,
however, that the rising old-age dependency ratio will reduce social
security benefits relative to earnings (Doescher and Turner 1988).
NOTES
1. The discussion in this section draws heavily from U.S. Genera] Accounting Office (1990).
2. The following discussion of reciprocity is taken from Brownlee (1989).
3. Material in this section is taken largely from Joint Committee on Taxation (1988).
4. The tax does not apply to lump sum distributions that are used to pay medical expenses that
are deductible for federal income tax purposes (that is, in excess of 7.5 percent of adjusted gross
income).
5. Employee contributions are treated differently because such contributions (other than to
401(k) plans) are taxable.
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Pension Reform Debate
Inevitably, raising pension benefits or reducing risks involves costly
changes, and there are winners and losers. Reformers must identify the
market imperfection that suggests the need for government interven
tion and analyze the arguments for pension reform, which fall into five
overlapping categories: (1) equity, (2) tax and budget policy, (3) gov
ernment regulation, (4) economic effects, and (5) financial responsibil
ity.
Rather than analyzing the arguments, this chapter debates them—
first presenting the strongest argument in favor of pension reform and
then the strongest argument against it. On the final issue of financial
responsibility, the debate is not pro or con but who should pay—
employers, government, or workers.

EQUITY

Equity arguments are motivated by value judgments about fair treat
ment of similar and dissimilar groups. Opinions differ as to what
defines an equitable balance between costs and benefits for competing
groups. Workers, firms, and taxpayers compete for lower taxes, higher
tax subsidies, lower costs, and higher and more secure benefits. In the
case of pension reform, at least one group bears costs when another
benefits.
Short-Tenure versus Long-Tenure Workers

Pension portability raises the benefits of short-tenure workers. In a
fixed-benefits budget, this advantage comes at the expense of other
workers.

in
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Pro
A full pension should not depend on 30 years of tenure with one
employer. With incomplete pension portability, job leavers receive
reduced benefits for the years they have worked. Because women in
pensions plans have shorter job tenure than men, pay via pensions
favors men at women's expense. Tax-favored pensions should not be
an employer monopoly. Short-tenure workers and job leavers cannot
compensate for their disadvantage in pension plans by maintaining
comparable tax-favored savings because the only comparable form of
savings, IRAs, has low contribution limits. Workers should be free to
receive a tax-favored pension without tying themselves to one
employer.
Con
Employers value long-tenure workers and should be able to reward
them through generous pensions. While pension portability raises the
benefits of short-tenure workers, those workers may have preferred
higher wages. When this is the case, short-tenure workers view them
selves as worse off with pension portability. The frequency with which
job leavers take lump sum distributions supports this point.
Workers versus Firms

Equity issues between workers and firms depend on who owns the
pension assets. Are they owned by workers, firms, or both? Whose
interests should the plan favor? Pension law requires plans to invest
assets solely in the interest of participants. It does not require, how
ever, that all elements of pensions favor workers at the firm's expense.
Elements of plan design that allow inflation to erode retirement bene
fits if taken before retirement are precisely those elements employers
depend on to encourage loyalty and long service.
Pro
Workers want the reduced risk of benefit loss that government regu
lations provide, and portability reduces the risk that workers will lose
benefits due to job change. Employers favor pension regulations with
which they already comply. These regulations may cut the risk of ben
efit loss perceived by workers even though the plan is already comply-
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ing with the regulation. Some employers favor pension reforms forcing
competitors to bear the same benefit costs they do.
Con
Favoring long-service workers is a good compensation strategy for
many employers. Workers and firms both gain from long-term commit
ments from workers to firms.

TAX AND BUDGET POLICY

The tax issue raised in pension reform deals with two important ele
ments: who benefits from the tax expenditures, and how much does
pension reform cost the Treasury Department in lost revenue. 1 In a
period of large budget deficits, political reality requires pension
reform to refrain from adding to the budget deficit. This translates into
a demand that pension reform be revenue neutral: it must be packaged
so that higher tax expenditures for some aspects of pensions are offset
elsewhere in the budget by higher tax revenues or lower tax expendi
tures.
Pro
It is wrong that pension tax advantages are enjoyed disproportion
ately by long-tenure workers, because the primary public purpose of
pension plans is to provide retirement income, not to reward worker
longevity.2 Further, the longevity subsidy depends largely on inflation,
which is beyond the control of employers or employees. Even if favor
ing longevity were desirable, subsidizing job tenure in an inflationdependent way is a questionable undertaking given inflation rate vari
ability.
Con
Congress uses the tax system for many social purposes, and there is
no reason why worker longevity should not be included.
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GOVERNMENT REGULATION

As budget deficits grow, the federal government looks increasingly
at the option of mandating benefits. This intervention, however, raises
the issue of government's role as regulator.
Pro
If it expands choices, government intervention through pension
reform is desirable. The value of freedom of choice is raised by
expanding the range of alternatives and giving workers more control
over their pension arrangements. Because government subsidizes ben
efits, it has a right and duty to decide how that tax subsidy should be
distributed and how job change should reduce tax benefits. It also has
an obligation to set minimum standards to protect relatively powerless
workers.
While a basic conflict of goals exists between maintaining a free
market and protecting workers from economic risks, protecting work
ers, at least to a point, overrides philosophical concerns about an unfet
tered market. Moreover, government mandates are often not aimed at
protecting the typical worker, but are motivated by social goals already
achieved by many workers. Mandates aim at protecting vulnerable
workers.
Workers, even if given options, do not always make the "right"
choices. Paternalistic reformers identify "merit goods," and argue that
these should be provided even if workers do not choose them. Pater
nalistic reformers argue that workers undersave for retirement due to
an inability to plan for distant needs; thus, portability must be man
dated to raise retirement savings.
Poor information exchange further justifies government interven
tion. Workers or firms who are poorly informed about the advantages
and costs of a benefit arrangement may seek less than adequate benefit
plans. For example, workers frequently underestimate their life expect
ancies and save too little for retirement. When information problems
are difficult to correct, it may be necessary for government to require
benefit coverage.
Externalities (costs to third parties) also justify government inter
vention. Because government provides public benefits to indigent retir-
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ees, retirees with low savings impose costs on society. Government
may force workers to internalize the costs by requiring minimum
retirement saving or may favor raising pension benefits to shrink social
security's burden as the population ages. Finally, economies of scale
argue for government intervention. Government could operate a porta
bility clearinghouse more efficiently than the private sector, given the
economies of large operations.
Con
Government intervention through pension reform coerces firms and
workers and distorts market outcomes, allocating resources suboptimally. The labor market decides the optimal level and mix of benefits.
It does so based on differing values placed on nonwage compensation
by firms, workers, and labor unions.
Pension reform restricts choices by interfering when management
and labor negotiate salaries. Requiring uniform minimum treatment of
covered workers, pension reform restricts employer freedom to negoti
ate packages that meet worker needs. It arbitrarily assigns higher prior
ity to one benefit at the expense of others. Pension reform may restrict
worker consumption by prohibiting preretirement lump sum distribu
tions. Worker well-being declines when workers prefer cash wages
over the extra benefits that reform forces them to accept.
The expanded choices that result from government intervention
cause adverse selection. This occurs because workers with longer than
actuarial life expectancy choose a benefit available on better terms
considering their own knowledge of life expectancy. The more choices
there are, the more room there is for adverse selection. Such behavior
raises the cost to employers of pension benefits.
Mandating portability disrupts pension plan administration. Any
mandated change requires new plan practices, and plans must hire
attorneys and employee-benefit specialists to assure compliance. To
achieve a goal over the range of possible situations, government regu
lations often become highly complex, eventually making simplification
itself a goal of reform. Mandates often require government to provide
services and enforce new regulations, thus increasing the federal
bureaucracy. Lacking a profit motive, government is less efficient than
the private sector.
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Underlying the paternalistic arguments for pension reform is the
question of adequacy: do workers save adequately for retirement?
Most undoubtedly do. The mandate of a paternalistic government
diminishes incentive for responsible individual behavior and private
charity. Further, and of most importance, mandates designed to raise
benefits ultimately do the opposite. By raising costs, mandates fre
quently force firms to reduce or end benefits.3

ECONOMIC EFFECTS

Pension reform alters behavior of workers and firms, affecting job
mobility and productivity. It also impacts retirement savings, affecting
the type of pension plan firms provide and whether, in fact, they pro
vide a plan. It may affect the ages and numbers of workers firms hire.
Job Mobility and Labor Market Efficiency

The loss of pension benefit with job change penalizes and reduces
mobility. The economic efficiency of pensions affecting labor mobility
varies between firms and over time, depending on economic condi
tions.
Pro
Some workers must change jobs to adjust to a dynamic economy.
Changes in technology and imports, and growing and declining
employment in different geographic areas and businesses, cause work
ers to change jobs. The United States, facing greater competition in the
world economy, needs to foster job mobility. Higher workforce flexi
bility is essential for efficiency. The flexibility of the U.S. labor force
would rise if pensions were linked to the worker rather than the job.

Con
The view that impediments to job change are undesirable supposes
that worker productivity is highly transferable between jobs, and that
any shift in relative prices or technology makes job change efficient. In
contrast, labor economists stress causes and effects of long-duration
jobs. The contract theories of long-duration jobs imply that reduced job
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mobility is efficient. Defined benefit pensions appear to have a produc
tivity-augmenting role by discouraging quits, encouraging firms to
invest in workers, and penalizing workers who "shirk."
Government portability mandates reduce efficiency by making it
more difficult for firms to retain labor. Workers would be more likely
to change jobs, and, consequently, employers might find it less advan
tageous to train workers. Portability also worsens labor-management
relations by reducing worker loyalty to employers.
Unlike mandated social security participation, workers can choose
whether or not to participate in the private pension system. That firms
and workers agree on pension plans with quit penalties suggests that
mobility would otherwise be excessive. Why would both voluntarily
impede worker freedom to change jobs when an alternative—the
defined contribution plan—offers tax advantages without penalizing
separation?
Cost and International Competitiveness
Imports and exports are playing an increasingly large role in the
U.S. economy, causing international competitiveness to be an increas
ingly important consideration in labor market decisions.
Pro
Portability increases labor market flexibility, raising U.S. interna
tional competitiveness. Portability may raise the cost of benefits, but
the higher costs imposed on employers by pension reform are offset by
lower cash wages than they would otherwise have to pay. Because such
an offset occurs, the higher initial costs imposed on employers would
not reduce their international competitiveness. In any case, exchange
rates adjust and international trade is based on comparative advantage
rather than absolute advantage.

Con
Pension reform makes domestic firms less competitive than foreign
firms, raising employer costs, reducing U.S. competitiveness, and cost
ing jobs. Higher costs cause firms to hire fewer workers or to favor
some workers over others. If firms view women as short-tenure work
ers, and pension reform reduces the penalty on short-tenure work, a
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firm needing long-tenure workers for efficient operations would favor
hiring men over women.
Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution Plans
Will mandated pension portability raise employer costs and reduce
pension coverage, especially by defined benefit plans? Are defined
benefit plans better for workers than defined contribution plans? An
answer of "no" to either question greatly simplifies (he portability
issue. Defined benefit plans could be required to provide greater porta
bility. That would raise costs and reduce their advantages to employers,
accelerating the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution
plans. Or all pensions could be required to be defined contribution
plans with benefits locked in until retirement.
Pro
For many portability proposals affecting defined benefit plans, con
verting a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan would be
an attractive alternative to the employer. While defined benefit plans
offer important advantages over defined contribution plans, problems
triggered by mandating portability cause a shift from defined benefit to
defined contribution plans. Employers have discovered the advantages
of defined contribution plans: predictable costs, fairly easy administra
tion, less government interference, and highly portable assets.
Con
Mandating portability raises pension costs, which results in firms
opting out of pension coverage. While terminating a plan may seem
drastic, defined benefit plan terminations were common in the 1980s
and early 1990s. Thus, regulations intended to provide workers with a
more secure pension instead trigger the end of the pension.
Many analysts have concluded that defined benefit plans provide
more retirement income security than defined contribution plans. The
employer is primarily responsible for the investment risk in defined
benefit plans, while the worker bears the investment risk in defined
contribution plans. Defined benefit plans are more widely used than
defined contribution plans in nearly all countries, probably because
firms are better able than workers to bear the investment risk. Also,
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most defined benefit plan benefits are guaranteed by the Pension Bene
fit Guaranty Corporation. Defined benefit plans benefit employers by
affecting workforce age structure. Workers are encouraged to stay dur
ing prime productivity years, and are encouraged, by early retirement
incentives, to quit when they grow older.
Old-Age Economic Security and National Savings
Private pensions play an important role in old age security and
national savings. With the aging U.S. population and low U.S. savings
rates, some analysts are concerned as to whether the private pension
system is performing adequately.
Pro
Mandating portability raises pension benefits for some retirees,
increasing old age security. Banning preretirement distributions has a
similar effect. Such an approach could also raise national savings, by
encouraging greater savings in pensions.
Con
The raised savings and benefit security would be undone if reform
decreased the likelihood that firms would provide pensions, or caused
them to provide less generous pensions. Also, workers frequently undo
higher savings by reducing other forms of retirement assets. Thus, the
positive effects on national savings and benefit security are likely to be
minimal.

FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Regardless of how desirable portability reform is for equity, tax pol
icy, government regulation, or economic effects, someone must pay for
the higher benefits. Pension reform changes contractual relationships.
Reforms effectively take financial assets from some people and give
them to others. In the long run, the issue becomes, who pays?
Three parties may pay for pension reform: (1) employers (and ulti
mately consumers and stockholders), (2) government (taxpayers), (3)
other workers covered by pensions and workers benefiting from pen-
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sion reform. A complete analysis considers the minimizing strategies
the paying party will entertain.
Employers
Many proposals designate employers as payers. The proposals do
so, in part, because it seems unfair to make a job stayer pay for a job
leaver's pension. If employers pay, the burden is borne by the firm the
worker is leaving, the firm the worker is joining, or both. When
employers pay, pension reform compels shareholders to surrender
financial assets to mobile workers.
Actuaries and employee benefit consultants would intensely scruti
nize pension portability reform to reduce employer cost and search for
ways to redesign pension plans to provide satisfactory benefits at
affordable prices. To compete in both labor and product markets,
employers may redesign pension plans to keep costs at a previous level
and shift costs by reducing pension generosity and/or by providing
smaller cost-of-living increases for retirees.
Mandating that employers pay for pension reform does not resolve
who ultimately pays. In addition to dropping a defined benefit plan or
cutting its generosity, employers may try to shift the burden within the
plan to the remaining workers and to retirees. Most employers, how
ever, feel more responsibility for their retirees and current workers
than for former workers.
Pension reform affects firms unequally. Because reform raises costs,
established firms with a higher percentage of older workers bear a
heavier burden.4 It is thus misleading in analyzing pension reform to
focus on average costs; one should consider the range of cost impacts
on employers.
Government
Some argue that if inflation is the culprit in most portability loss,
government should pay the cost. Perhaps this burden would make gov
ernment more circumspect about inflationary policies. Due to the
unpredictability of inflation, most employers are unwilling to take on
the inherent liability. Whether that argument is accepted, mandating
portability may cost government dearly in lost tax revenue. Any
change in pension regulations that raises pension contributions,
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reduces lump sum cashouts, and raises pension assets, will decrease
federal tax revenue.
Workers

The manner in which labor markets set wages and pension coverage
is an important pension policy element. Economists base their views
on the theory of equalizing differences, which holds that for costs paid
by employers, workers, in turn, pay for pensions and pension reform
through reduced cash wages and other benefits. The theory holds that
employers in competitive markets offer equivalent compensation pack
ages to similar workers. Thus, pension-covered workers must receive
lower wages than similar workers without pensions.5
Because competitive forces set the value of compensation, employ
ers tailor benefit packages to attract the workers they want. Employers
wishing to attract long-term workers offer better pension benefits and
lower current wages. Employers not needing long- tenure workers
offer packages with greater immediate rewards. If the labor market
operates as suggested by this theory, workers pay for pension reform
by exchanging wages for future pension benefits. The total compensa
tion they receive is unchanged. The theory does not imply that each
worker exactly pays through reduced wages for the benefits he/she
receives, but that as a group workers pay. While the theory is intellec
tually appealing, it has thus far proven too difficult to verify empiri
cally.
NOTES
1. Tax expenditures are the forgone tax revenues that arise due to tax deductions and the pref
erential nontaxation of some forms of income. Tax expenditures are logically equivalent to other
government expenditures in that both reduce the amount of money left to the Treasury for other
expenditures.
2. See, for example, Ozanne and Lindeman (1987).
3. This discussion is based in part on Mitchell (1991).
4. This discussion is taken largely from Conklin (1991).
5. This offset may be reduced if pension coverage increases worker productivity.

Policy Options
for Pension Portability
Numerous options would reduce pension benefit losses of workers
who leave jobs before retirement. A brief history will demonstrate the
range of alternatives that U.S. policymakers have considered but not
enacted. This is followed by an examination of various options
Public policymakers have studied pension portability since the mid1960s. In 1965 the President's Committee on Corporate Pension
Funds, formed by President Kennedy, proposed a central clearinghouse
to receive pension benefit distributions for job leavers. The Social
Security Administration was to administer the clearinghouse. In the
early 1970s, several years before passage of ERISA, pension reformers
introduced bills in Congress that included voluntary portability
arrangements. Senator Jacob Javits of New York in 1974 proposed the
formation of a central fund where job leavers could transfer pension
assets.
In 1980 the President's Commission on Pension Policy issued a
report recommending a Minimum Universal Pension System. Under
this system, all workers would be covered by a minimum mandated
employer pension with immediate vesting. A portability clearinghouse
would handle job leavers' benefits.
In 1988 a Department of Labor advisory group issued a report
including the following recommendations: require preretirement distri
butions to go to an IRA or another employer's plan; maintain or
enhance disincentives for preretirement distributions; study whether
plans should be required to accept rollovers from other plans; require
employers to set up Simplified Employee Pensions (SEPs) upon
employee request; and study options to expand pension coverage,
including mandating pensions for all employers. 1
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EARLIER VESTING

Private pension portability would be improved by requiring shorter
vesting. Such proposals aim at defined benefit plans, which generally
vest more slowly than defined contribution plans. Vesting could be
reduced to three-year cliff vesting or could occur immediately. Imme
diate vesting would reduce the benefits the average pension-covered
worker loses by 4 percent (from 14.8 to 14.2 percent) (table 9.1).
Table 9.1
Portability Loss with Full and Immediate Vesting
Percentage of covered workers
Immediate
vesting
Current vesting
Portability loss
requirements requirements
(%)
6.0
6.3
40 to 49
13.6
13.4
30 to 39
19.2
19.4
20 to 29
14.9
15.2
10 to 19
4.6
3.0
Ito9
39.2
38.4
None
4.2
2.7
Gain
100.0
100.0
Total
14.2
14.8
Average loss for all workers
23.4
23.3
Average loss for workers with a loss
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
NOTE: The portability loss is the percentage difference between the retirement benefit the
worker would have received if all service had been covered by the retirement plan of the last
employer and the benefit that the worker actually received. A worker who worked from at least
age 30 to age 65 under one pension plan would not have a loss under this definition, since the
maximum credited service for the plans in the model was 35 years. A worker who worked for 35
years under one plan and received a vested benefit from a second plan would show a "gain."

A typical pension plan in the late 1980s provided annual pension
benefit accrual of $100 to $500 early in a career (Hay/Huggins 1988, p.
iii). For most workers the lump sum value for four years of work
ranges from $400 to $2,000; thus, typical losses for unvested workers
in single-employer plans with five-year vesting are less than $2,000.
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Workers who change jobs after a short tenure have small benefits
because of the brevity of their tenure and because most of them are
young, low-income workers.
If vesting requirements were tightened, employers would probably
react by paying lump sums to terminating employees with short ser
vice. If these small lump sum distributions were not rolled over into an
IRA or saved, they would be unavailable for retirement income, and
the shorter vesting would not have reduced portability losses.

PRERETIREMENT INDEXING OF BENEFITS

Second only to benefit losses due to preretirement cashouts are port
ability losses that occur because deferred vested benefits of job leavers
are unindexed. Pension benefits of workers who change jobs erode in
real value because the wages used to calculate the benefit are unin
dexed for future wage growth or inflation. Had these workers remained
with the original employer, their accrued benefits would have been
indexed by their growing wages.
Two policies could greatly reduce this cause of portability loss. The
first would be to require that vested benefits be adjusted for preretire
ment inflation if they are left in the plan, or require the plan to incorpo
rate expected inflation to adjust the final salary for calculating a lump
sum distribution. The second would be to require that defined benefit
plans credit workers for service at prior jobs.
Price Indexing

One option for pension preservation would require employers to
calculate benefits at job change, and then index them to maintain real
value until retirement. This approach would amend the tax code to
require that defined benefit plans take the salary base they use to calcu
late deferred annuities and adjust it for inflation occurring between job
end and initial receipt of pension benefits. Workers in career-average
and flat-dollar benefit plans, as well as those in final-pay plans, would
be protected.
This option would determine the present value of benefits using a
nominal (market) interest rate to discount future liabilities, and then
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index that value. A computational alternative yielding a similar result
would discount future benefits with a real interest rate.2 For example,
with a real interest rate of say 2 percent, a higher present value of ben
efits results than if a nominal market interest rate were used. The plan
then would maintain this benefit value unindexed. This option places
the cost of portability reform, at least initially, on the employer who
loses an employee. Revising defined benefit plans this way raises
aggregate plan costs or redistributes benefits to short-service workers.
Under a second alternative, vested pension credits and an appropri
ate sum would be transferred to a pension clearinghouse or central pen
sion bank. The clearinghouse would index benefits for preretirement
inflation, and assess all participating employers an annual charge to
cover the preceding year's cost of inflation. The clearinghouse must
assess how much money should be transferred from a pension fund to
the clearinghouse for a pension credit; and it must assess, allocate, and
collect the annual cost of inflation, including possible charges or cred
its for bad or good investment returns. Any requirement should avoid
price indexing that exceeds what former workers would have received
had they stayed with the firm. The increase in the index could be lim
ited to inflation or to average growth in wages for workers covered by
the plan, whichever is smaller.
A related option would require that benefits of job leavers be
indexed for preretirement inflation, but if inflation exceeds a cap, bene
fits would increase at the cap rate. Mandatory indexing could be set at
the lesser of 5 percent or the Consumer Price Index. Other alternatives
include indexation at the inflation rate minus a stated percent. In addi
tion, indexing need not use a specific index, such as the Consumer
Price Index, but could take the indirect form of adding years to a work
er's service used for calculating benefits.3
Plans could still cash out small deferred annuities. Present value cal
culations, however, would discount the deferred annuity, using the real
interest rate implied by the plan's actuarial assumptions (the nominal
interest rate minus the inflation rate), rather than its nominal interest
rate assumption. This change would be required to adjust for increases
in nominal benefits needed to maintain the real value of benefits.
Indexing could also be targeted to groups such as workers involun
tarily separated due to plant closings or plan terminations. This policy
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would levy a benefit-related surcharge on plant closings and pension
terminations.
If the government required employers to price index job-leaver ben
efits, employers might demand that the government provide an asset
for funding these liabilities. Inflation-dependent deferred vested liabili
ties would add a new risk to the financial risks borne by the firm. There
are currently no U.S. assets with values that match the fluctuations in
that liability. If the government issued indexed bonds—bonds whose
rate of return is the inflation rate plus a stipulated real interest rate—
that asset would eliminate the inflation risk that firms would otherwise
bear in funding the liability for indexed deferred annuities.
Wage Indexing
An alternative approach to price indexing would require plans to
index preretirement earnings for wage growth, as does social security.
That indexing would cost firms more because wages generally rise
faster than prices.
Requiring plans to index salaries in benefit calculations would not
affect liabilities for workers who immediately retire at job separation.
However, liabilities for deferred annuities—amounts a plan must pay
employees who leave before the plan's early retirement age—could
increase greatly.
Instead of indexing for actual inflation or actual wage growth,
deferred pensions could be indexed for expected inflation or expected
wage growth. This would reduce the financial risk to the firm because
its liability would be certain. The firm's risk falls because the risk of
future inflation has been shifted to workers. Depending on how high
inflation actually is, such indexing may much exceed or fall far short of
the amount needed to maintain the pension's real value.
Cost of Indexing

The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the cost of indexing
the deferred vested benefits of job leavers. Plans that price-index bene
fits of job leavers up to retirement would have increases in annual costs
ranging from 6 to 28 percent (Ozanne and Lindeman 1987). These
costs equal 0.6 to 2.8 percent of annual compensation. If the policy
only required indexed deferred annuities to be provided to job leavers
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with 10 or more years of work, the cost increase would be much
smaller—4 to 19 percent. This expense may be viewed as small—
roughly equal to one year's typical wage increase. However, the
increase would be permanent. If increased costs were borne by workers
as reduced wages, 0.4 to 2.8 percent of lifetime compensation, depend
ing on the proposal, would permanently shift from wages to retirement
benefits.
If benefits were indexed up to retirement to the Consumer Price
Index, average portability losses (excluding those due to preretirement
distributions) would decrease from 15 to 5 percent of pension wealth
(table 9.2), and the share of the covered workforce experiencing such
losses would fall from 59 to 41 percent (Hay/Huggins 1988). Only 3
percent of covered workers would lose over 19 percent of a full-career
benefit.
Table 9.2
Portability Loss with Inflation Protection
Percentage of covered workers
Immediate
Portability loss
Current vesting
vesting
requirements
requirements

40 to 49
30 to 39
20 to 29
10 to 19
Ito9
None
Gain
Total
Average loss for all workers
Average loss for workers with a loss

6.3
13.4
19.4
15.2
4.6
38.4
2.7
100.0
14.8
23.3

0.0
0.0
3.0
23.3
14.8
40.5
18.4
100.0
5.0
9.3

SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
NOTE: The portability loss is the percentage difference between the retirement benefit the
worker would have received if all service had been covered by the retirement plan of the last
employer and the benefit that the worker actually received. A worker who worked from at least
age 30 to age 65 under one pension plan would not have a loss under this definition, since the
maximum credited service for the plans in the model was 35 years. A worker who worked for 35
years under one plan and received a vested benefit from a second plan would show a "gain."
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Indexing to general wage growth reduces benefit losses further.
Such indexing would nearly eliminate portability losses for most work
ers. In the Hay/Huggins (1988) model, indexing vested pension bene
fits by general wage growth reduces average portability loss from 15 to
2 percent. For workers with losses, the average loss would fall from 23
to 5 percent (table 9.3). The Hay/Huggins model, however, excludes
losses caused by lump sum distributions greater than $3,500.
Table 93
Portability Loss with Inflation and Productivity Protection
(Percentage of covered workers)
Immediate
Portability loss
Current vesting
vesting
(%)
requirements
requirements

40 to 49
30 to 39
20 to 29
10 to 19
Ito9
None
Gain
Total
Average loss for all workers
Average loss for workers with a loss

6.3
13.4
19.4
15.2
4.6
38.4
2.7
100.0
14.8
23.3

0.0
0.0
0.0
2.8
17.3
38.2
41.7
100.0
1.5
5.0

SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
NOTE: The portability loss is the percentage difference between the retirement benefit the
worker would have received if all service had been covered by the retirement plan of the last
employer and the benefit that the worker actually received. A worker who worked from at least
age 30 to age 65 under one pension plan would not have a loss under this definition, since the
maximum credited service for the plans in the model was 35 years. A worker who worked for 35
years under one plan and received a vested benefit from a second plan would show a "gain."

The tax revenue consequences of this option are uncertain. Employ
ers might adjust to the option by reducing overall benefit levels. Work
ers, bearing the costs through lower wages, shift compensation from
immediately taxable wages to pension compensation nontaxable until
paid as benefits. That shift sets the upper bound of revenue loss. If
firms accommodated the change by decreasing other aspects of pen-
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sion benefits or other nontaxable compensation, no revenue would be
lost.
Service Credit
An option eliminating plan design portability losses would require
the final employer to credit all service from previous employers with a
pension. The final employer would pay the part of the benefit in excess
of vested benefits from other employers. For a worker employed 20
years by each of two employers, both providing a benefit of 1.5 percent
of the high-five average salary times years of work, the retirement ben
efit to be paid from the pension plan of the second employer would be
paid as follows (Hay/Huggins 1988):
1. High-five average salary with first employer
2. Benefit for 20 years from first employer's plan
3. High-five average salary with second employer
4. Benefit for 20 years from second employer's plan
5. Benefit for 40 years from second employer's plan
6. Second employer benefit if all service credited ((5) minus (2))

$25,000
$7,500
$97,000
$29,100
$58,200
$50,700

Under current pension law, the second employer provides a benefit
of $29,100. The worker loses benefits of 37 percent, because he/she
receives a combined benefit of $36,600 rather than $58,200. If the sec
ond employer credited all service, the second employer would pay a
benefit of $50,700 and no benefits would be lost. This proposal only
benefits employees who go to a second employer who has a pension
plan.
Both preretirement indexing and transfer of service credits increase
employer costs for a defined benefit plan. The first increases cost of
workers leaving before retirement by requiring the initial employer to
increase benefits for subsequent wage or price increases. The second
increases the cost of hiring job leavers by requiring the last employer
to pay benefits for service with prior employers.
Both approaches induce employers to be selective in whom they
hire. The first might cause employers to avoid hiring young workers,
seen as likely job leavers. Employers might hire fewer young women,
viewing them as likely to change jobs more frequently than older
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women or men. The second approach might cause employers to avoid
hiring older workers with past service to be credited. Hutchens (1986)
has found that firms with pensions are less likely to hire older workers.
Portability Clearinghouse

A federal clearinghouse for retirement benefits could aid in asset
transfers between plans or hold and invest assets of workers who have
left pension-covered jobs. Those favoring a clearinghouse argue that a
central administrative agency would ease administration of portability.
Opponents argue that it would create a costly and unnecessary new
agency or further burden existing agencies. Moreover, it would unnec
essarily involve the federal government in the private sector by invest
ing pension funds. Further, IRAs were created as an alternative to a
clearinghouse.
Age-Weighted Profit-Sharing Plans

Some policies being considered for reasons other than enhancing
portability may increase portability losses. An example is an ageweighted profit sharing plan.4 Small employers frequently face the
dilemma of reconciling their desire for tax-sheltered retirement savings
and worker desire for current income. One proposal would allow
employers to adopt plans to which they contribute more money for
workers nearing retirement and less for younger workers.5 An
employer could do this with a defined contribution plan, where contri
butions increase with age or service.

LIMITING LUMP SUM DISTRIBUTIONS

The largest cause of benefit loss is the cashout of preretirement lump
sum distributions by job changers. Most defined contribution plans
allow preretirement distributions; except for small sums, most defined
benefit plans do not, although they could and some evidence suggests
that increasingly they are.
Prohibiting preretirement distributions would raise retirement bene
fits. It would raise administrative costs but would cost relatively little
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because no additional benefits would be required. A variation would
allow preretirement cashouts if they were rolled over into another pen
sion plan or an IRA. With such a requirement, defined contribution
plans could be obligated to accept transfers of lump sum distributions
from other plans.
Alternatives would permit, but discourage, preretirement distribu
tions. Some would differentiate between treatment of employer and
employee contributions. Employee contributions are common as elec
tive deferrals for 401(k) plans.6 One variation would allow preretire
ment cashouts of accumulated assets based on employee contributions
only (including employee contributions to 401(k) plans). An alterna
tive to requiring a pension plan to provide these options would deny
tax deducibility by ending tax qualification for noncomplying plans.
Another option would penalize workers instead of employers, increas
ing the excise tax on preretirement lump sum distributions from 10 to
20 percent. This policy would discourage workers from taking lump
sum distributions, but preserve the option to do so. Employer- and
employee-derived distributions could be taxed at different rates.
These proposals can be combined. The excise tax on preretirement
distributions attributable to employee contributions could be raised,
while benefits attributable to employer contributions could be lockedin until retirement age. To enhance flexibility for workers, individuals
could retain the availability of loans and hardship distributions based
on employer contributions. The resulting revenue from these tax-based
proposals would offset the tax revenue lost from employees who
decide not to take distributions.
Any proposal to prohibit or limit preretirement lump sum distribu
tions costs the federal government tax revenue in the short run,
because the government no longer receives the 10 percent excise tax
and the income tax paid on the distributions. Such a change, however,
would raise future tax revenue by postponing receipt and taxation of
benefits.
Because lump sum benefit calculations are based on standard mor
tality tables, workers with lower than average life expectancy gain by
taking benefits as a lump sum distribution rather than as an annuity
over a shortened life expectancy. This may induce some workers to opt
for lump sum distributions. While plans can require workers to have a
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doctor certify that they are in good health to qualify for a lump sum
distribution, this is rarely done.
Policy Options for Rollovers

If defined benefit plans were required to accept benefit credits and
assets from other plans, difficult administrative problems would arise.7
Benefits to be transferred are calculated by figuring accrued benefits
under the old plan and converting them into equal credit under a new
and perhaps totally different benefit accrual structure. The actuarial
assumptions and methods used to calculate present value of accrued
benefits must be set with careful thought to ensure equity between old
and new employers.
With the wide range of funding methods and assumptions used by
plans, the amount the old employer had accumulated for the terminat
ing employee would not equal the amount that the new employer needs
to fund all past liabilities for that employee. The amount transferred
would have to be a compromise between the accumulated liabilities
under the old and new employers' actuarial methods and assumptions.
An employee in a single-employer pension plan rarely moves to a
job with an identical plan. Thus, as well as determining which
employer pays for the benefits the worker otherwise would have lost,
the new employer must determine the service to be credited under the
new plan. If the new plan is more generous than the old one, then the
new plan would credit less service than the employee had previously
worked. The lesser service rewarded at the more generous rate would
give the equivalent benefit to that accrued under the old plan for more
years of service rewarded at a lower rate.8
The present value of accrued liabilities is greatly affected by the
actuarial assumptions used in the pension plan. For a plan with a nor
mal retirement age of 65 and typical mortality and interest assump
tions, a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate lowers the
accrued liability by approximately 25 percent for a worker age 40. For
a worker age 20, a 1 percentage point increase decreases the accrued
liability by 38 percent (Hay/Huggins 1990a). Changes in the annual
salary increase assumption have a similarly large effect. A 1 percent
age point increase in the salary growth rate assumption increases the
accrued liability by 27 percent for a worker age 40 and increases it by
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54 percent for a worker age 20. Actuaries do not have free rein in
choosing assumptions, however, but are statutorily required to ensure
that each is reasonable.
A solution to problems arising from plans using different actuarial
assumptions requires that all plans use prescribed assumptions when
dealing with portability transfers. If portability law requires no speci
fied set of assumptions, the amount transferred would vary widely.
Plans would pick actuarial assumptions that limit losses due to the
transfer in and out of workers, shifting the costs to other employers.

MANDATING UNIFORM PLAN FEATURES

Benefit loss could be reduced by requiring employers to provide
pensions with specified features. Converting the pension system
entirely to career-average defined benefit plans, some analysts have
argued, would eliminate portability loss due to plan design. However,
career-average defined benefit plans are periodically upgraded to offset
inflation, and thus also cause job leavers to lose benefits due to infla
tion. Service portability could be achieved by using standardized bene
fit formulas, with employers crediting full service for all jobs.
Requiring Defined Contribution Plans

If all workers were enrolled in defined contribution plans with
locked-in contributions, the portability problem would be solved.
However, in nearly all countries with well-developed private pension
systems, defined benefit plans cover more workers and provide greater
benefits than do defined contribution plans (Turner and Dailey 1991),
perhaps because firms are better ble to bear the investment risk.
If employers were required to replace defined benefit plans with
defined contribution plans, more of total benefits would be paid to
short-service workers and less to career workers. If an employer
replaced a defined benefit plan that cost 10 percent of salary with a
defined contribution plan, the retirement benefits for a full-career
employee would have to be lowered by 30 percent to keep the cost of
the plan at 10 percent for a typical group of workers (Bureau of
National Affairs 1988).
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Requiring Defined Contribution Coverage as an Option
Defined contribution plans are not the best coverage for all workers.
Instead of requiring defined contribution coverage, the government
could require employers to provide it as an alternative to defined bene
fit coverage.9 Employees could then plan for job change by choosing a
defined contribution plan. Another alternative would permit only work
ers with special need for job mobility (engineers, nurses, scientists or
secretaries) to qualify for this option.
All employers could be required to offer salary reduction 401(k)
plans to employees requesting them. This requirement would impose
administrative costs and fiduciary duties on employers. However,
under current law the administrative costs of qualified plans can be
charged against employee accounts. Further, ERISA offers options,
such as self-directed accounts for each employee, that could be used by
employers to minimize fiduciary exposure.

MANDATING PENSIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

The Minimum Universal Pension System, proposed by the Presi
dent's Commission on Pension Policy in 1980, would have required
employers to contribute 3 percent of compensation to a defined contri
bution plan for each worker over age 25 who had been with the firm at
least one year. Contributions would be immediately 100 percent
vested. Employers preferring not to administer a pension plan would
contribute to a portability clearinghouse, which would transfer funds to
a central portability fund for investment. Those favoring this manda
tory pension proposal argue that it would ensure a minimum benefit for
all workers and provide a fully funded portable pension.
Proposals for mandating pensions may limit the requirement to
employers hiring over a minimum number of workers, or by including
only workers who work over a minimum number of hours a year. Man
dating private pension coverage, however, conflicts with the voluntary
nature of the U.S. private pension system. Moreover, critics argue that
if a more expansive mandatory retirement system is desirable, it would
be more efficient to expand social security rather than create a new
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entity. They also argue that the 3 percent payroll tax may hurt small
and marginal businesses. Moreover, many low-income and young
workers—those most likely to lack pension coverage—might not
desire such a program if it resulted in lower cash wages. If the objec
tive were to increase the retirement income of low-income workers, a
more direct way of doing so would be to increase social security with
its progressive benefit structure. Social security, however, is mostly
unfunded, while a mandatory pension system would be fully funded.
Encouraging Increased Coverage
An alternative to mandating increased pension coverage would be to
encourage coverage by offering attractive options to employers who
adopt pension plans. Most large employers offer pensions, but many
small employers do not. An option making pension provision more
desirable to small employers exists in Japan, where small employers
with pension plans receive a subsidy unavailable to large employers.
Another alternative would be to reduce the cost of pensions. The
Internal Revenue Code and Title I of ERISA provide special treatment
for Simplified Employee Pension plans (SEPs). A small employer who
offers a SEP for which 25 or fewer employees qualify may offer a
"cash or deferred arrangement" (CODA). These plans are commonly
known as 408(k) plans. With these, the employee contributes by hav
ing the employer reduce his/her salary. In 1991, employees could con
tribute up to $8,475 to a SEP and reduce taxable income by the
contribution. These plans may reduce the burden on employers
because the employee makes the contribution.
One proposal for reducing portability losses by expanding coverage
would raise the limit for employers who may offer SEP- COD As to 50
eligible employees. The Department of Labor estimates that this pro
posal in 1990 could have extended plan coverage to 3.5 million work
ers in firms with 26 to 50 employees who were not covered by pension
plans.
Increasing Availability of IRAs
Another way to address the disadvantages of short-service workers
would be to increase their access to tax-favored savings independent of
their employers. This change would also aid workers who are not
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already covered by an employer-provided pension plan. IRAs could be
offered to all workers up to the defined contribution limit of 25 percent
of earnings or $30,000. The increased availability of IRAs might
encourage workers who change jobs to roll over pensions if they
already were participating in an IRA.
Expanding Social Security
Social Security Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) provides
fully portable benefits that are locked in until retirement. Credit for all
social-security-covered employment is given when calculating benefit
amounts. Thus, expanding social security, probably at the expense of
employer-sponsored plans, would enhance portability. However,
expanding mandatory social security would limit employer flexibility
in designing compensation packages to meet worker needs.
NOTES
1. The Portability and Preservation of Pensions Work Group of the ERIS A Advisory Council
on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans.
2. The real interest rate is the rate of expected investment earnings less the expected rate of
inflation. The result would be equivalent if expected and actual inflation were equal.
3. This discussion is taken largely from Ozanne and Lindeman (1987).
4. The material from this section is taken from Christl (1991).
5. This is proposed 401(a)(4) regulations from the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
6. With the exception of contributions to 401 (k) plans, employee contributions to pension
plans are not tax deductible. For this reason, employee contnbutions are treated differently in
some proposals than are employer contributions.
7. These issues are discussed in Hay/Huggins (1990).
8. Assume that two plans have identical benefit structures except that the new plan provides a
benefit at age 60 of 1.5 percent of final pay for each year of service, while the old plan provides a
benefit at age 60 of 1.25 percent of final pay per year of service. For simplicity, assume that the
worker's initial salary with the new employer equals his/her salary under the old employer: then
10 years of work under the old plan translates to 8.3 years under the new plan (8.3=10x(1.25/
1.5)). If the worker qualified to receive the benefit at a younger age under the new plan than under
the old one, the 8.3 years would be further reduced.
9. This proposal has been advanced by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
Inc.
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Portability Economics
Good public policy analysis must assess behavioral reactions, includ
ing the implications of policies for labor supply and demand, job quits,
savings, investment, and other economic behaviors of workers and
firms. Prior chapters examined potential costs of portability to firms.
This chapter examines how pension portability affects behavior of
workers and firms.

WHY FIRMS OFFER PENSIONS

Employers are less willing to offer pensions when portability poli
cies reduce their advantages or raise their costs to firms. To anticipate
how a policy will affect a firm and its workers requires understanding
what firms gain by offering pensions.
The tax system encourages employers to provide pensions.
Employer contributions are tax deductions for corporations and are
untaxable personal income to workers. Returns earned on contributions
also are untaxed as they accrue. The worker pays personal income
taxes when he/she receives the benefits at retirement, but the marginal
tax rate for most retirees is lower than their tax rate when working.
While it offers a rationale for why firms provide pensions, the tax
system cannot explain why firms impose pension penalties on job
changers. Pension penalties may aid firms by reducing turnover and
increasing productivity, but these effects are absent in simple economic
models where the labor market continuously equilibrates. 1 In these
models, contemporaneous demand and supply set pay as if labor ser
vices were auctioned each period.
In such models, the only purpose for pay is to allocate workers to
their most productive jobs; firms pay workers each period according to
the value of the marginal product. Maximum labor market efficiency
and national output result from the free flow of workers. In contrast,
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when jobs require firm-specific human capital, long job tenure raises
efficiency by encouraging workers and firms to invest in worker skills.2
Workers have firm-specific human capital when they have training that
only increases their productivity with one employer. Workers who bear
the full cost for training that raises their productivity only in their cur
rent firm suffer a capital loss from layoffs. But if the worker's wage
with specific training is under the marginal value product, the firm also
loses from a layoff.
For a firm to provide training, both worker and employer must have
incentives to continue employment. The worker's wage must be above
the alternative wage but below the value of the marginal product
(Decker 1976). The optimal split of investment costs and returns
between worker and firm depends on who is more likely to end the job,
with that party being required to bear a larger cost. By sharing invest
ment costs, a worker accepts reduced wages at an earlier age, causing
wages to grow more rapidly with experience. This steepening of the
wage profile encourages the worker to stay with the firm to receive
higher wages later. The worker is induced to stay if the wage exceeds
the current or projected alternative. Defined benefit pensions also
encourage worker tenure, being deferred compensation with a value
that increases with tenure.
Deferred pay also motivates workers in the "shirking" model.
Employers may defer pay in jobs difficult to monitor, and in situations
where workers are unproductive, steal, or otherwise shirk (Becker and
Stigler 1974). Both worker and employer recognize that shirking is
costly, and that reducing it benefits both parties by making workers
more productive and raising their wages. A solution to shirking has the
worker post "bond," forfeited if the employer detects shirking. While
workers rarely post bond in cash, the firm may require workers to post
bond by paying them under the value of marginal product early in their
career and more than the marginal product value later. A terminated
worker forfeits the bond (the deferred wages).
Pensions explicitly enter the shirking model (Lazear 1979). The
pension separation penalty is like a bond. Workers sacrifice wages
expecting to receive a pension based on work with the firm until retire
ment. If dismissed before retirement, they receive a pension valued at
less than their implicit contributions via forgone wages.The difference
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between the wages they have forfeited and the lower pension they
receive is the bond they forfeit.
Because of the tax structure, it is less costly to reduce turnover by
backloading pensions than by deferring wages. Tilting the wage profile
shifts taxable income from a low-tax-rate period—early tenure years,
with lower income—to a high-tax-rate period—later working years
with higher income. With a pension, however, compensation is shifted
to retirement, when workers often face lower tax rates.3 These marginal
tax rate arguments are of greater economic importance during periods
when the tax code is more progressive.
The human capital model and the shirking model justify long-tenure
employment. The models may justify job separation penalties to pro
vide incentives for long tenure, but in a dynamic economy some jobs
should be temporary. The key question is whether the separation pen
alty in defined benefit plans raises productivity through long tenure or
impedes efficient job mobility. To analyze the efficiency of mobility,
consider an employment contract with firm-specific worker productiv
ity. Worker and firm agree on an initial wage W. Both expect that the
value of the marginal product will exceed the wage, which will exceed
the worker's alternative wage. But, after the firm invests in the work
er's productivity, that productivity rises for other reasons outside the
firm. Now the worker's alternative wage exceeds the value of marginal
product in the firm. The worker has an incentive to quit, but if he/she
does, the firm loses its investment in the worker.
The firm requires the worker to pay via reduced wages for a "stay
pension," which is the pension valued on the assumption that the
worker will stay with the firm until retirement. If the worker quits, he/
she must pay severance, which takes the form of portability loss, to
compensate the firm for the lost training investment. The worker loses
pension benefits if he/she quits, because the pension will be valued on
current wage rather than projected wage at retirement.
If the worker loses pension benefits equal to the firm's loss on its
investment in the worker, efficient quits are guaranteed. The worker
quits only if capitalized earnings gained on the new job offset the pen
sion benefits lost from the old one. Thus, quit penalties arising from
nonportable pensions not only encourage investment in firm- specific
capital, but also preserve efficient job matches under demand and sup
ply shocks.
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When a worker's productivity declines, the employer may wish to
terminate him/her, but damage to an employer's reputation in the labor
market may be sufficient to prevent that action. As an alternative, a
firm could offer severance pay sufficient to offset lost wages plus
reduced pension value. If that amount is less than the difference
between the worker's wages and his/her value of marginal product,
both worker and firm are better off.
Workers whose alternative value of marginal product exceeds their
wage prefer to change jobs, but by discharge (rather than resignation)
to avoid the quit penalty. They have an incentive to reduce current pro
ductivity to cause that result. Similarly, a firm wishing to lay off a
worker has an incentive to create working conditions that prompt the
worker to quit. An implicit contract creating such incentives would
reduce worker productivity and is in neither side's interest.
Such moral hazard problems, however, would be mitigated by limit
ing severance payments to major layoffs such as plant closings. The
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) has liabilities of over
$1 billion due to plant closing benefits (Lockhart 1990), providing evi
dence on the extent that these benefits are offered. These liabilities
were 25 percent of PBGC claims in 1990, mostly for collectively bar
gained plant-closing benefits in the steel and automobile industries. In
some U.S. plans workers have shorter vesting schedules or are credited
with extra years of work if job ending is due to layoff. In Japan, pen
sion benefits are generally higher for laid-off workers than for volun
tary job leavers.
In sum, a nonportable defined benefit pension may act as an efficient
severance tax, discouraging excessive quits. When conditions call for
layoffs, however, the employer must pay severance to the worker to
honor the implicit contract and not lose reputation in the labor market.
But given problems in calculating sufficient severance pay, portability
loss may impede efficient firm-initiated separations.

PENSIONS AND TURNOVER

This book has examined how job change causes workers to lose
pension benefits. Now the reverse is examined: How does pension ben
efit loss affect the odds that a worker will change jobs?
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Empirical studies have produced overwhelming statistical evidence
that pensions correlate with reduced worker turnover. In addition to
vesting, which has already been discussed, three factors contribute to
that correlation. First, pension benefits are often backloaded, rewarding
long tenure. Second, workers who are inherently less likely to quit or
be fired—"stayers"—may prefer jobs offering pensions more than do
workers more likely to change jobs—"movers." Third, jobs with pen
sions often offer higher wages than those found elsewhere, reducing
quits and thus reducing turnover.
Backloading

Defined benefit plans are backloaded. This means benefits—relative
to earnings—accrue more rapidly the nearer the worker is to retire
ment, or the more years he/she has worked. While ERISA limits backloading by requiring vesting after a fixed period and by restricting
pension benefit formulas, it permits some backloading in benefit for
mulas.
Backloading occurs in a benefit formula by raising pension accrual
with age or service or by making options available to workers who
leave the firm at retirement age and unavailable to workers leaving ear
lier. Career-average benefit formulas can be backloaded by giving
more credit for later service in computing the average. More com
monly, benefit formulas are backloaded by being based on final salary.
The federal Civil Service Retirement System, for example, uses a
backloaded benefit formula.4 It provides annual benefit accrual of 1.5
percent for the first five years of work, 1.75 percent for the next five
years, and 2 percent beyond the first 10 years, the percentage applying
to the average of the three consecutive years of highest salary.
Backloading also occurs by giving higher postretirement cost-ofliving adjustments to retirees with greater years worked, or higher
adjustments to retirees who stayed with the firm until retirement age. It
occurs by giving employees who work until the early retirement age
the option of receiving benefits earlier than employees who leave the
firm at younger ages. Backloading rewards workers with steep earn
ings profiles, and it thus can be used by firms to reward successful
workers with positions of responsibility.
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Final-salary defined benefit plans are implicitly backloaded because
they are tied to end-of-job salary. In 1989,64 percent of participants in
defined benefit plans in large and medium-size firms were in plans
using final-salary formulas (Mitchell 1992). However, most other
defined benefit plans are implicitly tied to final salary through ad hoc
adjustments in benefit formulas to keep pace with wages.
Backloading occurs in some defined contribution plans, for example
those that distribute forfeited nonvested benefits of early leavers to
remaining participants based on account balances. This procedure
rewards long-tenure workers due to their large account balances.
Integrating pension benefits with social security causes backloading.
Because workers typically have higher earnings later in life, benefit
formulas with higher accrual rates at higher earnings back load. Social
security integration causes backloading because pension accrual rates
are higher for workers earning above the social security taxable maxi
mum earnings. Companies may integrate both defined contribution and
defined benefit plans with social security.
How common is explicit backloading? In 1989, 46 percent of work
ers in defined benefit plans with final-salary formulas were in plans
where the accrual rate explicitly varied by service, age, or earnings
(table 10.1). The comparable figure for workers in plans with careeraverage formulas is 59 percent, and when that formula is integrated
with social security the figure is 95 percent. In flat-dollar benefit for
mulas, the benefit per year of service varies by earnings or service for
17 percent of participants. In deferred profit-sharing plans of large and
medium-size firms in 1989, 9 percent of participants were in plans
varying the accrual rate based on service (table 10.2). Thus the view
that defined contribution plans are never explicitly backloaded is false.
Backloading through integration with social security is also common
among plans offered by large and medium-size firms (table 10.3). In
1989, 63 percent of participants in these plans were in integrated plans.
This percentage varied greatly by plan type. For final-salary and
career-average plans, 86 percent and 62 percent of participants, respec
tively, were in integrated plans, while under 0.5 percent of participants
in flat-dollar plans were in integrated plans.
Backloading also occurs through higher cost-of-living adjustments
to retirees with long tenure (Alien, Clark, and McDermed 1992). For
workers in large and medium-size firms receiving a postretirement
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benefit increase during 1984-88, 24 percent were in plans where the
increase depended on years worked.
Table 10.1
Percentage of Full-Tune Participants in Defined Benefit Plans
Where the Benefit Formula Varies
by Service, Age, or Earnings, 1989
Career earnings
Terminal earnings
benefit formulas
benefit formulas
With
With
integrated
integrated
formula
Total
formula
Total
95
46
59
53
Percent per year varies
4
16
17
3
By service
71
43
24
30
By earnings
a
a
3
3
By age
20
12
By earnings and service
3
3
Dollar amount benefit formula
Amount per year of services
17
varies
15
By earnings
2
By service
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1990), pp. 89,92
a. Less than 0.5 percent.
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Table 10.2
Percentage of Full-Time Participants in Deferred
Profit-Sharing Plans Where the Allocation Varies
by the Participants' Earnings or Service
1986,1988,1989
Percent of full-time participants
1989
1988
1986
Type of formula

Employer contributions
(1) Based on stated formula
Fixed percent of profits
Variable percent of profits
Other formulas
(2) No formula
Allocation of profits to employees
Equally to all
Based on earnings
Based on earnings and service
Other
Loans from employees' accounts
Permitted
Not permitted

59
NA
NA
NA
41

55
16
12
27
45

60
10
18
33
40

1
61
10
8

1
74
12
13

1
64
9
26

25
75

32
68

19
81

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1990).
NOTES: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of rounding. NA means data not available.

Table 10.3
Percentage of Full-Time Participants in Defined Benefit Plans that Integrate, 1980-1989
Percent of full-time participants
1988
1986
1983
1985
1984
1982
1981
1980
Type of formula
38
45
44
39
38
55
57
55
Without integrated formula
62
62
61
56
45
55
43
45
With integrated formula

Benefit offset by SS
payment*
Excess formula**

30
16

33
10

35
10

35
20

36
20

40
27

43
24

SOURCE: Mitchell (1992).
NOTES: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of founding.
'"Pension benefit calculated is reduced by a portion of primary social secunty payments.
**Pension formula applies lower benefit rate to earnings subject to social secunty taxes or below a specified dollar threshold.

39
26

1989
37
63
41
24
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Measuring Backloading
ERISA limits explicit backloading, trying to assure that benefits
accrue steadily over a worker's career. But even if a defined benefit
formula weighs equally all years so that it is not explicitly backloaded,
considerable backloading occurs in most of the formulas.
Backloading in a defined benefit plan can be measured as follows.
First, calculate the constant contribution rate needed for a defined con
tribution plan to equal the defined benefit plan's value at the projected
retirement date. Next, figure the current value of this hypothetical
defined contribution plan. This current value measures the value the
defined benefit plan would have accrued were it not backloaded. The
gap between this value and the defined benefit plan's current value
measures backloading.5
Assume, for simplicity, that the benefit formula is 1 percent times
final salary times years worked, with immediate vesting. The worker
joins a firm at age 40 with a salary of $100,000, so that the first year of
work adds $1,000 to his/her annual benefit at retirement. By age 50 the
worker has a salary of $200,000 and adds $2,000 to his annual benefit
at retirement (1 percent x $200,000). But because this salary is higher
than his/her age 49 salary, and because he/she now has already worked
10 years, 1 percent times 10 times the difference between his/her salary
of $200,000 and his/her salary at 49, say $190,000, is also added. This
is another $1,000; that is, the prior year the future annual retirement
benefit equaled 1 percent times 10 years times $190,000. This year the
future annual retirement benefit equals 1 percent times 11 years times
$200,000. The greater annual retirement benefits gained by working
another year at age 50 are caused by the added year of service and the
higher salary interacted with past service. The total rise is $3,000.
Assume the worker's salary rose from $100,000 at age 40 to
$200,000 at age 50 because the price level doubled. (This occurs with
7 percent inflation.) In real dollars, the worker's salary is equal in both
years, being $200,000 in age-50 dollars. But his/her year of work at
age 40 raised the nominal benefits at retirement by $1,000 (or 0.5 per
cent of real salary), while his/her year of work at age 50 raised the
nominal benefits at retirement by $3,000 (or 1.5 percent of salary).
Thus, for equal real salary, his/her year of work at age 50 had three
times as large an effect on annual benefits at retirement. With no infla-
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tion, the same salary pattern provides a much smaller increase in pen
sion accrual relative to salary. With no inflation—the worker's salary
rising from $100,000 to $200,000 solely due to greater productivitypension accrual rises from 1 percent of real wages to 1.5 percent.
This example demonstrates how typical defined benefit pension for
mulas backload benefit accruals. It also shows how the degree of backloading depends heavily on inflation. But it understates backloading by
ignoring interest discounting, which reduces the value of pension
accruals early in life relative to those late in life. It also understates the
difference in the two examples, because in the inflation example the
discounting would be greater due to the increase in the nominal interest
rate. These calculations also understate backloading by ignoring the
effect of awarding greater percentage cost-of-living adjustments to
retirees with long careers and by assuming no explicit backloading.
Backloading has a disadvantage to employers as a job-tenure incen
tive: it is heavily influenced by inflation, which employers do not con
trol. Why would employers want job leavers to lose more when
inflation is higher? This arrangement may be a second-best solution
because ERISA limits the extent to which benefit formulas explicitly
backload (Ippolito 1986a). With no economic reason why mobility
should be lower when inflation is high, it would appear that during
inflationary periods some workers may be discouraged from quitting
when it otherwise would be efficient to do so.
Backloading and Job Change
The effect of backloading on job change depends on the underlying
employment contract. Pensions impose a penalty on early separations
when firms implicitly promise workers a job until retirement—an
"implicit lifetime contract" (Ippolito 1985). The term describes the
unstated but implied promises a firm makes about future benefits and
employment. The contract takes this form because explicit agreements
on future employment are rarely made. Exceptions occur predomi
nantly in collectively bargained agreements.
Implicit contracts regarding future benefits are not legally enforce
able. For that reason, and because later they may conflict with the
firm's interest, implicit contracts must have an economic rather than
legal enforcement mechanism for workers to rely on. To be viable and
retain credibility, they must be self-enforcing. It must be in each par-
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ty's long-run interest to maintain the contract, though it may not
always be in each party's short-run interest.
With an implicit contract, at least one party's earnings must exceed
the best alternative. Two potential sources of surplus in the employ
ment relationship are the productivity gains of job-specific human cap
ital and the savings in direct mobility costs for each party if they need
not find new partners.
The crucial factor in long-term implicit contracts is a firm's ability
to credibly commit itself. If the firm violates implicit contracts, it will
be unable to exercise this option in the future and will lose the benefits
of raised productivity. The firm will also have more difficulty in hiring
workers. Because larger firms fail less and may care more about repu
tation in the labor market, larger firms more commonly make implicit
contracts.
Implicit contracts may explain why larger firms offering pensions
grant ad hoc cost-of-living adjustments to retirees, though they are not
legally or contractually obligated to do so. It may also explain why
firms with low predicted failure rates, and thus more credible implicit
contracts, more commonly offer pensions (Curme and Kahn 1990).
A backloaded pension does not affect job change if the worker
expects to leave the employer long before retirement. The worker only
gives up wages in exchange for a pension based on current earnings,
which are lower than final earnings. This labor market, where the
worker is only hired for one period at a time, is called a spot market. It
is also characterized as the legal view of the market because firms are
only legally obligated to provide pension accrual based on current
worker earnings (Bulow 1982).
In a spot labor market, a worker's current wage equals his/her mar
ginal productivity. The worker realizes that layoff may occur due to
bankruptcy or decreased demand for the firm's product; the firm real
izes that the worker may find a better job and leave. Thus, both parties
require full pay in each period, with the wage being constantly renego
tiated as labor market conditions change. When workers change jobs in
a spot market they lose nothing, though their pension benefits are
lower than otherwise, because they have not paid for those benefits
through forgone wages. Thus, though their future benefits are reduced,
with no capital loss workers are not discouraged from changing jobs.
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Gustman and Steinmeier (1987) compare the spot market value of
pension accrual to pension accrual with continued employment. For
workers age 25 to 34 with tenure up to 10 years, the accrual based on
the spot market assumption averaged 0.6 percent of earnings, versus
14.1 percent for employment to retirement. At ages 45 to 54 with 21 to
30 years worked, the two averages were 10.4 and 15.8 percent. The
diminishing gap between the two averages indicates backloading.
The amount a job leaver loses in pension benefits under a long-ten
ure implicit contract depends on the worker's age and tenure. The pen
sion portability loss curve over a lifetime is hill shaped, rising and then
falling as age of separation rises. Low service and earnings cause the
pension portability loss initially to be low, but it grows with tenure due
to rising accrued benefits. Under a wide variety of assumptions, the
loss peaks around age 45 or 50 and then declines. The decline occurs
because the gap between separation earnings and retirement age earn
ings shrinks, offsetting the rising accrued benefits against which a loss
is suffered. The portability loss falls to zero at retirement age.
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1988) estimate that job leavers age 40
to 55 generally lose benefits equal to between one-half and two-thirds
of annual earnings. Considering the time over which workers recoup
these losses through higher earnings at alternative employment, the
capital loss could be a powerful impediment to job change for older
workers. Further, for firms caring about their reputation as employers,
the capital loss also results in fewer layoffs because layoffs reduce
retirement benefits for workers.
Kotlikoff and Wise (1987) calculate how much pension wealth
workers lose when changing jobs and compare that to the workers'
expected future wages. Their calculations range from 2 to 50 percent of
future wages, depending on age of hire, normal retirement age, and age
of job change. Most losses are less than 10 percent, but they vary by
plan. A worker starting work at age 31 and changing jobs at age 41 has
accrued for that period on average only 72 percent of the pension
wealth of a worker staying with the firm until retirement.
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Sorting
The sorting hypothesis provides another explanation for why work
ers with pensions tend to have long job tenure. The sorting hypothesis
states that firms use pension plans to select workers least likely to
leave. If some workers are "stayers" while others are "movers," the
firm has an incentive to sort out movers. A bonus conditional on longterm attachment is worth less to a mover, or to a person with a low dis
count rate, and will thus achieve the desired goal (Salop and Salop
1976). Such a bonus improves the firm's productivity because by
attracting low turnover workers the firm's search, hiring, and training
costs are reduced. Without deferred pay, workers have little incentive
to consider how job change affects their employer.
Some analysts criticize this theory because defined benefit plans are
inefficient in screening out quitters at hire. For firms where training
costs occur at the beginning of employment, turnover shortly after hire
is the most costly. Defined benefit plans lightly penalize short-tenure
workers; however, for firms who train workers over a long period, pen
sions may be effective.

Efficiency Wages
Another reason for the correlation between pensions and long job
tenure involves an employer's use of additional compensation to
encourage long tenure. One such aspect of compensation has been
called "efficiency wages." Some analysts argue that pension jobs pay
high wages to deter worker turnover. According to this argument, the
high wages rather than features of pension plans are the cause of the
correlation between pensions and low job turnover.

STATISTICAL STUDIES

Studies have demonstrated that pension coverage negatively corre
lates with reduced turnover, quits, and layoffs6 and is positively related
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to tenure.7 Two studies investigate how pensions affect worker job
mobility by modeling the impact of vesting standards—Schiller and
Weiss (1979) and Wolf and Levy (1984). Neither study estimates the
value of benefits job leavers lose.
Schiller and Weiss (1979) hypothesized that workers considering
job change compare the discounted value of wages and pensions on the
current job to the discounted value of those streams of compensation
on alternative jobs. They found that higher values of unvested benefits
reduced the odds of job change, and that vested workers were more
likely to change jobs. They found that workers age 25 to 39 in plans
with longer vesting periods had higher odds of quitting before vesting.
Because they used pre-ERISA data, some plans may have required
over 10 years for vesting.
Wolf and Levy (1984) examined the relationship between pension
coverage, pension vesting rules, and job tenure. They found the odds of
leaving a job with 10-year vesting are four times greater the year after
vesting than the year before.
With ERISA rules, pension accruals are small at vesting so workers
of most ages lose little due to job change during early years of work on
a job (Kotlikoff and Wise 1985, 1987). For workers vesting at older
ages due to having started working on a pension-covered job later in
life, being unvested reduces job change more. This may be due to
backloading, which would cause the unvested benefits of older workers
to be greater than for younger workers.
Using a sample of 1,000 pension plans, and using intermediate wage
and interest rate assumptions, Kotlikoff and Wise found that the pen
sion wealth gain for those vesting at age 40 is 14 percent of annual
earnings for 10-year vesting. The pension wealth gain is much larger
for workers vesting at later ages—36 percent at 50 and 66 percent at
age 60. Ten-year vesting is now banned in single- employer plans, but
permitted in multiemployer plans. The gains are smaller with five-year
vesting; nonetheless, vesting could be important in reducing the mobil
ity of older workers before they attain vesting. Studies thus find that
vesting reduces mobility for workers approaching the vesting limit.
Mitchell (1982) examined effects of pension coverage on job turn
over and found that a male worker with a pension plan quit 10 percent
less frequently than his counterpart without a plan. She also found that
higher wages reduced job change.
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Monitoring theories of compensation predict that pensions at small
firms will be less backloaded and have a smaller impact on the quit rate
of workers than pensions at large firms. This prediction is based on the
assumption that smaller firms are better able to monitor their workers
and do not as much need to use deferred compensation as an incentive
device. Further, firms with backloaded pensions may honor promises
of deferred compensation by offering a lower risk of permanent layoff.
If small firms do not backload pensions to reduce turnover, their pen
sions should have a smaller effect on quits and layoffs. Even and
Macpherson (1990a) test these implications of monitoring theories.
They find quits and job changes are more likely to occur at small firms.
Between 1983 and 1986, the quit and job change rates are 26 and 39
percent at small firms, but 15 and 24 percent at large firms. Estimating
a probit model of quits and job changes shows that pensions do not
affect quits or job changes at small firms, but affect both at large firms.
This pattern may occur because defined contribution plans are more
common at small firms. Bodie and Papke (1990) and others have found
that defined contribution plans are less costly for small firms than are
defined benefit plans. Dorsey (1987) shows that small firms choose
defined contribution over defined benefit plans even after controlling
for worker and industry attributes.
In a second empirical specification, Even and Macpherson (1990a)
test whether the mobility effect depends on which plan is in use—
defined benefit or defined contribution. The results show that neither
plan reduces mobility at small firms, whereas both reduce mobility at
large firms. This supports the prediction that larger firms, being more
concerned with labor turnover, more commonly design pensions to
impede mobility, but leaves unanswered why defined contribution
plans have this effect
The next two studies concentrate on the benefits workers lose due to
backloading in defined benefit plans. Both studies estimate the dollar
value of losses. Alien, Clark and McDermed (1990) found that stayers
seek jobs offering pension coverage, and that sorting of workers asso
ciates pensions with reduced turnover. Backloading pension benefit
accruals had less effect, and reduced layoffs more than quits. These
results suggest that policy changes for calculating vesting or benefits
are unlikely to raise labor mobility.
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In contrast, Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) argue that the wage pre
mium on pension jobs explains most of the reduced mobility of pen
sion-covered workers. They marshal evidence suggesting that
backloading does not cause the correlation between pension coverage
and long job tenure. First, for workers in their early forties and
younger, the loss from backloading is a small part of compensation, so
that workers gaining from a move easily offset the pension benefits
they lose. Second, estimates of mobility equations show the puzzling
finding that defined contribution plans, generally not backloaded,
reduce turnover as much as defined benefit plans. This result suggests
that backloading does not cause lower turnover rates. Finally, when a
compensation premium measure is included in the mobility equation,
the compensation premium measure and not backloading accounts for
most of the difference in mobility rates between pension- and nonpension-covered workers. Their results suggest that benefit backloading is
statistically significant in reducing worker mobility, but has a small
effect.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) used data on males age 31 to 50
working at least 30 hours a week in private sector, nonagricultural jobs
from the 1984 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participa
tion (SIPP). They found that of workers who left jobs voluntarily, 59
percent were in nonpension jobs, while 43 percent had held pension
jobs.8 The accuracy of these statistics was unclear, however, because of
data problems concerning reasons for job leaving. Using a different
data set—the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), with 1984
data—Gustman and Steinmeier find that 64 percent of nonpensioncovered workers and 61 percent of pension-covered workers were vol
untary job movers.
Both data sets have weaknesses that reduce reliability. Further, the
number of involuntary job leavers with pensions rises during economic
downturns, so that a single statistic for a short period does not reflect a
business cycle. While complete data on voluntary and involuntary job
change for pension-covered workers are unavailable, the available data
show that involuntary job leavers are an important aspect of the pen
sion portability issue.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) find individuals initially without
pensions are over three times more likely (19.5 versus 6.1 percent) to
change jobs than individuals with pensions. The gap between movers
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from pension and nonpension jobs is even wider when coverage in the
new jobs is considered. Of movers from nonpension jobs, 14 percent
gained pensions, while 64 percent of movers from pension jobs lost
coverage in the move. Pension figures for the new job include only
workers in a pension plan as of the 1985 survey. If you include those
excluded because they "have not worked for the employer long
enough," the share of movers from nonpension jobs who gained pen
sions rises to 21 percent, and the share of movers from pension jobs
losing pensions drops to 56 percent (table 10.4).9
The figures for those who lost pension coverage in a job change
show a far different reality from what is commonly assumed. The Hay/
Muggins (1988) study of portability assumed that job leavers with pen
sions went to jobs with pensions. The study bases the assumption on
the hypothesis of two worker types: (1) lower-income workers receiv
ing adequate social security benefits to maintain their living standard
and thus never covered by a pension; and (2) higher-income workers
needing a pension to supplement social security benefits in retirement
and thus covered by a pension. The statistics from the Gustman and
Steinmeier study show that many workers leaving pension jobs take
nonpension jobs.
Gustman and Steinmeier figure the value of backloading versus pro
jected compensation for pension-covered workers. Backloading is
expressed in dollars per hour of work until retirement because the
worker must stay until retirement to avoid losing the backloaded bene
fits. This is compared to cumulative wages until retirement, again in
dollars per hour until retirement. They find backloading averages only
2.5 percent of projected compensation for pension-covered workers.
This represents 21 percent of pension wealth for the workers in this
sample. 10 In the empirical estimations, they find backloading accounts
for 5 percent of the difference in mobility rates between pensioned
workers and nonpensioned workers. For workers age 45 to 50, backloading accounts for 8 percent of the difference in mobility rates
between pension- and nonpension-covered workers.
The results of Gustman and Steinmeier thus imply that making pen
sions perfectly portable would have little effect on job tenure for most
pension-covered workers. They conclude that pension coverage is
associated with efficiency wages that are higher than market wages.
Pension-covered workers generally have a higher wage on the current

Table 10.4
Wages, Pensions, and Mobility, 1984
Stayers
No pension in 1984 job

Percent movers
Mean wage in 1984
Mean wage in 1985
Percent with 1985 pension

Movers

19.5% (998)
$8.71 (654)
$8.86 (654)

$7.72 (133)
$8.23 (133)
13.8% (160)

Pension in 1984 job

Percent movers
Mean wage in 1984
Mean wage in 1985
Percent with 1985 pension

6.1% (1753)
$11.87 (1490)
$11.89 (1490)

$11.22 (88)
$10.52 (88)
35.8% (107)

Defined benefit pension in 1984 job

Percent movers
Mean wage in 1984
Mean wage in 1985
Percent with 1985 pension
Percent movers
Mean wage in 1984

6.0% (1126)
$11.94 (58)
$10.81 (58)
42.9% (63)
plans)
profit-sharing
(including
job
1984
in
pension
Defined contribution
6.2% (627)
$9.94 (30)
$11.73 (530)
$11.95 (960)
$11.94 (960)

Table 10.4 (continued)
Wages, Pensions, and Mobility, 1984
Stayers

Mean wage in 1985
Percent with 1985 pension

Movers

$9.96 (30)
$11.82 (530)
__________________________________21.9% (32)_____
Defined contribution pension in 1984 job (excluding profit-sharing plans)

6.9% (174)
Percent movers
$12.03 (8)
$11.53 (149)
Mean wage in 1984
$10.70 (8)
$11.44 (149)
Mean wage in 1985
Percent with 1985 pension_____________________________________22.2% (9)______
SOURCE: Gustman and Stemmeier (1990)
NOTES: Figures in parentheses are numbers of observations. Wages are indexed to 1984 dollars by the Index of Average Hourly Earnings (1989 Eco
nomic Report of the President, table B-44) and are included in the means only if valid wage observations are available in both years. Means are geometric
means (i.e., antilogs of mean log wages). Wages less than $1 or greater than $50 are excluded from the analysis.
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job than that attainable from the next best job. That wage premium
reduces turnover and may help to explain the reduced turnover
ascribed to pension coverage.

EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF PENSIONS

Econometric studies suggest that pensions reduce mobility for some
workers, particularly older workers in large firms. Less attention has
been paid to the effect of pension-reduced mobility on labor market
efficiency."
Whether a defined benefit pension raises labor market efficiency is
an empirical question hinging on whether the quit penalty in the pen
sion is systematically related to the value a firm places on long job ten
ure. While the quit penalty may be explained as a tool to reduce
inefficient quits, evidence is needed to support that contention. If the
amount of benefits workers lose is unrelated to training, monitoring
costs, or the need to attract stable workers, the result will be ineffi
ciency due to reduced labor market flexibility.
Deferred compensation reduces worker shirking. Thus firms are
likely to use that tactic when direct monitoring of worker effort would
be costly. It follows that jobs where monitoring costs are high are more
likely to offer pensions. Hutchens (1987) found that jobs classified as
repetitive in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles had a 9 percentage
point lower probability of pension coverage than other jobs. Further,
jobs classified as repetitive strongly correlated with a Dictionary of
Occupational Titles measure of the time required to obtain the skills
needed for the jobs. When this training index is added to the pension
coverage equation, the estimated coefficient on training is positive and
large. This finding supports the argument that pension-induced long
tenure raises the benefit from firm-specific training.
Dorsey (1990) investigated the relationship between the required
training for a job and pension coverage and provides evidence that
pension coverage is associated with training. 12 This presumably occurs
by reducing quits, so that the firm can count on recouping training
expenses. In another study, Dorsey (1987) used IRS data on pension
plan sponsors to estimate the causes of primary defined benefit versus
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defined contribution coverage. If nonportability raises worker produc
tivity, firms with production processes requiring greater training or
monitoring should be more likely to provide defined benefit coverage.
Dorsey's estimates show that industries with high concentrations of
professional, managerial, and craftsmen occupations were more likely
to have defined benefit pensions.
In sum, indirect evidence is consistent with a correlation between
pensions and increased productivity. The pattern of pension coverage
supports predictions from the training and shirking models, where pen
sions have a productivity augmenting role. Moreover, some initial
direct evidence shows that pension coverage occurs more commonly in
firms providing greater training. Finally, employers are more reluctant
to discharge workers facing a high pension separation penalty. This
result suggests that employers have valuable investments in those
workers.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Reducing the vesting period from five years is likely to have little
effect on job change except for short-tenure workers, who may be
induced to stay on the job long enough to vest when the vesting period
is reduced. After vesting, the odds of job change rise, so that reducing
the vesting period may ultimately increase job change. Indexing
deferred vested benefits for inflation would also raise mobility, for the
same reason. But imposing standards to guarantee benefit preserva
tion—prevent preretirement cashouts—might reduce mobility because
workers could not access pension assets by changing jobs.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) argue that raising portability by
reducing the benefits workers lose due to backloading would little
affect job change, because backloading has little effect on job change.
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1990) agree, but from a different
premise. They argue that there would be little effect on job change
because backloading, for the most part, reduces layoffs, an effect
examined more closely in the next chapter. If either argument is cor
rect, reducing backloading would not affect job change.
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NOTES
1. This discussion largely follows Dorsey (1990).
2. This theory was pioneered by Gary Becker (1964) and Walter Oi (1962).
3. There are also tax advantages to employers for defemng compensation through pensions,
rather than deferring by paying higher wages later. The returns on employer contributions to a
pension plan are not taxed while they accrue. However, if the employer had funded deferred
wages by investing in the firm, the retained earnings invested in the firm would not be tax deduct
ible, and the returns on the capital in the firm would be taxed at the marginal corporate income tax
rate.
4. The Civil Service Retirement System is unregulated by ERISA.
5. This method of calculating backloading, used by Gustman and Stemmeier (1990), is a gen
eralization of the method used by Ippolito (1986a).
6. These studies have been surveyed in Andrews (1990) and Gustman and Mitchell (1991).
7. See for instance Wolf and Levy (1984).
8. The Census Bureau regards these data as preliminary and requires the following statement
regarding their use: "This report uses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
1984 Panel (Preliminary) Wave 6 Core plus Topical Module File, which was released by the Cen
sus Bureau for research to improve understanding and analysis of SIPP data. The data on the file
are preliminary and should be analyzed and interpreted with caution. At the time the file was cre
ated, the Census Bureau was still exploring certain unresolved technical and methodological
issues associated with the creation of this data set. The Census Bureau does not approve or
endorse the use of these data for official estimates."
9. The percentage of job movers who had a pension on a previous job but not on the current
job is higher than Piacentim (1990b) found, but the Piacentini results are for movers who had a
pension on any previous job, while the Gustman and Stemmeier results are only for a one-year
time period.
10. The magnitude of the backloading loss found by Gustman and Stemmeier (1990) is con
sistent with that found by Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1990).
11. This discussion is drawn largely from Dorsey (1990).
12. He uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

II
Layoffs and Portability Issues
This chapter examines the relationship between pensions, pension
portability, and layoffs and focuses on two interrelated policy issues:
the impact of pensions on layoffs and the reverse impact of layoffs on
pension benefits. The discussion of these issues suggests that special
portability policies may be needed to aid workers who are laid off. 1

THE IMPACT OF PENSIONS ON LAYOFFS

There are two ways in which pensions could affect layoffs. First,
firms that offer pensions could engage in the opportunistic behavior of
laying off pensioned workers more readily than nonpensioned workers.
Opportunistic behavior could also be in evidence when firms that offer
pension coverage exhibit higher layoff rates than firms that do not offer
pension coverage. There could be financial gain for the firm from lay
ing off unvested workers or from laying off older workers who are cov
ered by defined benefit plans and who have not yet reached the age of
benefit eligibility. (Backloading of pension liabilities creates an incen
tive for firms to dismiss this latter group of workers.) Such actions,
however, may violate pension law.
Second, pensions could discourage layoffs, either because of some
feature of a plan that inhibits layoff or some characteristic of pensioncovered jobs or the workers in these jobs that is also associated with
low layoff rates. Theories to explain this effect vary widely.
Opportunistic Behavior by Firms
Firms engaged in opportunistic behavior, for example, when they
offer pensions to workers whom they intend to dismiss long before the
workers can collect the full value of their pension benefits. While there
may be financial gain for firms from this behavior, there are reputational costs to consider.2 Firms can also hire workers with the intent of
163
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fulfilling pension obligations, but then dismiss them prematurely
because of unexpected change in the firm's situation (e.g., a technolog
ical breakthrough or unexpected foreign competition). Again, this can
result in financial gains to the firm. In both cases, whether behaving in
a deceptive manner or responding to an unexpected change, the firm is
said to be engaging in opportunistic behavior.
Most of the evidence of opportunistic behavior by employers takes
the form of specific court cases, two of which are discussed here. In
both instances, the presence of a pension increased the risk of layoff.
DeSoto, Inc.
Four former employees of DeSoto have charged that in 1989 the
company laid off 10 percent of its workforce in an effort to increase the
overfunding in its pension plan and thereby help avert a takeover
attempt.3 The laid-off employees filed suit in U.S. District Court in
Chicago to stop the company from terminating its pension plan and
from distributing $28 million in after-tax surplus assets to its share
holders. The plaintiffs, who had each worked at the company for
between 16 and 29 years, argued that DeSoto had laid off 200 employ
ees late in 1989 as part of an effort to thwart a $50-per-share hostile
takeover bid by Sutton Holding Corporation of New York. As of late
1992, this case had not been decided.
Continental Can Company
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a nation
wide program at Continental Can Company targeted for layoff those
employees who were approaching pension eligibility and thus violated
the terms of ERISA.4 This upheld a district court judge's injunction
against the use of the plan (McLendon v. Continental Can Co., CA 3,
No. 89-5596, 7/26/90).
Under a 1977 collective bargaining agreement with the United Steel
Workers, Continental established "magic number" pension benefits to
ensure benefits for employees subjected to periodic (temporary) lay
offs. Benefits under the plan, which accrued when the employee
reached a certain age and a certain number of years of service, included
layoff benefits to those employees experiencing a break-in-service of
two years or more from plant shutdowns, involuntary layoffs, or physi
cal disability.
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Faced with both substantial unfunded liabilities under the pension
plan and a dwindling market for steel beverage cans, Continental Can
devised the "bell system," a nationwide program subsequently found
by a federal judge to stand as a reverse acronym for "Let's Limit
Employee Benefits" or "Lowest Level of Employee Benefits." A com
puter program generated printouts of the workforce with codes
attached to each worker showing benefit eligibility and identifying
which employees were close to vesting.
Four employees who lost their jobs brought a class action against
the company in 1983, charging that Continental had implemented the
"bell system" to avoid pension liabilities in violation of section 510 of
ERISA. The plaintiffs maintained that they were laid off because they
were approaching eligibility for magic number pension benefits, and
that Continental kept them on permanent layoff, even when jobs were
available, to prevent them from achieving a vested right to benefits.
The company claimed that the system was strictly informational and
that the employees who were laid off lost their jobs because of the
industry slowdown. In 1989, Judge H. Lee Sarokin of the U.S. District
Court in New Jersey found that Continental had "engaged in a com
plex, secret and deliberate scheme to deny its workers bargained-for
pensions (that) raises questions of corporate morality, ethics and
decency which far transcend the factual and legal issues posed by this
matter." After several appeals, Continental Can agreed to a $45 million
settlement as a final resolution of the case.
Evidence of Pensions Associated with Fewer Layoffs

These court cases appear to be isolated examples of situations in
which the presence of a pension increased the likelihood of layoffs.
Virtually all economic studies that examine the more general experi
ence conclude the opposite: workers who are covered by a pension are
less likely to be laid off than workers who are not covered.
Several studies have examined both quits and layoffs (i.e., Mitchell
1982; Alien, Clark, and McDermed 1986; Even and Macpherson
1990a). In general, these studies find that the relationship between pen
sions and worker mobility is even more negative for total job change
than for quits.5 Only a few studies explicitly examine the impact of
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pensions on layoffs (Fames, Gagen, and King 1981; Cornwell, Dorsey,
and Mehrzad 1991; Alien, Clark, and McDermed 1990).
Parnes, Gagen, and King (1981) investigate whether the presence of
a pension affects the likelihood of being permanently laid off. Using
the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men, they identify men
who at the time of the initial (1966) survey had been with their current
employer for at least five years and who were permanently separated
from that employer sometime between 1966 and 1975. Because their
concern is with displaced workers for whom layoffs are unaccustomed
events, Parnes, Gagen, and King exclude workers in construction and
agriculture. According to their multiple classification analysis, older
male workers with pensions are considerably less likely to be displaced
than older male workers without pensions: the likelihood of displace
ment is approximately 5 percent for men with pensions and 12 percent
for men without pensions.
Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad (1991) also use the National Longi
tudinal Survey of Mature Men; however, they select men who were
discharged between 1971 and 1976 and do not exclude workers in con
struction and agriculture. (They do, however, exclude self-employed
workers.) Despite these differences, their results are similar to those of
Parnes, Gagen, and King. They find that, on average, the likelihood
that an older pension-covered worker will be laid off is 4.6 to 5.4 per
centage points lower than that for an older, noncovered worker.6
In addition, Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad examine whether the
value of potential pension loss affects dismissals among older male
workers. Their results on this are mixed. When the pension loss calcu
lations are based on a constant wage-pension tradeoff, the pension loss
coefficient is zero and is insignificant.7 Coupled with the negative and
significant coefficient on the pension coverage variable, this signifies
that while workers with pensions are less likely to be discharged, the
risk among covered workers is no higher for workers with greater
potential losses. However, when the pension loss calculations ignore
the wage-pension tradeoff, the pension loss coefficient becomes larger
and significant, signifying that a higher loss raises the risk of layoff.
The Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad study tests whether firms
behave in an opportunistic manner. Although the authors find no
empirical support for the idea that pensions raise the risk of layoff for
older male workers, they point out that, because the agreed-upon risk
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of discharge will probably be lower for pension-covered workers in an
implicit contract, their findings do not necessarily rule out opportunis
tic behavior. As a further examination of the issue of opportunistic
behavior, they investigate whether unanticipated pension losses
increase the likelihood of layoffs. They find that workers with greater
unexpected losses are more likely to be discharged. They also attempt
to test whether firms with declining profits and declining reputation
capital are more likely to behave in an opportunistic manner, but their
results are insignificant. Their final test is an examination of the effect
of ERISA on the probability of dismissal. They cannot reject the
hypothesis that ERISA had no effect on the propensity of employers to
dismiss workers who were covered by pensions.
Like Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad (1991), Alien, Clark, and
McDermed (1990) explore whether pension losses affect layoffs. How
ever, because they use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
rather than the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men, they look
at all workers rather than just older male workers. Their PSID sample,
which covers the period 1975-82, consists of private wage and salary
workers who were employed at the time of the 1975 survey and
reported earnings. They selected only those workers under age 55 (in
1975) who were heads of household working 35 or more hours per
week, and they excluded individuals employed in agriculture, forestry,
fishing, and unclassified trade industries. Alien, Clark, and McDermed
find that for these workers the probability of being laid off falls by 1.3
percent for each $1,000 increase in the capital loss of the pension.8
(Recall that this is not consistent with the findings of Cornwell,
Dorsey, and Mehrzad, who find a positive relationship between the
two.)9 The capital loss has a much larger effect on layoffs than on quits.
Alien, Clark, and McDermed do not explain why there is a smaller
impact on quits, but they point out that the observed negative relation
ship between layoffs and capital loss is consistent with models that
portray pensions as "part of an implicit contract where bonding pre
vents shirking and reputational concerns prevent employers from
pocketing... (the capital /ass)...by firing their workers" (Alien, Clark,
and McDermed 1990, p. 26).
In summary, econometric studies on the relationship between pen
sions and layoffs suggest that the presence of a pension is associated
with fewer layoffs. However, the evidence on the relationship between
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pension loss and the probability of layoff is mixed. In general, the
research findings are consistent with models that view pensions as part
of an implicit contract between workers and firms. Although none of
the findings rules out opportunistic behavior by firms, they suggest that
opportunism does not dominate.
Researchers have not yet fully explored the reasons why these
empirical studies indicate a negative relationship between pension cov
erage and layoffs. This remains fertile ground for future research.

THE IMPACT OF LAYOFFS ON PENSION BENEFITS

Pension-covered workers who are laid off can suffer the same porta
bility losses as workers who quit their jobs. However, laid-off workers
may incur additional losses as well. These losses are associated with
the inability of many displaced workers to find jobs equivalent to the
ones from which they were laid off (i.e., their new job may offer a
lower wage or a less generous pension or no pension at all). In addi
tion, laid-off workers may decide to drop out of the labor force because
the job prospects are so bleak, or they may experience lengthy periods
of unemployment. Some displaced workers may receive benefits (i.e.,
severance pay) to help compensate them for their losses. However, in
many cases, these benefits fail to compensate them for lost earnings, let
alone pension benefit loses.
Although laid-off workers do not inevitably find themselves in these
situation, one of the empirical regularities that distinguishes quits from
layoffs is that laid-off workers are far more likely to encounter these
adversities than workers who quit. Policymakers who are concerned
with the impact of turnover on pension benefit loss should be aware of
these potential situations and take them into account when designing
policy.
Nonportability Losses

In addition to portability losses, workers who are laid off may incur
other pension losses based on their subsequent employment experi
ence.
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Losses from Lower Wages or Less Generous Pension
Reemployed displaced workers may suffer pension benefit losses
either because their new job offers a pension with less generous terms
or because their reemployment wage (and subsequent earnings path) is
lower than what it otherwise would have been. There is no evidence on
the likelihood that a laid-off worker will be reemployed in a job offer
ing a pension with less generous terms. However, there is a consider
able amount of research on the impact of layoffs on reemployment
wages which affect the pension benefits of covered workers.
In summarizing the literature on wage loss associated with layoffs,
Hamermesh (1989) states that, on average, reemployment wages are 5
to 15 percent below wages on the terminated job. Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) present evidence that pension-covered jobs may be at the
high end of this range. Using data from the 1984-87 PSID for males
age 31 to 50, they estimate that the mean wage of involuntary movers
from pension-covered jobs falls by 9.1 percent, while the wage of
involuntary movers from non-pension-covered jobs rises by 4.1 per
cent. 10
Examining the average wage loss associated with layoffs obscures
the substantial variation in what happens to workers when they are laid
off. Each of the three Displaced Worker Surveys shows that about half
of the displaced workers earn as much or more in their new job as they
did in the job from which they were terminated. However, approxi
mately 30 percent of the workers earn 20 percent or more less (Flaim
and Sehgal 1985; Horvath 1987; Herz 1990). If this decline in wages
persists over time, the pension-covered workers in this group will suf
fer moderate benefit losses (assuming benefits are based on earnings).
Losses from having No Pension
Some displaced workers find themselves without a pension after
they are laid off. This can occur for two reasons. Either the new job
does not offer a pension, or the worker remains unemployed and may
permanently drop out of the labor force. Only a small percentage of
workers who were laid off permanently drop out of the labor force.
Information on the dropout rate is limited, but using the longitudinal
capabilities of the CPS, Devens (1986) provides evidence that less than
15 percent of displaced workers remain permanently out of the labor
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force. Those workers who were covered by a pension may suffer con
siderable loss of benefits.
Similarly, pension-covered displaced workers who are reemployed
in jobs that do not offer pensions may also suffer losses. There are sev
eral reasons why laid-off workers may be reemployed in nonpension
jobs. First, some workers may decide to take part-time jobs, which are
less likely to offer a pension than full-time jobs. According to the first
and second Displaced Worker Surveys, of the displaced workers with
three or more years of tenure who worked full time on their terminated
job and who were able to find new jobs after being laid off, approxi
mately 10 to 12 percent were in part-time jobs. Another 8 percent were
self-employed, and the remainder were in full-time wage and salary
jobs (Flaim and Sehgal 1985; Horvath 1987).11 A second reason is that
some laid-off workers, particularly those who lose jobs in declining
industries, must switch industries in order to find a new job. As shown
in table 11.1, the general tendency is for workers to move from jobs in
the goods-producing industries (especially manufacturing), where pen
sion coverage is high, to jobs in the services and trade industries,
where pension coverage is low. For example, only 39.8 percent of the
(reemployed) workers who were displaced from jobs in durable goods
manufacturing were reemployed in that industry. Almost 17 percent
went into wholesale and retail trade, where pension coverage rates
were considerably lower. Another 16 percent went into services.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1990, tables Al and A4) present wideranging evidence on the extent to which pension-covered displaced
workers are reemployed in jobs that do not offer pensions. Using panel
data from the 1983-86 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for males
31-50 years old, they find that 48 percent of involuntary movers who
had a pension on their terminated job did not have a pension on their
new job. Their data from the 1984-85 Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), which also covers males 31-50 years old, show a
much higher percentage: 71 percent of involuntary movers who had a
pension on their initial job did not have a pension on their new job.
There are several possible reasons for these varying estimates, includ
ing small sample sizes and problems with both the SCF and SIPP data
(discussed in Gustman and Steinmeier 1990).12
Hutchens (1986) also presents evidence relevant to this issue. He
finds that firms offering pensions are less likely to hire older workers

Table 11.1
Reemployed Workers by Industry of Lost Job and Industry of Job Held in January 1984
and Pension Coverage Rates by Industry, 1983

Industry of
lost job
Total
Construction
Manufacturing
Durable goods
Nondurable
goods
Transportation &
public utilities
Wholesale &
retail trade
Services
Other

Total
(OOOs)
3,058
281
1,474
980

Percentage distribution by industry in January 1984
Pension
Transportation Wholesale
Manufacturing
coverage
rates
& retail
& public
Durable Nondurable
1983
Services Other
trade
utilities
goods
Construction Total goods
11.8 47
21.0
20.7
7.5
9.6
18.7
10.6
28.3
10.3 32
23.2
12.6
4.2
2.2
6.2
4.0
43.6
8.4 NA
15.4
16.8
5.0
15.8
47.1
31.1
7.4
7.8 67
15.6
16.7
5.4
6.3
39.8
46.1
8.5

493

5.1

48.6

14.0

34.7

4.4

12.9

19.3

9.7

198

11.6

12.3

7.7

4.6

42.6

11.8

11.5

10.2

455
347
300

4.1
7.6
8.7

14.6
12.0
7.4

9.0
8.1
5.0

5.6
3.9
2.3

5.4
3.6
6.3

50.1
19.4
17.7

16.8
46.4
23.5

8.9
10.9
36.4

SOURCE: Seller and Lawrence (1992).

59
53 (T)
81 (PU)
47 (WT)
35
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(over age 55). Thus, older workers laid off from a pension job are prob
ably less likely to find another pension job than are younger laid-off
workers.
Income Replacement for Laid-OrT Workers
Laid-off workers may receive compensation from a variety of fed
eral, state, and private sources. These include unemployment insur
ance, supplemental unemployment insurance, severance pay, trade
adjustment assistance, plant closing benefits, and pension-vesting
credit for an extra year of service. There are two reasons why compen
sation is important to consider vis a vis pension benefit losses. First, if
the compensation either partially or fully offsets the pension losses,
then the losses incurred by laid-off workers may not be an especially
important policy issue. The policy debate can focus generally on the
impact of turnover on pension benefit losses without taking the laid-off
workers explicitly into account.
The existence of compensation for laid-off workers provides a test
of implicit contract theory. Dorsey (1990) points out that the portability
losses incurred by workers who quit act as a penalty to these workers
for breaking an implicit long-term contract with their employers. How
ever, workers who are laid off also suffer these portability losses.
Dorsey argues that, in the case of layoffs, firms are breaking the
implicit contract, and there should therefore be a penalty to the firm (if
indeed implicit contract theory accurately describes the employeremployee relationship). If the firm pays laid-off workers directly (e.g.,
through severance pay) or indirectly (e.g., through contributions to an
unemployment insurance fund), then this can represent a partial pen
alty to the firm. In both cases, the magnitude of compensation relative
to the wage and pension losses is of interest.
The three Displaced Worker Surveys, which feature the most com
plete set of information on laid-off workers, include questions on
unemployment insurance only. These data suggest that a considerable
number of displaced workers fail to receive enough benefits to cover
their lost earnings, let alone their pension losses. According to these
surveys, about half of the laid-off workers who received unemploy
ment insurance had exhausted their benefits by the time of the survey
(Raim and Sehgal 1985; Horvath 1987; Herz 1990).
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This conclusion is supported by findings from a 1983-84 survey of
379 workers who were put on indefinite layoff by a major automobile
manufacturer in April 1983 (cited in Flaim and Sehgal 1985, p. 14).
This survey found that, on average, compensation payments covered
about 30 percent of the displaced workers' income loss. The amount of
income offset by these benefits was lower the longer the layoff period.
The benefits covered about 55 percent of lost income for workers laid
off for less than one year; however, they covered only 13 percent for
workers laid off for more than two years. The proportion of lost
income offset by the compensation payments also varied with senior
ity. The benefits received by workers with more than 10 years of
seniority replaced a larger proportion of lost income than those
received by workers with less seniority.
Thus, there is some limited evidence that for some workers compen
sation benefits fail to offset lost income. However, there is other evi
dence that this is not the case for all laid-off workers. Flaim and Sehgal
(1985, p. 14) cite the following finding from a demonstration study
(conducted in the early 1980s) involving laid-off automobile workers
from the Detroit metropolitan area:
Depending upon the particular plant from which they had been
laid off, the workers were found to have received either unem
ployment insurance benefits, or unemployment insurance coupled
with company-funded supplemental unemployment benefits, or,
in some cases, both of these benefits as well as trade adjustment
assistance, which was paid to those whose jobs were deemed to
have been lost because of imports. Therefore, some of the workers
had their pre-layoff earnings almost entirely replaced by benefits,
at least for a time.

Moreover, there is some indication that under certain circumstances
some severance plans can compensate laid-off workers for more than
just lost earnings. For example, some severance plans are structured so
that, regardless of how long it takes to find a new job, an eligible laidoff employee receives a certain number of weeks of salary based on
years of service.13 Under this type of plan, a worker who is laid off
after 10 years of service may receive 10 weeks of severance pay (at the
rate of pay before termination). If the worker finds a new job after two
weeks and if the new job features at least the same rate of pay as the
old job, then the worker will receive eight weeks of compensation in
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excess of lost earnings. This could offset some of the worker's loss in
pension wealth. Other severance plans stop payments when the worker
begins a new job. However, some of these plans offer laid-off workers
a guaranteed minimum, i.e., if the employee is entitled to a maximum
of 18 weeks of severance pay but finds a job within three weeks, that
employee receives the guaranteed minimum, say 13 weeks of sever
ance pay. Again, in cases like this, certain laid-off employees may
receive more than their lost earnings, and thus be compensated for
some of their loss of pension wealth.
It is not known how common these particular types of severance
plans are. In general, however, severance plans are fairly common. The
most recent Employee Benefits Survey shows that 39 percent of all
full-time employees in medium-size and large firms (defined as
employing at least 100 workers) were eligible for severance pay (U.S.
Department of Labor 1990). The percentage is higher for professional
and administrative employees (54 percent) and technical and clerical
workers (46 percent) than for production and service employees (27
percent). 14 These figures are similar to those from a U.S. Government
Accounting Office (1986) survey conducted in the mid-1980s. This
survey covered firms that appeared to have laid off workers recently
and found that 54 percent of these firms offered severance pay. The
percentages were higher for white-collar workers (53 percent) than for
blue-collar workers (34 percent).15 Doescher and Dorsey (1992) found
that explicit pension plan provisions for early retirement bonuses in the
event of a major layoff are common. Allowing older workers to begin
receiving benefits immediately reduces or eliminates their pension
losses. They also found that severance pay plans were more likely in
firms that also sponsored defined benefit pensions. This result is con
sistent with the prediction that employers will attempt to offset defined
benefit pension losses of job losers. Clearly, further research is needed
to identify the extent to which benefits paid to laid-off workers com
pensate them for lost earnings and lost pension wealth. At issue is
whether these benefits in any way offset the pension wealth losses
incurred by workers when they are laid off.
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Policy Implications of Layoffs
The effect of layoffs on pension benefit losses is an important policy
issue, not because it affects a large number of workers, but because it is
such an important issue for those it does affect To date, most of the
policy focus has been on preserving the pension benefits of mobile
workers in general, with little distinction between workers who quit
and those who are laid off. This section first discusses how the general
policy proposals will affect laid-off workers. It then suggests the kinds
of policies that could help the small minority of high-tenure workers
who suffer serious pension losses when they are laid off.
In general, the policies directed at preserving the pension benefits of
mobile workers can be classified as either policies that affect the porta
bility of pensions or policies explicitly designed to preserve retirement
income. While these policies may meet most of the needs of workers
who voluntarily quit their jobs, they only address some of the concerns
of workers who are involuntarily laid off. The policies designed to
enhance portability generally focus on plan design changes. Some pro
posals call for more liberal vesting requirements, while others attempt
to expand service portability.
Requiring shorter vesting schedules would enhance portability by
allowing more short-tenure workers to carry accrued pension benefits
with them when they change jobs. About 70 percent of all laid-off
workers had less than five years of tenure. While not all of these work
ers are covered by pension plans, this statistic suggests that a high per
centage of displaced workers lose their pension benefits because they
are not vested. Policies to tighten vesting requirements will reduce the
number of short-tenure workers who must forfeit their accrued benefits
when they are laid off.
Policies designed to enhance service portability will also help dis
placed workers. A vested worker who is covered by a defined benefit
plan and is laid off will suffer a pension benefit loss due to backloading. Policies requiring either that the vested benefits of separated par
ticipants be adjusted for inflation or the defined benefit plans give
participants credit for service at previous jobs or that permit only
defined contribution plans would help blunt this loss. A policy that
requires indexing would eliminate most of the loss from backloading,
as would a policy that permits only defined contribution plans. How-
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ever, policies that call for pooling of service credits or require employ
ers to credit all years of service in the workforce would only be
effective for workers who are reemployed in jobs that offer pension
coverage. Because the general tendency is for laid-off workers to leave
jobs in industries where pension coverage is high for jobs in industries
where pension coverage is lower (table 11.1), these types of policies
could seriously undermine elimination of losses due to backloading for
laid-off workers.
While the portability policies discussed above will help laid-off
workers, it is not clear that the policies designed to preserve retirement
income will do so. The primary focus of policies designed to preserve
retirement income is to limit the use of lump-sum distributions for cur
rent consumption. This involves placing limits on preretirement distri
butions, increasing the tax penalties on distributions that are not rolled
over, and simplifying the transfer of distributions into qualified retire
ment accounts. As is the case for workers in general, these types of pol
icies will help preserve retirement income for laid-off workers.
However, some displaced workers may be better off if they can use
their accrued pension benefits to help them through a lengthy period of
unemployment. Policies permitting hardship distributions would be
one way to help displaced workers.
It is important to note that neither the portability policies nor the
preservation-of-retirement-income policies address some of the more
significant pension benefit losses incurred by some displaced workers,
in particular losses associated with failure to find a new job or with tak
ing a new job that does not offer a pension. These losses must be
addressed through other channels. 16 One way to do this might be to
require that pension plans offer laid-off workers some kind of nonmonetary bonus or credit to compensate them for their loss. For example,
some pension plans automatically vest laid-off workers. Others credit
laid-off workers with an extra year of service for vesting purposes
(Pension Rights Center 1990-1991). Requiring plans to include either
of these provisions, or a similar provision (e.g., offering laid-off work
ers an extra year of service for purposes of computing benefits), could
help compensate displaced workers for their loss in pension wealth.
Another approach might be to directly compensate workers for their
pension losses. This could occur through any of the programs currently
in place to compensate displaced workers for their lost earnings. For
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example, the trade adjustment assistance program and perhaps the
unemployment insurance program could be expanded to cover com
pensation for lost pension wealth. Similarly, severance payments and
plant-closing benefits could be structured so that they include pension
wealth compensation for laid-off workers.
Any serious consideration of these proposals should include an
assessment of costs. It is also important to determine to what extent
laid-off workers are currently compensated for their wage and pension
losses. The current literature offers only scant information on this
point.

CONCLUSIONS

Both workers who quit and workers who are laid off can incur sev
eral different types of losses. Portability policies will help with the
vesting losses and backloading losses incurred by workers experienc
ing both types of turnover; preservation-of-retirement-income policies,
on the other hand, will help workers who quit, but may make displaced
workers worse off. The other categories of pension wealth loss—losses
incurred because of either a less generous pension on the new job or no
pension at all following the layoff—will not be addressed by current
proposals to enhance portability and preserve retirement income. For
workers who quit, this is not a major concern because they voluntarily
incur the pension losses. For laid-off workers, however, it is important
to know the extent to which the benefits paid compensate them for lost
earnings and lost pension wealth. If the benefits either fully or partially
offset the pension wealth losses, then policies designed to enhance
pension, portability may be sufficient to meet the needs of laid-off
workers. However, if the benefits do not offset their losses, then there
may be a need to develop special policies for workers who incur losses
in their pension wealth due to being laid off.
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NOTES
1. This chapter was written by Tabitha Doescher.
2. Firms that engage in this type of deceptive behavior may have considerable difficulties
recruiting a quality workforce. Further, some aspects of this type of behavior would violate fed
eral pension law.
3. This case was reported in Chernoff (1990, pp. 2,38).
4. This case was reported in Bureau of National Affairs (1990).
5. Although this finding seems to suggest that pensions deter layoffs even more than they deter
quits, the results are sometimes confounded by the inclusion of temporary layoffs in total job
changes.
6. This may include temporary, as well as permanent, layoffs.
7. In this regression, the pension loss calculations assume that workers receive a pension in
lieu of higher wages. Thus, the pension loss calculations net out the sacrifice of future wages. The
tradeoff is assumed to be a constant fraction of the wage.
8. This may include temporary, as well as permanent, layoffs.
9. Corn well, Dorsey, and Mehrzad obtained their pension loss data from Robert Clark, so the
difference between the two studies cannot be attributed to differences in calculating the pension
loss (or capital loss) variable. One possible explanation is that Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad
look at older male workers only, whereas Alien, Clark, and McDermed examine workers who
were under age 55 at the beginning of the study.
10. These figures from both Hamermesh and Gustman and Stemmeier are simply compari
sons between the real wage at the time of the layoff and the real reemployment wage; they do not
take into account any merit or productivity wage increases which may have occurred in the
absence of displacement. For those workers with lengthy periods of unemployment, this could be
a sizable omission.
11. These surveys were conducted during downturns in the economy. The statistics may vary
over the business cycle.
12. It is interesting to contrast these data with information on the current pension status of
workers who participated in a pension plan on a prior job. Using the May 1988 CPS, Piacentini
(1990a, table 2) reports that 69 percent of private-sector, full- time workers who participated in a
pension plan on a prior job were covered by a pension on their current job; 53 percent reported
that they were currently participating in a plan. These figures were 70 percent and 56 percent,
respectively, for the males in the sample (tabulations for males ages 31-50, the group used by
Gustman and Stemmeier, were not available). Thus, 30 percent of the males who had a pension on
a previous job were not covered by a pension on their current job, while 44 percent were not cur
rently participating in a pension plan. (Note that these data include males who quit their previous
job, as well as those who were laid off.) This is only a slightly lower percentage than that found by
Gustman and Steinmeier for laid-off males included in the Survey of Consumer Finances; how
ever, it is a considerably higher percentage than that found in the Survey of Income and Program
Participation.
13. With this type of plan, there is no built-in disincentive to avoid job search.
14. The Employee Benefits Survey also contains information on supplemental unemployment
benefits, which are much less common than severance plans. Five percent of all full-time employ
ees are eligible for supplemental unemployment benefits. The percentage is higher for production
and service employees (9 percent) than for professional and administrative employees and techni
cal and clerical workers (2 percent each).
15. The General Accounting Office survey also shows that 16 percent of the firms offered
early retirement to laid-off workers, 15 percent offered pay in lieu of notice, 10 percent offered
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lump-sum payments, 10 percent offered supplementary unemployment benefits, 43 percent
offered continuation of health insurance, and 28 percent offered continuation of life insurance.
Except for supplementary unemployment benefits, the white-collar percentages were higher than
the blue-collar percentages.
16. These losses may also be incurred by workers who quit their jobs. However, workers who
quit are presumably doing so voluntarily. There is no perceived policy need to compensate them
for these losses. Laid-off workers are a different matter. Because these workers leave their jobs
involuntarily, it may be desirable to provide them with some kind of compensation.
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An International Perspective
on Pension Portability
In searching for solutions to the pension portability problem, policy
analysts should consider all available evidence on the range and feasi
bility of policies. Because several countries have done more than the
United States to reduce pension benefit loss, a close look at their poli
cies might answer a number of feasibility questions faced by U.S. policymakers. 1
This chapter examines portability policies in countries with private
pension systems similar to those of the United States and focuses on
policy aspects that may be applicable to the U.S. pension system.2 The
countries considered are Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom. Each has a well-developed private pension system
where employers voluntarily provide pension benefits. Other western
industrialized countries, such as Germany, France, and Italy, have pen
sion systems that differ considerably from those of the United States,
and for that reason they are considered in less detail.

BACKGROUND
Employer-sponsored private pension systems in Japan, the Nether
lands, the United Kingdom, and the United States are regulated by the
national government. In contrast, pensions in Canada are regulated by
the provincial governments, with each province having separate stan
dards for its pension plans.3
The province of Ontario employs 40 percent of Canada's privatesector workers and thus represents a major part of the country's experi
ence. Ontario has been a leader in pension reform, with other provinces
often copying its policies. For this reason, Ontario is treated as repre
senting Canadian pension policy for purposes of this chapter.
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Employer-sponsored pensions in the Netherlands are nearly univer
sal for full-time workers. By contrast, less than half of the private-sec
tor labor force in the United States, Canada, Japan, and the United
Kingdom is covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan. The
three English-speaking countries, however, all provide tax advantages
for individual retirement accounts, which can substitute for employersponsored pensions. Workers may use IRAs for pension portability,
since they can transfer preretirement distributions from employersponsored pensions to an individual account. Workers also may choose
an individual plan as a portable alternative to an employer-sponsored
pension. While individual plans are not available in Japan, until
recently Japanese workers could have tax free savings accounts, which
could be used like an IRA.
Patterns of job change vary across countries (table 12.1), possibly
reflecting the differing attitudes towards job change. Only 4 percent of
Japanese workers left their jobs over a one-year period (Yumiba 1991),
while 11 percent of British workers did so (Daykin 1991). In the Neth
erlands and the United States, 7 percent of workers changed jobs in a
year (Keizer 1991). In all four countries, women more commonly
changed jobs than men (table 12.1). In Japan and the United Kingdom,
young males more commonly changed jobs than older males (table
12.2).
Table 12.1
Job Changers as a Percentage of Labor Force
Males
Females
Total
4.8
Japan
4.2
3.8
Netherlands
6.5
6.7
7.3
United Kingdom
11.0
10.0
14.0
NA
NA
United States
6.5
SOURCE: Turner and Dailey (1991).

Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom have a two-tiered social
security system. The first tier provides a flat benefit per person, and the
second tier provides an earnings-related benefit. Japan and the United
Kingdom allow workers to "contract out" of the earnings-related part
of social security. Employers can cut social security payments if they
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fund equivalent pensions, and the contracted-out pension plans have all
of the portability features of social security. British workers also can
opt out of the earnings-related part of social security (the State Earn
ings Related Pension) by contributing to an individual Personal Pen
sion Plan. But it is only financially beneficial for workers under the
ages of 40 to 45 to do so because of the long period needed to accumu
late sufficient benefits in a Personal Pension Plan. Non-contracted-out
pensions are the ones that correspond most closely to U.S. private pen
sions.
In Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, defined bene
fit plans are often contributory—workers and employers both contrib
ute to the plan. This creates portability problems not faced in the
United States, where contributory defined benefit plans are rare. In
Japan and the Netherlands almost all plans are defined benefit plans.
Canada and the United Kingdom have some defined contribution
plans, but they are not as common as in the United States. Thus, while
the United States does not have some portability features provided in
other countries, portability features of U.S. defined contribution plans
generally are not found elsewhere.
Table 12.2
Percentage of Males Who Changed Jobs as a Percentage
of All Male Employees by Age, 1987 and 1989

Age range
<25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-59
60-64
65>

1
I

United Kingdom
(1987)
21.6
12.0
7.0
4.0
4.0
2.0
NA

Japan
(1989)
11.0
4.8
2.6
2.0
3.1
1.7

SOURCE: Turner and Dailey (1991).

Most Japanese pension plans are severance pay plans, yielding lump
sum benefits whenever employment ends, whether at retirement age or
earlier. Vested deferred benefits for job leavers are not maintained with
the former employer.
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PORTABILITY POLICIES

The following section focuses on particular portability policies that
have been adopted in other countries, comparing vesting standards,
preretirement indexing, service portability, and lump sum distribution.
Because the Netherlands is the only European country where a new
employer bears liability for a worker's pensionable service with a prior
employer, the manner in which the Dutch handle service portability is
examined in depth.
Vesting Standards

The maximum period for a Dutch, British, or Canadian worker to
vest is less than for an American. In the Netherlands, workers must
vest after participating one year in a plan, though participation may be
restricted until age 25 or later. The United Kingdom requires vesting
after two years of participation, but workers are usually eligible to par
ticipate at age 19 after one year of work. Ontario requires vesting after
two years of tenure in a plan.
Japan is the only one of these countries with no legislated vesting
rules, yet Japanese pension plans provide rapid vesting even without
regulations.4 Less than 15 percent of workers are in plans that require
over two years if separation is initiated by the employer. By contrast,
60 percent of workers are in plans that require over two years if separa
tion is voluntary. Even for long service, the firm pays higher lump
sums if the firm rather than the worker ends the job.
Vesting is immediate in France, but it requires 10 years of service
and age 35, or 12 years of service, in Germany. In Denmark contribu
tions vest, but benefits do not.5
Preretirement Indexing

When a worker changes jobs and the plan indexes deferred benefits
for inflation, the employer pays for much of the portability loss that
otherwise occurs with job change. In the Netherlands, most plans vol
untarily index deferred vested benefits. Also in the Netherlands, if the
plan awards benefit increases or cost-of-living adjustments to its retir
ees, it must grant the same increases to former workers with deferred
pensions.
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British law requires plans to inflation-index deferred vested benefits.
Legislation requires plans to index benefits before retirement for job
leavers, up to 5 percent annually based on increases in retail prices. Ire
land, starting in 1996, will require plans to index deferred vested bene
fits up to 4 percent annually. Because of the caps, these systems
completely index benefits only if inflation is low.6 Plans are not
required to index deferred vested benefits in Canada or the United
States and rarely do so.
Japanese plans do not index deferred vested benefits because job
leavers receive accrued benefits as a lump sum payment at separation.
Japan has considered lifetime employment with one employer as the
most desirable career pattern; thus policymakers have had little con
cern for minimizing portability losses.
Portability of Service

Plans transfer deferred vested benefits in the Netherlands through
five portability clearinghouses called transfer circuits. A plan may par
ticipate in a portability clearinghouse, and most large pension plans do.
The private sector set up clearinghouses in 1987 after the Dutch gov
ernment indicated that it would mandate a solution if the private sector
did not develop a way to eliminate pension benefit losses for job leav
ers.
The clearinghouses require plans to use benefit formulas based on
final average salary and years worked and allow insured and noninsured plans to participate. In 1988, 78 percent of workers (including
government employees) in a pension plan were in a plan belonging to a
portability clearinghouse (Keizer 1991). A job leaver may leave the
vested rights in a former employer's pension plan or use a clearing
house to transfer them to a new employer's plan.
Small pension plans in the Netherlands provide portability in a dif
ferent manner. Most are insured through purchase of individual poli
cies under a group arrangement and may transfer the paid-up policy to
job leavers.
A Dutch worker who leaves a job has a right to a deferred pension in
proportion to his/her service relative to a full career. Before the mid
1980s, the worker only had a right to a deferred pension based on the
paid-up premiums (for an insured plan). The funding methods used
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often made the former sum much less than the pension figured in pro
portion to service.
Key to reducing portability losses through an employer-based sys
tem is deciding who pays for the losses—the former employer or the
new employer. This issue is complicated when plans use different actu
arial assumptions. The interest rate and wage growth rate assumptions
strongly affect the calculated value of pension liabilities. The gap
between these two assumptions is key in figuring whether the old or
new employer pays the extra sum needed to cut the portability loss.
Usually the interest rate assumption is 1 or 2 percentage points
higher than the wage growth rate assumption for figuring liabilities in
an ongoing plan. The more the interest rate assumption exceeds the
wage growth rate assumption the less the sum transferred by the
former employer. With a difference between the two assumptions of 1
or 2 percentage points for figuring a job leaver's liability, the former
employer would pay for the portability loss otherwise occurring. That
pattern of assumptions is equivalent to projecting wages and using a
market interest rate.
In the Netherlands, to figure the sum transferred by the former
employer to the clearinghouse, uniform actuarial assumptions must be
used. These assumptions exclude decrements to pension liabilities
other than mortality (no job turnover assumed) and future salary
increases (a zero wage growth rate assumption), and include a 4 per
cent interest rate for discounting future liabilities. With a 4 percent
interest rate assumption and a zero wage growth assumption, the old
employer transfers more assets than had he/she assumed a market
interest rate, say 7 percent, and a zero wage growth assumption. Future
liabilities are discounted at a lower real rate in the first instance. With
these assumptions, the former employer pays for some future benefits
arising due to the effect on benefits of future wage growth credited to
past service.
When figuring asset transfer value in the Netherlands, however, the
accrued liability's present value derived by using these assumptions is
further cut. It is reduced by a percentage depending on the difference
between the 4 percent interest rate and the interest rate on a portfolio of
government bonds. The cut is not sufficiently large to make the liabil
ity equivalent to that figured using a zero wage growth rate assumption
and a market interest rate.
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These adjustments produce a liability causing the former employer
to pay for part of the effect of future salary increases on the benefit for
the transferred service. The new employer, however, must pay a large
part of the effect of future wage growth on past service.7 The Nether
lands is the only European Community country where the new
employer has a liability for the effect of future wage growth on pen
sionable service with a prior employer. In all other countries, the
worker loses this advantage.
Japan has two portability clearinghouses—one that handles large
plans and one that is dedicated to smaller groups. Until 1989, the clear
inghouse for large plans—run by the government Pension Fund Asso
ciation—only accepted transfers of pensions up to the sum contracted
out of social security. Since 1989, it has accepted the contracted-out
portion of a pension as well as any additional pension benefit. The
clearinghouse for small plans—Smaller Enterprise Retirement Allow
ances Mutual Aid Plans—is used by only 3 percent of eligible job leav
ers.
In the United Kingdom some nationalized British industries operate
"transfer clubs," where uniform actuarial factors determine the accrued
vested benefit to which a worker is entitled. The receiving plan grants
added years of service using the same factors; however, few employers
have taken advantage of these arrangements (Atkins 1991).
A British worker changing jobs may transfer his/her benefit to an
approved individual insurance policy. The benefit value must be fig
ured using a current long-term interest rate. The calculation need not
consider future pay raises, but must consider statutory preretirement
inflation indexing.
One of the more bureaucratically efficient pension portability sys
tems is found in Israel, where most workers are covered under a single
pension plan sponsored by the major labor union. Thus, when workers
change jobs, they lose no benefits because they do not change pension
plans.
Lump Sum Distributions

In contrast to Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom,
workers in Japan normally receive a lump sum payment of accrued
benefits when they change jobs. (Lump sum payment is also the nor-
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mal benefit payment at retirement.) Because Japanese savings rates
have been high, Japanese policymakers have not been concerned that
preretirement distributions would be used for nonretirement purposes.
Their lack of concern contrasts with the concern of U.S. policymakers
that workers save too little for retirement when allowed to spend retire
ment savings.
In Ontario, vested pension benefits cannot be received in a preretire
ment lump sum distribution. They must be locked in and can only be
received as a lifetime annuity paid during retirement.8 The only lump
sum distributions permitted are for disabled persons, pensions below a
stipulated value, and 25 percent of the value of deferred pensions
accrued pre-1987. In cases where benefits are only plan-vested and not
statutorily vested (the plan has more rapid vesting than law requires),
such sums may be refunded if the plan allows. If a worker has contrib
uted to a pension plan but has not worked long enough to vest, the con
tributions plus interest are returned to the worker when he/she changes
jobs.
In Canada, transfers of assets can be made to a Registered Retire
ment Savings Plan (RRSP), which is like an American IRA. The assets
in an RRSP, however, are locked in with no possibility of withdrawal
until retirement age. In theory, assets can be transferred to a new
employer's plan, but most employers will not accept such assets. If the
plan rules specify, the deferred pension's present value can also be
used to purchase a life annuity from an insurance company; however,
the annuity must not begin before the worker is eligible for early retire
ment. A divorced spouse with an order for spousal benefits under the
Family Law Act of 1986 must have the same benefit options as the par
ticipant.
The Netherlands permits preretirement lump sum distributions only
of the worker's contributions before vesting, transfer of funds to
another plan, or emigration.
In the United Kingdom only unvested contributions can be returned
to the participant who is changing jobs; all other benefits are locked
in.9 Thus, after two years in a plan, workers cannot receive preretire
ment distributions. Recent legislation, however, gives job leavers
options for transferring funds. Preretirement distributions may be
moved to another plan, placed in a Personal Pension Plan, or used to
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buy back into the national social security system if the distribution is
from contracted-out contributions.
Funds can also be used to purchase an insurance policy or annuity
contract. Any member of a pension plan—not just job leavers—may
ask for a transfer value or cash equivalent of his/her accrued pension
rights. The plan trustees must arrange for the transfer to a statutory
alternative chosen by the member. Although it may occur anytime, this
transfer usually occurs at job change.
The United Kingdom provides two options for portable individual
retirement savings. First, workers enrolled in private pension plans are
entitled to purchase Free-Standing Additional Voluntary Contributions
from an insurance company, provided the combined benefits to which
they are entitled do not exceed statutory limits for tax exemption.
These contributions allow members of employer-sponsored plans to
increase retirement benefits through individual contributions, similar to
an IRA. Such benefits are portable because, like individual account
plans, they are not tied to an employer. The second option extends Per
sonal Pension Plan eligibility to all employed individuals regardless of
whether they participate in an employer-sponsored plan. Workers cov
ered by a private pension may opt out of that arrangement and set up a
Personal Pension Plan. Instead of preserving a job-leaver's benefit
rights within the plan, a British worker may use the accrued rights to
purchase an annuity. A plan used for contracting-out may pay a pre
mium to government to repurchase in social security pension rights
that would have replaced social security benefits.
Some British plans reject asset transfers or only accept transfers for
workers below a set age. This occurs when the employer would be
forced to subsidize prior service in a salary-related plan. Some plans
guarantee to index pension rights in line with earnings. If the member
suffers a pay cut in a new job, he/she may opt to retain rights in a prior
plan.
The United Kingdom offers job leavers many pension options
because British Conservative political philosophy highly values indi
vidual choice. With the range of options, however, individuals may
"game the system," seeking the arrangement most favorable to their
circumstances. The more options available, the more serious is this
problem of adverse selection, with workers of like attributes bunching
into the pension types most favorable to their life expectancy or
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income. Current U.K. pension law has been fully in place for only a
few years, and more time is needed to evaluate whether so many
choices will create funding problems for any plans due to adverse
selection in plan choice.

CONCLUSIONS

The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Canada have done more
than the United States to cut portability losses. These countries require
short vesting periods and stringently restrict lump sum distributions.
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom index vested benefits for
most early leavers.
Japan and the United States are the only countries in this group
allowing virtually unrestricted lump sum distributions at job change. In
the other countries, retirement benefits are preserved by requiring
workers to use one or more options: retain benefits with the prior
employer, transfer vested benefits to the new employer, or transfer ben
efits to a portability vehicle like an IRA, where the benefits lock in
until retirement.
What lessons can be learned from countries with more pension port
ability than the United States? Many American and Canadian observ
ers suggest that the cost of indexing benefits for early leavers (people
with deferred vested benefits) would greatly reduce pension plan
growth. Though it has not been rigorously analyzed, the experience in
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom appears to reject that posi
tion.
NOTES
1. This chapter draws heavily on material presented m Turner and Dailey (1991), and espe
cially Andrews (1991). For further information about private pension systems in other countries,
refer to Turner and Dailey (1991).
2. For example, this chapter does not discuss the issues of pension portability across national
borders, which European pension policy analysts are currently discussing because of the creation
of a single European labor market (see Jolliffe 1990).
3. This chapter compares the countries feature by feature. For an explanation of portability on
a country-by-country basis, see Turner and Dailey (1991).
4. For a discussion of portability in Japan, see Murakami (1991).
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5. Vesting is not required in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Belgium (for
self-administered plans) (Jolliffe 1990).
6. In the United Kingdom, the statutory requirement to revalue vested benefit rights originally
existed only for benefit rights accruing since January 1, 1985. Under the Social Security Act of
1990, the requirement now applies to all accrued benefits.
7. An additional technical calculation must then be made to determine the number of years of
service credited under the new plan. For example, assume that two plans have identical benefit
structures, except that the gaining plan provides a benefit at age 60 of 1.5 percent of final pay for
each year of service while the losing plan only provides a benefit at age 65 of 1.25 percent of final
pay. The 40-year-old member with 10 years of service was making $40,000 a year at termination
with the first employer and started with the second employer at $45,000 a year. The 10 years of
service would be shortened (to 4.82 years) for purposes of calculating benefits in the new plan
because the new benefit accrual rate and salary base are both greater. Both the old and the new
employers are responsible for funding any actuarial loss generated in their own plans by the port
ability transfer.
8. For a discussion of portability in Canada see Conklin (1991).
9. This discussion of portability in the United Kingdom is drawn largely from Birmingham
(1991).

13
Conclusions
Tradeoffs and Options
Any changes in portability policy will be made after balancing com
peting interests. Policies that help one group or further some of their
goals may hurt another group or detract from their goals. Direct and
indirect costs diminish the extent goals are achieved or interest groups
are helped. Workers and firms may undo mandated changes in income
flows by changing compensation outside the pension plan.
Before making decisions, policymakers must clarify priorities
among goals and between groups. This book provides no answers
about priorities, which are ultimately political decisions, but clarifies
many of the conflicts and tradeoffs. This final chapter summarizes con
flicting interests that should be considered in making portability policy
and offers a selective list of policies that will reduce portability losses.
For several reasons, portability policies that rely on a job leaver
finding another job with a pension will not work well in the United
States. Econometric evidence indicates that although firms offering
pensions employ older workers, they are less likely to hire older work
ers. This finding is supported by statistics showing that many workers,
especially women, who had a pension on a previous job did not have
one on their current job.
Econometric studies suggest that making pensions portable will
have only a small effect on job mobility in the United States. Pensions
alone do not inhibit mobility much. Pension-covered workers are less
likely to change jobs than noncovered workers for a number of rea
sons: (1) people covered by pensions are less likely to be laid off; (2)
jobs offering pensions tend to select workers who are less likely to
change jobs; (3) jobs offering pensions tend to pay a high enough wage
to discourage job change; and (4) other aspects of compensation, such
as retiree health benefits, also discourage job change.
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TRADEOFFS AMONG WORKERS

Many portability options raise benefits for short-tenure workers.
The net increase in wealth for these workers and the presumed
decrease in wealth for long-tenure workers depends, however, on
whether workers pay for pension reform with reduced wages. If that is
the case, then gains or losses in wealth due to pension reform will be
offset by changes in wages. The wage-pension tradeoff, however,
probably results in an imperfect adjustment of compensation costs
because it is not possible to perfectly determine in advance who will be
a short-tenure worker.
The interests of women, who traditionally have had more job mobil
ity than men, may be favored by portability policy. But mobility statis
tics comparing full-time male and female workers overstate the
difference because women covered by a pension have job mobility that
more closely resembles job mobility of men. Portability policy will
raise labor market efficiency for some workers by lowering the cost of
changing jobs, but may reduce labor market efficiency for others by
discouraging long tenure and investment in job skills. The balance
between these two groups will vary depending upon factors such as
import competition and technological changes that affect the stability
of employment in the economy.

TRADEOFFS BETWEEN WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS

If portability policy reduces employer willingness to offer a pension
plan or causes employers to offer defined contribution plans when
workers would rather have defined benefit plans, employees may be
hurt. Because portability policy would reduce income gains from job
stability, firms would use defined benefit pension plans less frequently
for retaining and rewarding long-service workers. Firms needing
highly trained and stable workforces may be hurt relative to firms
where high labor turnover has little effect on the firm's costs.
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TRADEOFFS BETWEEN GOALS

In government budgeting, portability policies that cost the treasury
tax revenue must compete with other possible cash expenditures and
tax expenditures of government funds. More fundamentally, the goals
of labor market efficiency, retirement income adequacy, greater
national savings, governmental nonintervention, and tax equity may
conflict Pension portability may raise retirement income while reduc
ing efficiency for some firms where long worker tenure is needed
because of the lengthy worker training required. The goal of greater
national savings could possibly be achieved via unrestricted IRAs.
That goal, however, may conflict with tax equity if the tax benefits go
largely to high income workers.
With the possible negative and positive effects of portability policy,
along with little evidence on the relative importance of various trade
offs, it could be argued by a self-interested party that any major policy
would be "the straw that broke the back of defined benefit plans." In
this regard, foreign experience provides a good idea of the range of
feasible policies and suggests that the United States could do a lot
more to reduce the pension benefit losses of job changers.
The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent, Can
ada have all gone further than the United States in reducing the porta
bility losses suffered by a mobile workforce. All three countries have
virtually ended preretirement lump sum distributions. The United
Kingdom and the Netherlands have indexed benefits for deferred
vested (early) job leavers. Of less importance, all three offer more
rapid vesting than the United States. Japan, however, reflecting the
view of the productivity- raising effect of a lifetime commitment to
one job, has done much less than the United States to reduce pension
benefit loss due to job change.
Policy Options

A wide range of feasible options could reduce the loss of pension
benefits due to job change. The following is a selective list.
1. Prohibit plans that grant lower percentage cost-of-living adjust
ments for retirees with less service or who end employment prior to
retirement.
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2. Prohibit plans from requiring a later age for initial benefit receipt
for workers ending employment prior to retirement
3. In defined contribution plans, prohibit contribution rates that rise
with service, age, or earnings.
4. In defined contribution plans, prohibit the distribution of forfeited
account balances to remaining participants based on account balances.
Instead, require that the distribution be based on annual contributions
or earnings.
5. In defined benefit plans, prohibit plans from having formulas with
higher accrual rates at higher years worked or older ages.
6. Reduce to four the years required for vesting for both multiemployer and single-employer plans.
7. Require that preretirement lump sum distributions from defined
benefit plans be calculated using a real interest rate, such as 3 percent.
8. Prohibit preretirement lump sum distributions except at job
change for small sums or for financial hardship. Alternatively, require
that all sums withdrawn from a pension before retirement be rolled
over into an IRA. These restrictions could be limited to workers age 30
to 59.
9. Require inflation indexing up to 4 percent annually of wages used
to figure benefits for early leavers in final-pay plans. Alternatively,
require such indexing only for early leavers who have worked 10 or
more years for the employer.
10. Require flat-benefit plans and career-average plans to upgrade
benefits for early leavers using the same formula that they use for cur
rent workers.
11. Require firms to provide extra years of credit in defined benefit
plans and extra contributions in defined contribution plans for laid-off
workers.
12. Amend the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act so that displaced
workers are compensated for lost pension benefits as well as lost
wages.
American workers using the political system have increasingly
required firms to provide pension benefits that are unreduced by job
change. That trend is likely to continue. This book has shown that
many policy options could be chosen to further protect pension bene
fits from losses that occur when workers change jobs.
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